The Political Economy of Campaign Spending and Checks and Balances by Koh, Ernest Seng Yoong
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND
CHECKS AND BALANCES
Ernest Seng Yoong Koh
Doctor of Philosophy, 2017
Dissertation directed by: Professor Ethan D. Kaplan
Department of Economics
This dissertation studies the role of money on election outcomes and the welfare
impacts of the system of checks and balances in the context of United States.
The rst two chapters investigate the impact of campaign spending by their pur-
pose on candidate vote shares. In Chapter 1, I rst document the spending compo-
sition of U.S. House of Representative candidates. I use transaction level data from
2004 to 2016 to develop 5 alternative spending measures that are distinct in their
purpose. I nd that incumbents allocate a large portion of their budget towards ad-
vertising spending and less on fundraising and indirect expenditures (such as transfers
and donations) as the race becomes increasingly tight. Challengers are found to spend
at least a quarter of their budget on political advertising and almost never engages in
indirect spending. I also document spending patterns by geographical location and
incumbent seniority.
In Chapter 2, I use data on spending measures developed in Chapter 1 to em-
pirically estimate the eects of disaggregated spending on incumbent's vote share. I
nd that the incumbent's vote share increases in the incumbent's share of fundrais-
ing, advertising, campaign events (such as rallies and canvassing eorts), and indirect
spending. I also investigate the dierential impact of each type of spending by elec-
toral and candidate characteristics.
Chapter 3 studies the costs and benets to voter expected welfare of having the
system of Checks and Balances (CBs). I develop a theoretical framework where
government ocials dier in their ideologies and their policy preferences are not
known to the voters. I found that only extreme voters will ever be hurt by CBs. This
occurs whenever the preferred policy of the checker who holds veto rights, is closer
to the status quo than to the ideal policy of the proposer, who holds bill proposal
rights. I also found that an increase in uncertainty in the checker's political stand
may exacerbate the detrimental eects of CBs. On the other hand, uncertainty on
the proposer's preferences enhances the benets of CBs by increasing policy stability.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND
CHECKS AND BALANCES
by
Ernest Seng Yoong Koh
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulllment




Professor Ethan D. Kaplan, Chair
Professor Allan Drazen
Professor Michael J. Hanmer
Professor Peter Murrell
Professor John J. Wallis
© Copyright by
Ernest Seng Yoong Koh
2017
Dedication
To my parents and Rachel
ii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to my advisor, Ethan Kaplan for
his help and support. I am grateful for your patience and encouraging words at all
stages of my graduate studies. I would also like to thank Allan Drazen for his valuable
inputs in all aspects of my research. Your constructive criticisms and guidance forced
me to think harder about my ideas, which beneted me tremendously. A further
thank you to you both for generously taking time out of your packed schedule to
organize the biweekly Political Economy research group, which was very helpful to
me.
A special thank you goes out to John Wallis, who gave me critical feedback and
suggestions in the later parts of my research which helped gave structure to this
dissertation. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Peter Murrell for attending
my brown bag presentation and for providing me with valuable comments on the rst
two chapters of my dissertation. I would like to thank Michael Hanmer for agreeing
to serve on my dissertation committee.
Many thanks to John Shea, who is an exceptional director of graduate studies,
and who gave me helpful career advise and for providing many research and teaching
opportunities during my time here at the University of Maryland. I would also like to
thank many departmental stas, especially Vickie Fletcher, Terry Davis, and Mark
Wilkerson who all did outstanding work in each of their respective roles, which allowed
me to focus wholeheartedly on my research.
From the Masters in Applied Economics program, John Straub provided me with
the rare opportunity to be the teaching assistant of the program, of which I truly
appreciate. To Stephanie Bergwall, who often cheered me up during the day and
who would always bring a smile with her to work, thank you for being a wonderful
colleague and a friend.
I would also like to thank all seminar participants at the University of Maryland
iii
for helpful suggestions.
Finally, to all my peers, especially Jake Blackwood, Joonkyu Choi, Pavel Coron-
ado, Prateik Dalmia, Sai Luo, Yongjoon Park, Svetlana Pivovarova, Cristian Sanchez




List of Tables viii
List of Figures x
1 A Documentary of Candidate Spending Composition in the U.S. House of
Representative Elections 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 What does Total Spending Capture? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Spending Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.2 Algorithm for Imputing Missing Categories . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Spending Measures and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Congressional Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.2 Electoral Closeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.3 Incumbent Seniority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6.1 Cross Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6.2 χ2 Statistics - Further Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Disaggregated Campaign Spending Eects  Evidence from the U.S. House
of Representative Elections 41
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
v
2.3 Empirical Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.1 Challenges to Identication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.2 Comparison of Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.1 Incumbent and Challenger Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.2 Incumbent's Spending Share in Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.3 Breaking Down the Eects by Spending Components . . . . . 59
2.4.4 Party Eects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.5 Candidate Expenditure Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.6 Closeness of Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4.7 Redistricting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Repeated Incumbent and Challenger Races . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.1 Incumbent and Challenger Spending Eects . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5.2 Incumbent Spending Share Eects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5.3 A Note On Levitt (1994)'s Implementation Strategy . . . . . 72
2.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6.1 Cook Political Ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6.2 General and Primary Election Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3 Ideology, Uncertainty, and Checks and Balances 97
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.2 Literature Review and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2.1 Checks and Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2.2 Veto Players and Gridlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3.1 Checks and Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3.2 Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
vi
3.3.3 Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.4 Timeline of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.3.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.4 One-sided Variation on Checker's Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.1 No Checks and Balances (V =0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.2 Checks and Balances (V = 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.4.3 Checks and Balances (V =1) with Complete Information . . . 112
3.4.4 Checks and Balances (V =1) with One-sided Uncertainty on
Checker's Bliss Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4.5 Disentangling the Eects of Uncertainty and Veto Power on
Voter Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.5 One-Sided Variation on Proposer's Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5.1 No Checks and Balances (V =0) with Asymmetric Information
on Proposer's Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5.2 Checks and Balances (V =1) with Complete Information . . . 125
3.5.3 Checks and Balances (V =1) with One-Sided Uncertainty on
Proposer's Bliss Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.6 Conclusion and Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.7 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.7.1 One-Sided Uncertainty on Checker's Platform . . . . . . . . . 135




1.1 Spending Categories and Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.2 Top Words for Each Category by Predictive Power . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3 Examples of Spending Weights Imputed by Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4 Spending Measures and Their Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.5 Summary Statistics for Spending Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Summary Statistics for Spending Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.7 Mean Spending by Incumbent Vote Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.8 Mean Spending by Incumbent Seniority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.9 Contingency Matrix for χ2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1 Total Spending Eects on Incumbent Vote Share . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.2 Spending Eects on Incumbent Vote Share for Various Measures . . . 83
2.3 Spending Eects Broken Down Into Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4 Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share, by Measure . . . 85
2.5 The Eects of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Shares with Admin-
istrative Spending Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.6 Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share Broken Down into
Spending Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.7 Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share by Political Party 88
2.8 Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share by Spending Level 89
2.9 Eect of Incumbent Spending Shares, by Closeness . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.10 Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share: Redistricting . . 91
2.11 Repeated Challengers - Eect of Incumbent and Challenger Spending 92
2.12 Repeated Challengers - Eect of Incumbent Spending Share . . . . . 93
2.13 Cook Political Ratings - Eect of Incumbent and Challenger Spending 94
2.14 Cook Political Ratings - Eect of Incumbent Spending Share . . . . . 95
viii
2.15 Eect of Incumbent and Challenger Spending: General and Primary
Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.1 Equilibrium policies under one-sided variation on checker's bliss point
τ̃ c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.2 Equilibrium policies under one-sided variation on proposer's bliss point
τ̃ p. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.3 Equilibrium Policies under Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.4 Ideology of indierent voters τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l when S ∈ [−α, 0] . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.5 Ideology of indierent voters τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l when S ∈ [−α, 0] . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.6 Ideology of indierent voters τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l when S ∈ [−2α,−α] . . . . . . . . 170
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Percentage of Missing Categories by Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 Mean Total Spending by District: 2004-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3 Mean Advertising Spending by District: 2004-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 Mean Total Spending by District: 2012-2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5 Mean Advertising Spending by District: 2012-2016 . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Candidate Spending Composition by Electoral Closeness . . . . . . . 32
1.7 10-Fold Cross Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.8 Illustration of Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Party Committee Contributions to Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.2 Level vs Relative Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3 Predicted Vote Share by Incumbent's Spending Share for All Measures 81
3.1 Presidential Vetoes of Non-Private Bills for 1945-2008 . . . . . . . . . 161
3.2 Distribution of Party Members' Bliss Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.3 Equilibrium policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.4 Expected welfare comparison between V =0 and V =1 under one-sided
uncertainty on checker's bliss point, when S is center-left (−α ≤ S ≤ 0) 163
3.5 Methodology on disentangling the eects of uncertainty and veto power
on voter welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.6 Expected welfare comparison between V =0 and V =1 under one-sided
uncertainty on proposer's bliss point, when S is center-left (−α ≤ S ≤ 0)164
x
CHAPTER 1 A Documentary of Candidate Spending Com-
position in the U.S. House of Representative
Elections
There are two things that are important in politics. The rst is
money and I can't remember what the second one is."
 Mark Hanna, 1895
1.1 Introduction
One of the functions of elections is to serve as a formal platform for voters to se-
lect leaders who will shape the nation's institutions and policies. Since voter welfare
depends on the identity of the elected politician, it is of utmost importance to un-
derstand the factors that inuence an election outcome. One such aspect that has
received wide attention over the past 50 years is campaign nance.1 Billions of dollars
have been poured into recent elections by candidates in hope of getting elected. If
campaign money do indeed inuence the public's voting decisions, then the impact of
candidate spending in election becomes a question of great importance, and a thor-
ough understanding of its implications can provide valuable insights that could assist
in the design of campaign spending regulations.
Previous studies on campaign spending have so far been unsatisfactory in provid-
ing conclusive evidence on the role of candidates' expenditure on election outcomes,
especially for incumbents. While many have found that spending by the closest chal-
lenger increases the challenger's own vote share (or similarly, decreases the vote share
of the incumbent), there is little consensus on the eect of incumbent's spending
on votes. A large portion of the literature has found small or even negative impact
1For a brief review of the campaign spending literature, see Stratmann (2005).
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of incumbent's spending (e.g. Abramowitz (1991); Jacobson (1978); Levitt (1994)).
There is also a host of articles that found positive and signicant eect of incum-
bent's spending upon votes (e.g. Gerber (1998); Green and Krasno (1988); Erikson
and Palfrey (2000)). These studies all seek to answer the same question, but dier in
their empirical strategies used to estimate the causal eect.
A common feature of the papers mentioned above is the use of an aggregate mea-
sure of campaign spending (henceforth total spending). To the extent that dierent
types of spending yields dierent amount of votes, focusing on total spending alone
does not allow us to tease out the heterogeneous eects of spending on election out-
comes by their purpose. Unfortunately, there are only a few studies that address this
problem from a disaggregated perspective, mainly due to data constraints. To the
best of my knowledge, only two papers do this. Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994) rst
identied the issue that total spending can contain components that are irrelevant to
one's campaign. However, they only managed to collect detailed spending data from
the 1990 U.S. House elections. Due to their small sample size, they lack the statistical
power to estimate the spending eects by types. Moreover, they use only Ordinary
Least Squares regressions and do not address endogeneity bias. Schuster (2015) uses
the variation in advertising and campaign events spending (e.g. campaign rallies,
speeches, get-out-the-vote eorts etc.) to identify the eect of spending on voter's
self reported voting behavior, taken from the American National Election Studies
(ANES) survey. He found a positive eect of spending on voter persuasion. However,
there are concerns that shroud the use of survey data and the adopted empirical
strategy, which are further discussed in Section 2.2.
To follow up on previous work done in this front, my research answers three im-
portant questions. First, how do candidates spend their money in election? Second,
what are the components of spending that are crucial in inuencing an election out-
come? Third, how do these types of spending dierentially impact a candidate's vote
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share by electoral and candidate characteristics? These questions are answered in
the rst two chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 1 addresses the rst question by
documenting spending patterns of the top two candidates in each congressional dis-
trict in the U.S. House of Representatives elections. I also document compositional
changes in spending along several dimensions, such as across congressional district,
electoral closeness, and incumbent seniority dened as the number of years in oce.
Chapter 2 relates to the second and third questions by presenting empirical results
and relating them back to the literature. Together, the rst two chapters shed light
on the dierential impact of the types of spending that drives electoral outcomes.
In this chapter, I document the spending patterns of U.S. House candidates by
using transaction level data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The de-
tailed disbursement les are available from 2004 onward.2 Each entry contains a
short spending description and supposedly, with a category number ranging from 1
to 12 associated to it. Table 1.1 contains the full list of spending categories and
their descriptions. However, approximately 60% of a total of 3 million transactions
are missing a category number. I develop a text analysis algorithm to impute the
missing categories for these entries. Details on the algorithm are laid out in Section
1.3.2. I then develop 4 alternative measures of campaign spending: 1) Direct spend-
ing  total spending excluding indirect expenditures such as contribution refunds,
fund transfers, loan repayments and donations. 2) No administrative spending 
which further eliminates administrative expenses, in fear that this category acts as a
default placeholder for spending entries that are hard to classify, 3) Communication
spending  which consists of advertising, campaign materials and campaign events
spending (such as get-out-the-vote eorts), that are types of spending that involve
direct voter contact, and nally, 4) Advertising spending. I also group the comple-
mentary components to direct spending and term it indirect spending. This consists
2At the time of writing, candidate spending data is only available up to the 2016 election.
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of money that are not spent on a candidate's own campaign.
Using these measures of spending, I document the spending composition of candi-
dates based on their incumbency status. In particular, I nd that a House incumbent
outspends a challenger 3:1 on average when spending is measured at the aggregate
level, i.e. total spending. However, this ratio decreases to 2:1 as we focus on ner
measures such as communication and advertising spending, which are arguably better
representations of actual spending by candidates. Further, I nd that a large portion
of this discrepancy is due to high levels of indirect spending by incumbents, or money
that is used for other purposes than the candidate's own campaign, such as fund
transfers from one committee to another, contribution refunds, and donations.
I also investigate spending patterns of candidates by electoral and candidate char-
acteristics. In particular, I examine candidate spending across congressional districts,
electoral closeness, and incumbent seniority. First, I nd that incumbent and chal-
lenger spending have a strong positive correlation. In districts where incumbent's
spending is high, chances are that the challenger's spending is also high. This is true
for all spending measures. However, the level of spending appears to be more ho-
mogeneous across districts within the same state when we focus on a ner spending
measure, such as advertising spending. This is especially true for incumbents. I also
nd that several partisan states, such as California and Texas have many districts
where spending levels are low for both incumbents and challengers. This suggests
that incumbency advantage might be higher in these regions compared to other dis-
tricts in the country. Candidates from the opposition party might also be discouraged
from running against the incumbent since these states are well known to be estab-
lished regions and powerhouses for their respective party. However, spending levels in
these districts are higher in recent years (2012 to 2016) compared to the past decade
(2004 to 2010) for both incumbents and challengers, which suggests a higher degree
of political competitiveness in these areas.
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Next, I look at how candidates' spending composition changes with electoral close-
ness, as proxied by ex-post incumbent vote share. I nd that incumbents on average
allocate a larger portion of their total budget on advertising expenditures, and less on
fundraising and indirect spending as his vote share decreases (or similarly, the race
gets closer). On the other hand, challengers highly prioritize advertising spending,
which takes up at least 25% of their entire budget and almost never engage in indirect
spending at all levels of closeness in a race.
Finally, I study the change in candidate spending by incumbent seniority. Se-
niority is dened in terms of the number of years the incumbent has held oce. I
nd that a Freshman incumbent, or an incumbent who is up for reelection for the
very rst time, spends about 50% more in total spending, and twice the amount of
advertising spending than a senior incumbent, or an incumbent who has held oce
for at least 3 terms. This makes sense as new incumbents have to convey information
about their political stance to the voters whereas the constituents are more likely to
be well informed on the competency and platforms of experienced incumbents. As a
consequence, we also observe an average challenger spends signicantly more when
they face a young incumbent compared to when they are up against senior incum-
bents since they stand a much better chance in winning the election in the former
scenario.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the components that are
contained within total spending and motivates the need to focus on disaggregated
measures of spending. Section 1.3 describes the data, sources, problems, as well as
the text analysis algorithm used to impute missing spending category numbers. Sec-
tion 1.4 presents summary statistics of House candidates' spending for years 2004 to
2016, and further breaks it down by electoral and candidate characteristics, starting
with geographical regions, followed by electoral closeness, and nally incumbent se-
niority. Section 1.5 provides a brief summary of the results and Section 1.6 houses
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the Appendix which contains additional details on the algorithm.
1.2 What does Total Spending Capture?
Total spending is an aggregate measure of candidate expenditures reported by the
Federal Election Commission. It is presented in the candidates' summary pages and
is the measure that is most widely used in the literature. There are a total of 12
types of expenditures that make up the total spending numbers. These components
are developed by FEC and are listed on their website as well as in the report ling
instructions for candidate committees. The full list of categories and their detailed
descriptions are presented in Table 1.1. The types of spending that make up total
spending are vastly dierent in nature. On the one hand, we have money that is
spent directly by the candidate such as administrative, traveling, fundraising, adver-
tising spending etc. On the other hand we have money that are not spent directly on
one's own campaign, such as fund transfers from one political committee to another
(within and between candidates), contribution refunds, loan repayments, and dona-
tions. Some of these categories, especially in the latter group, are questionable as to
whether they should be reective of how much a candidate spends in an election.
Putting the issue of denition aside, a more fundamental concern regarding total
spending is that it does not capture the essence of spending behavior. For exam-
ple, Joseph Crowley and Michael Arcuri, are reported to have spent $1.73 million
and $1.62 million in total spending in the 2008 House elections respectively. Both
politicians are incumbents from the state of New York, where Mr Crowley was the
representative of the 7th district while Mr Arcuri was the representative of the 24th
district. Their spending amounts look quite similar at face value. However, this
simple comparison completely hides the fact that there are large dierences in the
spending amounts of several categories. For starters, Mr Arcuri faced a much closer
election than Mr Crowley, where the former obtained 52% while the latter obtained
6
84.7% of the total votes.3 In terms of spending, Mr Arcuri spent a staggering $850,000
on political advertising while Mr Crowley spent only $60,000 in this category. For
fundraising expenditures, Mr Arcuri spent about $180,000 while Mr Crowley spent
an amount close to $450,000. For transfers and donations, these numbers are $30,000
and $510,000 respectively for Mr Arcuri and Mr Crowley. These are just several
examples of the variation in spending composition between any two candidates that
seemingly spend the same amount of money in terms of total expenditure. To the
extent that the heterogeneity in spending composition generates dierent electoral
outcomes, any study that examines the relationship between campaign spending and
votes ought to incorporate these dierences in their methodology.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Spending Data
Candidates running for oce are required to establish a principal campaign commit-
tee, who will be responsible for reporting the candidate's spending to the Federal
Election Commission (FEC). Both transaction level and aggregate level data are
publicly available and can be downloaded from the FEC website.4 As mentioned pre-
viously, the aggregated (total) spending gure is the historical measure of campaign
spending. The disaggregated (transaction level) data breaks each candidate's total
spending into one of the twelve spending categories listed in Table 1.1.
There are two main sources on the FEC website from which I draw my spend-
ing data from. The rst source is a candidate summary webpage that reports, on
a less granular level, the in-ow and out-ow of cash. This is where I obtain can-
didate spending data on transfers, loan repayments, contribution refunds, political
3Vote percentages obtained from
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/elections/2008/General/USCongress08.pdf
4The data sets are updated daily by FEC. Hence, spending les downloaded in the future might
not be identical to the data set used in this study. The discrepancies might stem from report
amendments, late ling, and manual corrections.
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contributions and donations (categories 8 through 12). The second data source is the
operating expenditure database which houses transactions for categories 1 through 7,
i.e. administrative through campaign events expenditures. There are a total of about
3 million transactions made by the top two candidates in each House election from
2004 to 2016.56
A major drawback to the data is that approximately 1.8 million entries (about
60% of all transactions) are not assigned a category number. Since my goal is to
compute the amount of spending in each category for each candidate, removing these
many entries will undoubtedly raise concerns of systematic sample selection bias. To
get a better understanding on how this can become a problem, Figure 1.1 shows the
distribution of the percentage of spending entries that have missing category numbers
by candidates. The shape of the histogram indicates that this issue is candidate
specic, as most of the candidates either fully characterize their transactions or they
do not. Among the pool of candidates who did not classify more than 90% of their
entries, they are more likely to be incumbents (67%), Democrats (57%), and winners
(72%). They are also higher spenders on average (at $1.3 million in total spending)
compared to candidates who did not classify less than 10% of their entries (at $0.9
million in total spending). Since this omission in category assignments is by no means
random, the sample will be heavily tilted towards challengers, Republicans, losers, and
lower spenders if we simply remove the transactions with missing category numbers
from the sample.
Fortunately, a short spending description is available for each transaction. Hence,
I develop a text analysis algorithm which is similar in spirit to Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010) to impute the missing category numbers using the reported description. The
5The number of transactions are tallied after I eliminate memo entries which appears twice in
the data set. For example, a payment of a credit card payment is counted as a memo entry and the
individual transactions in the statement will also appear as a non-memo entry. Thus to prevent
double-counting, the memo entries are thrown out from the data set.
6The exact number of transactions could possibly dier over time due to daily updates to the
spending data, as mentioned previously.
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algorithm is described in the next section.
1.3.2 Algorithm for Imputing Missing Categories
The goal of this algorithm is to search for and identify words that are highly predictive
of a spending category. For example, an entry with TV Advertising as its descrip-
tion should clearly be predicted as advertising expenditure. Sta Salary should be
predicted to belong to the Administrative/Salary/Overhead category and so on.
Since the methodology that I use in this paper is most similar to Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2010), a brief background on their work is warranted. In a broad sense,
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) is concerned about measuring political slant of U.S.
newspapers. To do this, they used text from the 2005 Congressional Records to
identify phrases that are used most frequently by a Democratic or a Republican
legislator. Examples of words or phrases used mostly by Democrats include tax
breaks, trade decit, minimum wage, and workers right. On the other hand,
Republicans mainly use phrases such as tax relief, war on terror, illegal aliens, and
death tax. Next, they used the list of partisan words to map phrases into ideology,
and nally to predict the language slant in newspapers. My algorithm employs a
similar idea in that it attempts to identify keywords that are predictive of a spending
category. The algorithm diers from theirs in that I am imputing continuous weights
for each category, instead of binary weights. Using a cross validation test, I am able
to provide a relative ranking of the performance of my algorithm to other variants of
it through the means of minimizing the mean squared error. The explanation of this
test is provided in Appendix Section 1.6.1.
Next, I introduce the algorithm used to impute the missing category values. Let
Ω be the set of all spending entries and let ΩC be the partition of Ω that contains
all transactions with an assigned category number. Further, let ΩN be the subset of
Ω that contains only spending entries without a preassigned category or an assigned
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category number that is not 1-12.7
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Porter stem and removal of connector words
I reduce each word in the spending description to its linguistic root so that similar
words such as advertising, advertise, advertised, etc. are treated as the same word.8
This reduces both the number of unique words in Ω and also increases the precision
of the algorithm.
I also remove all stop words or connector words such as and, the, it etc. that
conveys no actual meaning and are only used as conjunctions. The list of stop words
is taken from http://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/stopwords1.html.
Step 2: Learning phase on ΩC
A word-category pair wc in ΩC is dened as a word w that is contained within
the spending description of a transaction which is associated to a specic spending
category. For example, an entry with spending description TV advertising that
is classied as category 4 has two unique wc pairsTV-4 and advertising-4. Note
that a word need not necessarily be assigned to only one category. In fact, we have an
abundance of words that get assigned to multiple categories, such as food which is
commonly associated with traveling, fundraising, and campaign event expenditures.
Let Λ denote the set of all wc pairs in ΩC .
For each wc pair in Λ, dene fwc to be the number of times word w gets assigned
to category c in all spending entries of ΩC , i.e. the frequency that wc appears in ΩC .
Similarly, let fwc′ be the frequency that word w gets assigned to categories other than
7Occasionally, I observe several invalid category numbers (not within the range of 1 to 12). I treat
these entries as having a missing category number and impute the weights using the text analysis
algorithm.
8The Porter Stemming algorithm that I use is the porter2 function contained in the stemming
1.0.1 Python package. This diers from the original stemming algorithm written by Martin Porter
(1980) in that it is more accurate by reducing a larger amount of similar words to the common base
word. The tradeo for this eciency is code time.
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c in ΩC . fw′c and fw′c′ are dened analogously. I perform a number of ltering steps
before arriving at the nal list of words that are predictive of a category. First, I
throw out any wc pair that appears less than 100 times in ΩC to eliminate spelling
or assignment errors. Second, following Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), I compute the
χ2 statistic for each of the remaining wc pairs which measures the strength of the
relationship between the word w and category c. The statistic is given as follows:
χ2wc =
(fwcfw′c′ − fw′cfwc′)2(fwc + fwc′ + fw′c + fw′c′)
(fwc + fwc′)(fwc + fw′c)(fw′c + fw′c′)(fwc′ + fw′c′)
(1)
I then gather all wc pairs if their χ2 value is above 3.841, which corresponds to
a 95% condence level with 1 degree of freedom.9 This restriction is put in place
such that I retain only words that have high predictive power of a category. Third,
I eliminate a wc pair if the inner expression of the quadratic term in the numerator
fwcfw′c′ − fw′cfwc′ is negative. This ensures that the nal list contains only words
that positively predicts a category. The details of this ltering step is described in
Appendix Section 1.6.2.
This nal list, denoted as ΛF , contains 808 unique wc pairs. Note that a word
might still be predictive of more than one category after surviving the ltering criteria.
For example, website is used in administrative spending since it involves building
and maintenance of the ocial candidate website. It is also used as advertising
spending to mean online or internet advertising. In these cases, the weights are split
by their relative frequencies in each of these categories.
Table 1.2 presents the top 5 words for each category sorted in descending order by
the their predictive power based on the χ2 statistic. Words such as salary, payroll,
phone, oce and tax are all unambiguously indicative of the transaction being
spent on the administrative side of the campaign. Advertise, radio, media, TV
9There are only 2 categories for each wc pair the category of interest c, and the complement of
the category c′. This implies a degree of freedom of 1.
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and buy are also highly connected to the activity of political advertising.
Step 3: Imputing missing categories in ΩN
I compute the spending weights of each category for each transaction in ΩN using
the elements in ΛF . For each transaction in ΩN , the weight assigned to category








where n denotes the number of words in the spending description. In other words, the
weighting scheme given by Equation (2) is determined by how frequent the words in
the spending description gets assigned to category c in ΛF compared to how frequent
the same words appear in ΛF . In the case where fw,c is 0 for all w and c, the entry
is eliminated from the sample. This could occur if each word in the description does
not have the statistical power to predict a category (hence, not in ΛF ), or that all
words are foreign to the learning set ΩC (new vocabulary or spelling errors). There
are approximately 15,000 such observations, which accounts for only less than 1%
of the total number of observations in the sample and less than 0.6% of the total
spending amount within all entries that have missing category numbers. Finally, the
imputed spending amount for category c is given by $X ∗ δC , where X is the amount
of spending for that transaction.
Appendix 1.6.3 contains a simple example that illustrates how the algorithm is
carried out in practice.
Discussion: To get a better understanding of the credibility of the algorithm, I
present several examples of the actual output (category weights) produced by the
algorithm. These examples are given in Table 1.3. Bear in mind that these examples
are by no means an exhaustive representation of the full sample. They are only used
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to gain a sense on how well the algorithm performs.
The examples in Table 1.3 are split into 3 panels. Panel A provides 5 examples of
spending entries where the algorithm assigns full weight or close to full weight (above
90%) to a single category. These are examples where there should be no ambiguity in
the type of spending. For example, Airline Ticket is associated to travel spending,
while Oce Alarm Service, Payroll Taxes and Withholdings, and Web/Internet
Services are all part of a campaign's overhead expenses. Panel B shows examples for
which the algorithm assigns a more evenly distributed weights to several categories.
These items can be thought of entries that are ambiguous in their purpose and the
inference of the correct spending category from the description alone can be dicult.
For example, Food for Volunteers does not explicitly mention the exact purpose for
the volunteers. They could be volunteers for fundraising events, campaign rallies, or
canvassing activities. Similarly, Meeting Expense is also ambiguous on the context
of the meeting. The nal panel, Panel C contains examples where the algorithm
fails to predict any weights. These are entries that contain spelling errors in the
description or they can be transactions that are highly specic and do not occur
frequently. For example, Adverisements is a misspelled word of Advertisements
and it is simply not possible for an algorithm to correct all typographical errors. It is
also unsurprising that the algorithm does not pick up phrases that contain a person's
name (e.g. Zhang, Xing) or specic descriptions (e.g. Barbershop Chorus, Hot
Dog Buns).
While there is certainly a point of content as to whether the imputed category
weights are unbiased, the algorithm developed in this section is very similar to some of
the most inuential work done in the literature (e.g. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)).
In that sense, we can take comfort in that there is sucient credibility in our method-
ologies.
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1.4 Spending Measures and Descriptive Statistics
Using the imputed spending data, I develop 5 alternative measures of candidate spend-
ing. The contents of each measure are listed in Table 1.4.10 The rst measure, Total
spending, is the traditional measure used in most studies in the literature on campaign
nance (Jacobson (1978); Levitt (1994); Green and Krasno (1988), etc.). The second
measure, Direct spending, eliminates all transactions that are not directly spent on
a candidate's own campaign, such as loan repayments, fund transfers between candi-
date committees, contribution refunds and donations. No Administrative spending
further excludes administrative expenditure, as we worry that administrative spend-
ing (category 1) could be used as a default placeholder for entries that do not fall
neatly in a single category. For example, house christmas ornaments, thank you
gifts, political strategist expenses etc. are being labeled as administrative expendi-
tures but they might not reect the candidate's overhead spending. The reader should
bear in mind that this does not imply that administrative spending is unimportant
for an election, but rather, No Admin spending serves as a benchmark to compare
and contrast the role of administrative spending in the context of election outcome
when we turn our attention to empirical estimates in Chapter 2. Next, I group
spending items that involve direct voter contact and those that have been the focus
of recent research on political strategy, such as campaign advertising (Spenkuch and
Toniatti (2016)), campaign events (e.g. personal canvassing, campaign rallies etc.),
and campaign materials (e.g. iers, handouts, etc.) (Gerber and Green (2000)).
The aggregated spending on these 3 items is termed Communication expenditures.
Advertising expenditure is self-explanatory, and nally, Indirect expenditures are
10FEC also provides a reported alternative for the total and direct spending measures. The
direct spending measure corresponds to Operating Expenditures reported by FEC. The corre-
lation coecient between the total spending variable computed via the algorithm listed in Section
3 and the total spending variable reported by FEC is 0.981. The correlation coecient between
the direct spending variable computed via the algorithm listed in Section 3 and the operating
expenditure variable reported by FEC is 0.976. All regression results are robust to using either
measure.
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spending components that are complementary to Direct spending.
The summary statistics for each spending measure is given in Table 1.5. Using
the aggregate (total) measure on spending, an incumbent spends approximately $1.5
million in an election on average, which is about 3 times as much as an average
challenger who only spends $0.5 million. More surprisingly, more than 82% of the
total spending by the top two candidates in the race is attributed by the incumbent
alone on average. Notice that this number is above 75%, which is the ratio of mean
incumbent spending to the sum of the means of incumbent and challenger spending,
indicating that there is a signicant number of races where almost all of the spending
is done by the incumbent. However, much of this is due to incumbent's indirect
spending. In row 6 of Table 1.5, we see a large gap between indirect spending by an
incumbent and a challenger. In particular, an incumbent engages in about $240,000
of spending that is not directly related to his campaign compared to only $30,000
by a challenger. This is all not too surprising as incumbents are long known to
have an advantage in fundraising, which often times lead to contribution amounts
far exceeding what is required to win an election. Hence, it could be in their best
interest to transfer the excess money to another party member who needs it more than
he does. The spending gap between an average incumbent and challenger decreases
by about $200,000 after the elimination of indirect spending (dierence in rows 1
and 2 of column 8). More importantly, the average ratio between an incumbent's and
challenger's spending amount decreases as we go down the rows of Table 1.6, implying
that spending amounts between the two candidates are more equal as we focus on
types of spending that are important to a candidate. Moreover, only 71% of the total
advertising expenditures in a race are attributed to an incumbent, which is more
than a 10 percentage point dierence from total spending share. Since challengers
are more likely to face liquidity constraints, they should be more selective in the
usage of each dollar and this pattern suggests that they highly prioritize advertising
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spending as a means of pulling votes. Hence, the main insight that Table 1.5 provides
is that although incumbents do stand an advantage over challengers in terms of total
spending, this inequality might be exaggerated from the inclusion of the types of
spending that might matter little in an election.
Table 1.6 further breaks down the aggregate spending into individual spending
categories. Incumbents on average outspent challengers in all categories except for
loan repayment. This is not surprising as challengers tend to borrow more than
an incumbent due to the fact that they are typically less established and have less
funds. This could also explain the fact that challengers barely transfer any of their
campaign money to other committees or candidates. Comparatively, incumbents con-
tribute about $116 thousand to other candidates whereas challengers transfer about
$3 thousand on average. The pattern is also consistent with many other components
of indirect spending, which includes transfers to other committees of the same can-
didate (row 8) and political donations (row 12). An average incumbent's campaign
size, as proxied by administrative spending, is about 3 times as large as an average
challenger's campaign size. Most of the challenger's money is spent on advertising 
about $230 thousand, which encompasses about 44% of their total spending. This
shows that challengers do prioritize spending their money on tv, social media, online,
and any other form of campaign advertisements since they tend to be less well known
to the public than an incumbent is.
Next, I document candidates' spending pattern by geographical, electoral, and
candidate characteristics. First, I compare candidates' spending by congressional
district. Then, I look at spending compositions by electoral closeness and nally, by
the incumbent's seniority as measured by the number of years in oce.
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1.4.1 Congressional Districts
Figure 1.2 plots the mean total spending for incumbents (Panel (a)) and challengers
(Panel (b)) in each congressional district for the years of 2004 to 2010 by spending
quartiles. Total spending in a district is averaged across 4 election cycles (2004 to
2010). White regions indicate low average total spending levels (either by incumbent
or challenger status) while the dark blue regions represent districts with high averaged
total spending levels. District shaded in black indicates regions where spending data is
unavailable. This could occur whenever there is no candidate for a given incumbency
status in all House elections from 2004 to 2010. In panel (b), this occurs whenever
a district has no challenger for all 4 election cycles, in which case the incumbent ran
unopposed in each year. The second reason where this could happen is whenever
the candidates' do not le their spending reports to FEC. These districts are then
dropped from the sample. The sample ends at 2010 since district borders are redrawn
after the 2010 Census. As a result, the number of seats in a given state might also
change. The total spending map for years 2012 to 2016 is given in Figure 1.4.
First of all, there seems to be a strong positive correlation between an incumbent's
and a challenger's total spending. We see that many of the districts that fall within
the top quartile of incumbent's total spending also fall within the top two quartiles
of challenger's total spending. Second, there can be plenty of variation in spending
across districts within the same state. For example, candidates in Texas do not appear
to spend in cohesion with one another, even within the same state. There are cases
of bordering districts where the incumbent's total spending lies within the bottom
quartile of the distribution in one district while the other lies within the top quartile
of the distribution. We also see high variations of spending in California and Florida.
One explanation is that it is hard to coordinate spending in a large state with many
congressional districts. However, this is not nation wide. We do see states like New
York that has a total of 29 seats in the House having more homogeneous spending
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across its districts.
Spending is most heavily concentrated in several regions including North and
South Dakota, the Mountain states, the upper east region surrounding the New York
metropolitan area, and patches within the Southern Atlantic States especially Vir-
ginia, South Carolina, and Georgia. We also observe that partisan states such as
California, and Texas do not attract challengers who spend a lot, which suggests that
incumbency advantage is these states are higher than average.
Next, I look at the distribution of advertising spending to see if there are any
signicant changes to spending behaviors. Figure 1.3 depicts the distribution of ad-
vertising spending by quartiles for incumbents and challengers.11 First, comparing
panel (b)'s of Figure 1.2 and 1.3, we see that the spending patterns for challengers
appear to be similar. This is consistent with our previous observation that advertising
spending takes up a signicant portion of the challenger's budget. On the other hand,
we do see more distributional changes in incumbents' spending going from total to
advertising expenditure. The distribution of spending appears to have shifted away
from California and Texas towards larger districts, such as Montana and Wyoming
which are each represented by a single at-large district. Districts in the Midwest
states also appear to be on the upper end of distribution of incumbent's advertising
spending. The most prominent change is around the New York-Pennsylvania area,
where the districts are now shaded in dark blue, indicating that advertising spending
in this area is a lot higher than average. However, this does not necessarily mean that
these incumbents are engaging in higher levels of political advertising. It could very
well be driven by the fact that the spot prices of TV advertising in the New York
metropolitan area is one of the highest in the country Stratmann (2009).
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 are similar to Figures 1.2 and 1.3, but shows the spending
distribution for years 2012 to 2016 instead. We do see a signicant change in spending
11Spending distribution maps for other measures are available upon requests.
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patterns across decades. In 2012 to 2016, incumbent's total spending appears to be
more homogeneous across districts within the same state (e.g. see Illinois, Iowa,
Texas and Washington) compared to the distribution of total spending in 2004 to
2010. Part of the reason could be that high spending incumbents get relocated to
dierent districts where spending has been typically low.
1.4.2 Electoral Closeness
This section seeks to understand how the candidate's spending composition vary by
electoral closeness as proxied by the ex-post two-party vote share. Table 1.7 shows
the mean spending by vote share bins of 10 percentage points. First, observe that
an average incumbent's spending amount is highest in the 40-50 percent vote share
bin, where the incumbent barely lost the election. This is consistent with studies
that found that incumbent's spending increases with expected closeness (Erikson and
Palfrey (2000); Gerber (1998); Green and Krasno (1988)). Part of the reason is
that incumbents react to how much their challenger is spending in a race (Jacobson
(1978)). This is supported by the fact that challenger spending is signicantly higher
in this range compared to races where the challenger stands no chance of winning.
On the contrary, we do not expect incumbents to spend large amounts of money in
races that they are condent of winning.
Second, notice that the percentage of total spending due to advertising expen-
diture is decreasing in vote share. In particular, incumbents facing a close election
(40-50 vote share category) allocate more than half of their budget on advertising,
whereas incumbents in a lopsided election (90-100) allocate only about 10 percent
of their total spending on advertising. Among the components that involve direct
voter contact (communication spending), almost 80% are being spent on advertising
alone for incumbents in close races. This is signicantly higher than an average of
about 30% for incumbents who won the election by a landslide . This implies that
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incumbents heavily prioritize advertising (Spenkuch and Toniatti (2016)) over other
mobilization methods such as personal canvassing (Gerber and Green (2000)) when
the election is tight and switch strategies to focus more on get-out-the-vote eorts
over political advertising when the race is safe. Figure 1.6a shows exactly how total
spending is being split up into ner categories for dierent levels of electoral closeness.
We can clearly see that as the incumbent's vote share decreases, a larger percentage
of the budget is allocated to advertising expenditure and the share of spending on
fundraising and indirect expenditures decrease.
We observe a similar pattern for the challengers. One key dierence is that in-
direct expenditures, or components to spending that are not related to one's own
campaign, is small regardless of electoral closeness for challengers. If indirect spend-
ing is viewed as only a secondary mean to direct spending in increasing one's vote
share, it makes more sense for challengers to allocate his spending on items that has
a better chance of persuading a voter, such as political advertisements or canvassing
activities. Figure 1.6b also shows that advertising expenditure takes up at least a
quarter of the challenger's budget, even when they do not stand a chance of winning
the election.
1.4.3 Incumbent Seniority
Political strategies develop with experience. Incumbents who have been in oce for
several years might change their spending strategies over time as they become well
versed with the political landscape. To study the change in spending patterns, I
split the sample along the dimension of incumbent seniority. In particular, I create
3 groups. The rst consists of all races with Freshmen incumbents, i.e. incumbents
who are up for reelection for the very rst time or those who have been in oce for at
most 1 term.12 The second group consists of all races with Sophomore incumbents,
12Some incumbents assume oce in the middle of a term as a result of death or retirement by
the former politician in oce and are considered as Freshmen incumbents if they run in the next
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i.e. incumbents who are seeking reelection for the second time. Finally, I group all
races with incumbents who have been in oce for at least 3 terms and they are known
as Senior incumbents.
Table 1.8 presents the summary statistics of candidates' spending by incumbent
seniority. It is obvious that among the 3 groups, Freshmen incumbents spend the
most in elections on average in all measures except for indirect spending. Notice
that the dierence in direct spending between a Freshman and a Senior incumbent
can be mostly attributed to political advertising, which explains about 70% of the
gap in direct spending. The rest of the dierences are mostly due to the change in
administrative spending, or campaign size. In part, this could be due to the fact that
junior incumbents are less well known to the public than senior incumbents. Hence,
one of the best way to convey information to his constituents is through political
advertising. As time goes by, the need to advertise is reduced as the incumbent
should be relatively well know by then. Getting reelected many times will also boost
the incumbent's condence in a race, which could explain the increase in the level
of transfers (indirect spending) despite the decrease in total spending levels with
incumbent seniority.
The average total spending levels between a sophomore and a senior incumbent
are very similar. However, this obscures the fact that sophomore incumbents en-
gage in more advertising than senior incumbents. The mean dierence in is about
$120,000. This gap is almost entirely oset by the higher levels of indirect spending by
senior incumbents with a mean dierence of about $100,000. This observation further
underscores the importance of breaking down aggregate spending to ner measures.
For challengers, we see that they spend the highest on average when facing an
inexperienced incumbent. Once again, they do this primarily by expanding advertis-
ing expenditures. This makes sense as it is perhaps their best chance to take oce
election.
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whenever a freshman incumbent is on the ballot compared to facing a well established
incumbent. The high reelection rates of House incumbents further deter them from
launching any serious threats to a senior incumbent, which explains their reduced
level of spending.
1.5 Summary
In this chapter, I document candidates' spending composition in the U.S. House of
Representation election from 2004 to 2016. I rst address the missing data problem
by developing a text analysis algorithm that imputes spending weights for each of
the 12 disbursement categories developed by the Federal Election Commission. Using
the imputed data, I investigate how incumbents and challengers spend their money
at a much ner level than previous studies have done by breaking down each can-
didate's aggregate spending into individual expenditure components. On average,
an incumbent is quoted as spending $1.5 million (in 2010 dollars), which is about 3
times larger than the total spending of an average challenger. I nd that a great deal
of this dierence is due to indirect spending, which consists of fund transfers from
one political committee to another, contribution refunds, and donations. The ratio
between spending that involves direct voter contact, which consists of advertising,
campaign materials (e.g. banners, iers, etc.) and campaign events (e.g. rallies,
speeches, canvassing eorts etc.) are much tighter at about 2, indicating that the
spending advantage held by an incumbent might be traditionally overestimated.
I also study changes in patterns of candidate spending across several dimension
of electoral and candidate characteristics. First, I document spending patterns by
congressional districts and found that spending is more homogeneous across districts
within the same states as we focus on spending items that have been traditionally
believed to pull votes, such as political advertising. In some cases, partisan states such
as California and Texas do not exhibit high levels of spending by both incumbents
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and challengers. This could suggest that incumbency advantage in these states are
higher than in others. Next, I study candidates' spending composition by electoral
closeness. This exercise reveals that incumbents increase their spending priority on
political advertising while engaging less in fundraising and indirect expenditures as
electoral closeness increases (or similarly, incumbent's vote share decreases). I also
nd that challengers allocate a signicant percentage (of at least 25%) of their total
spending regardless of electoral closeness and that they almost never engage in indirect
spending. Finally, I also investigate spending behaviors of candidates by incumbent
seniority. I nd that Freshmen incumbents spends about 50% more in total spending
and about twice as much in advertising spending compared to a senior incumbent.
Challengers also take this opportunity by increasing their spending amounts whenever
they face an inexperience incumbent as this is when their opposition is at his weakest
state.
However, a simple summary statistic of the candidates' spending composition does
not provide us with a good understanding of the eect of money on election outcomes.
The next chapter addresses this concern by discussing the empirical approach used
to estimate the eects of spending on vote shares.
1.6 Appendices
This appendix contains additional details on the algorithm used to impute missing
spending categories.
1.6.1 Cross Validation
I compare the performance of my proposed algorithm in Section 1.3 to two alter-
natives, which uses χ2 weights and binary weights as the metric to impute the
weights for each spending category respectively. Specically, my proposed algorithm
(call it A1) assigns spending weights to each category according to word frequency
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. The third algorithm (A3) assigns binary weights to each cate-
gory, where the value of 1 is given to the category c that has the highest weight in
A1, i.e. maxcδ
A1
c , and a weight of 0 to all other categories. In the event of a tie, the
tie-breaking criteria is that we give full weight to the category that gets assigned the
highest weight in A2. This is sucient to break all ties in my sample.
I use a 10-fold cross validation approach to rank each algorithm by means of
minimizing the mean squared error. Figure 1.7 illustrates the algorithm and the test
proceeds as follows. The set ΩC , which contains spending entries with preassigned
category, is rst randomly split and sorted into 10 dierent subsamples. In run
k = 1, ..., 10, bin k is chosen as the validation set, denoted as ΩV while the remaining
9 bins are designated as the training set, denoted as ΩT . In Figure 1.7, ΩV is shaded in
gray while ΩV is shaded in green. For each run, the learning phase of the algorithm is
used on ΩT and then category weights are imputed by the algorithm on the spending
entries in ΩV . Since ΩV lies within ΩC , I observe the true category of each entry in
ΩV . Thus allows me to compare the predicted to the true category value. This is
repeated for a total of 10 runs, and for each of the algorithms A1, A2, and A3.
I use the mean-squared error (MSE) as the metric for performance comparison.





c=1(wi,c − ŵi,c)2, where wi,c is the reported
weight for entry i for category c in the validation set ΩV (note that wi,c will equal
1 for exactly one category and 0 for others), ŵi,c is the predicted weight depending
on the algorithm used, and n1 is the size of ΩC . The MSE for A1 is 0.303, 0.425 for
A2, and 0.433 for A3. In this sense, A1 comes out as the clear winner among these 3
algorithms.
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1.6.2 χ2 Statistics - Further Restriction
I impose a further restriction that the inner expression of the quadratic term in the
numerator of equation (1) should be positive, i.e. fwcfw′c′ − fw′cfwc′ > 0. This is be-
cause the χ2wc metric has been typically used for the test of independence between two
random variables, and is silent on whether one is positively or negatively correlated
with the other. For our purpose, it is crucial to know the direction of correlation.
The interpretation of the statistic diers depending on the sign of this term. If it is
positive, then this implies that word w is highly predictive of category c. However,
if the sign is negative, then this implies that word w is predictive that the spending
entry should not belong to category c.
For illustration, consider the contingency matrices in Table 1.9. In both scenarios,
χ2wc are identical. However, in scenario 1, it is apparent that if we encounter word w
within a spending description, it should belong to category c. On the other hand, in
scenario 2, it implies that the spending entry should not belong to category c if word
w is part of its description.
This further restriction implies that that nal subset of wc pairs contain only
words that positively predicts a category.
1.6.3 Example
Here, I present an example to help illustrate the algorithm. Assume that all words
satisfy the χ2 lter listed in section 1.3.2. Further assume that there are only two
spending categories, 1 and 2. Consider the example provided in Figure 1.8, where
there are only 5 spending entries. The top 4 observations have preassigned categories,
so they belong to ΩC . On the other hand, the last entry has a missing category, so the
algorithm will impute the spending weights for each category. The phrase Printing
and Food will be collapsed down to print food after applying the porter-stemming
algorithm on each word and eliminating connector words. Two-thirds of the weight
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will be assigned to category 1, since the words print and food are assigned to
category 1 exactly once each in ΩC , and print is further assigned to category 2
exactly once in ΩC . The dollar amount for the last entry is split according to the
imputed weights, so two thirds of $30, or $20 is assigned to category 1 while the
remainder of $10 is assigned to category 2.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of Missing Categories by Candidates
Notes: This gure shows the density histogram of the percentage of entries in the sample that are
not assigned a category number for each candidate. The lower end (~0%) of the horizontal axis
indicates that a candidate assigns a category number for almost all of his reported transactions.
The upper end (~100%) of the horizontal axis indicates that a candidate does not assign a category
number to almost all of his reported transactions.
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Figure 1.2: Mean Total Spending by District: 2004-2010
(a) Incumbent
(b) Challenger
Notes: This gure shows the average total spending by congressional district for years 2004 to 2010
for incumbents and challengers. Alaska and Hawaii are rescaled and repositioned to the bottom
left corner of each gure. State borders are highlighted in red. Districts are colored based on total
spending quartiles. Regions where spending data is unavailable are shaded in black. There are two
reasons that this could happen. One, there is simply no credible spending data. Second, there might
be no incumbents (open seat races) or challengers (incumbents ran unopposed) in the sample period.
Spending amounts are readjusted to 2010 dollars and units are in millions of dollar.
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Figure 1.3: Mean Advertising Spending by District: 2004-2010
(a) Incumbent
(b) Challenger
Notes: This gure shows the average advertising spending by congressional district for years 2004
to 2010 for incumbents and challengers. Alaska and Hawaii are rescaled and repositioned to the
bottom left corner of each gure. State borders are highlighted in red. Districts are colored based
on advertising spending quartiles. Regions where spending data is unavailable are shaded in black.
There are two reasons that this could happen. One, there is simply no credible spending data.
Second, there might be no incumbents (open seat races) or challengers (incumbents ran unopposed)
in the sample period. Spending amounts are readjusted to 2010 dollars and units are in millions of
dollar.
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Figure 1.4: Mean Total Spending by District: 2012-2016
(a) Incumbent
(b) Challenger
Notes: This gure shows the average total spending by congressional district for years 2012 to 2016
for incumbents and challengers. Alaska and Hawaii are rescaled and repositioned to the bottom
left corner of each gure. State borders are highlighted in red. Districts are colored based on total
spending quartiles. Regions where spending data is unavailable are shaded in black. There are two
reasons that this could happen. One, there is simply no credible spending data. Second, there might
be no incumbents (open seat races) or challengers (incumbents ran unopposed) in the sample period.
Spending amounts are readjusted to 2010 dollars and units are in millions of dollar.
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Figure 1.5: Mean Advertising Spending by District: 2012-2016
(a) Incumbent
(b) Challenger
Notes: This gure shows the average advertising spending by congressional district for years 2012
to 2016 for incumbents and challengers. Alaska and Hawaii are rescaled and repositioned to the
bottom left corner of each gure. State borders are highlighted in red. Districts are colored based
on advertising spending quartiles. Regions where spending data is unavailable are shaded in black.
There are two reasons that this could happen. One, there is simply no credible spending data.
Second, there might be no incumbents (open seat races) or challengers (incumbents ran unopposed)
in the sample period. Spending amounts are readjusted to 2010 dollars and units are in millions of
dollar.
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Figure 1.6: Candidate Spending Composition by Electoral Closeness
(a) Incumbent
(b) Challenger
Notes: This gure shows the average spending composition of candidates for incumbents (Panel (a)),
and challengers (Panel (b)) by ex-post incumbent vote share. There are a total of 1928 elections
in the sample from 2004 to 2016. The sample is divided into 4 partitions, where the incumbent
lost (<50% vote share), where he barely won (between 50-60% vote share), where he won by a
comfortable margin (between 60-70% vote share), and where he won a lopsided race (>70% vote
share). The mean level of spending for each subgroups are reported in the bottom right corner
of each pie-chart. Admin, Fundraise, and Advert are all spending categories by themselves.
Indirect is the sum of categories 8-12 of Table 1.4. Others is the sum of categories 2, 5, 6, and 7
of Table 1.4.
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Figure 1.7: 10-Fold Cross Validation Algorithm
Note: This gure illustrates the 10-fold cross validation. Each row represents an equal-sized bin of
the sample. Columns represent the ith number of runs, where i = 1, ..., 10. In each run, the 9 bins
that are shaded in green represents the training set and the single bin shaded in dark gray represents
the validation set.
Figure 1.8: Illustration of Algorithm
Note: This gure illustrates the text analysis algorithm presented in Section 1.3.2. ΩC indicates
the partition of the sample where spending entries have assigned category numbers. ΩNC indicates
the partition of the sample where spending entries have missing category numbers. This example
assumes that the χ2 statistic criteria is satised for each word-category pair. See Section 1.6.2 for
more details.
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Table 1.1: Spending Categories and Descriptions
Category Description
1. Administrative/Salary/Overhead
Rent, sta salaries, postage, oce supplies, equipment, furniture, ballot access
fees, petition drives, party fees and legal and accounting expenses.
2. Travel
Costs of commercial carrier tickets; reimbursements for use of private vehicles,
advance payments for use of corporate aircraft; lodging and meal expenses
incurred during travel.
3. Solicitation and Fundraising
Costs for direct mail solicitations and fundraising events including printing,
mailing lists, consultant fees, call lists, invitations, catering costs and room rental.
4. Advertising
Purchases of radio/television broadcast/cable time, print advertisements and
related production costs.
5. Polling -
6. Campaign Materials Buttons, bumper stickers, brochures, mass mailings, pens, posters and balloons.
7. Campaign Event
Costs associated with candidate appearances, campaign rallies, town meetings,
phone banks, including catering costs, door-to-door get-out-the-vote eorts and
driving voters to the polls.
8. Transfers To other authorized committees of the same candidate.
9. Loan Repayments Repayments of loans made or guaranteed by the candidate or any other person.
10. Refunds of Contributions
Contribution refunds to individuals/persons, political party committees or other
political committees.
11. Political Contributions
Contributions to other federal candidates and committees, donations to
non-federal candidates and committees.
12. Donations Donations to charitable or civic organizations.
Source: Federal Election Commission Form 3 instructions.
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Table 1.2: Top Words for Each Category by Predictive Power
Number Category Top Words
1. Administrative/Salary/Overhead Salary, Payroll, Phone, Oce, Tax
2. Travel Travel, Airfare, Gas, Meal, Lodging
3. Solicitation and Fundraising Fundraise, Cater, Event, Direct, Consult
4. Advertising Advertise, Radio, Media, TV, Buy
5. Polling Poll, Survey, Petition, Carrier, Research
6. Campaign Materials Material, Sign, Paraphernalia, Print, Shirt
7. Campaign Event Event, Food, Campaign, Cater, Parade
8. Transfers Transfer, Fee, Wire, Fund
9. Loan Repayments Loan, Payment, Repay, Bank
10. Refunds of Contributions Refund, Contribution, Excess, Return
11. Political Contributions Contribution, Politic, Donate, Ticket
12. Donations Donate, Charity, Sponsorship, Contribution, Ticket
Notes: Words are sorted in descending order by their χ2 statistic.
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Table 1.3: Examples of Spending Weights Imputed by Algorithm
Description Weights
Panel A: Single Category
Airline Ticket Travel (93%), Campaign Events (5%)
Oce Alarm Service Admin (100%)
Payroll Taxes & Withholdings Admin (100%)
Refreshments for Fundraiser Fundraise(99.45%), Campaign Events (0.55%)
Web/Internet Services Admin (96%), Advertising (4%)
Panel B: Multiple Categories
Campaign Consulting Admin (55%), Fundraise (25%), Campaign Materials (7%), Campaign Events (12%)
Event Services Admin (64%), Fundraise (17%), Campaign Events (18%)
Food for Volunteers Admin (15%), Travel (23%), Fundraise (35%), Campaign Events (27%)
Meeting Expense Admin (19%), Travel (36%), Fundraise (29%), Campaign Events (15%)




Hot Dog Buns -
Rev Share Deduction -
Zhang, Xing -
Notes: This table shows the spending description and category weights imputed by the text analysis
algorithm given in Section 1.3.2 for some examples of entries with missing categories. Spending
weights are given in parentheses. Panel A shows 5 examples for which the algorithm assigns full
weight or close to full weight (above 90%) to a single spending category. Panel B shows 5 examples for
which weights are more evenly distributed across multiple categories as determined by the algorithm.
Panel C shows 5 examples for which the algorithm fails to predict any category weights. Note that
all examples are pulled randomly from the sample and are by no means an exhaustive list.
Table 1.4: Spending Measures and Their Contents
Spending Measure Contents
1 Total Categories 1-12
2 Direct Categories 1-7
3 No Admin Categories 2-7
4 Communication Categories 4, 6, and 7
5 Advertising Category 4
6 Indirect Categories 8-12
Notes: Category numbers corresponds to spending categories listed in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics for Spending Measures
Incumbent Challenger
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)









1. Total 1536.52 1381.91 - 534.78 912.44 - 82.63 1001.74 2.87
2. Direct 1299.34 1224.82 81.69 506.24 848.35 92.67 81.42 793.10 2.57
3. No Admin 831.89 918.38 50.03 343.77 640.15 59.49 79.73 488.12 2.42
4. Communication 713.20 831.82 41.73 311.25 597.70 51.10 78.88 401.95 2.29
5. Advertising 437.97 626.85 22.55 233.61 494.13 32.11 71.36 204.36 1.87
6. Indirect 237.18 384.91 18.31 28.53 181.51 7.33 87.50 208.65 8.31
Observations 1928 1928
Notes: All amounts adjusted to 2010 dollars. % of Total indicates the mean of spending for each measure (other than total spending) as a percentage
of the mean of total spending. Inc Share denotes the average percentage of spending by measure in each race that is due to the incumbent.
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics for Spending Categories
Incumbent Challenger







1. Administrative/Salary/Overhead 467.46 513.28 162.47 279.57 80.38 304.99 2.88
2. Travel 55.51 94.37 12.75 42.39 82.65 42.76 4.35
3. Solicitation and Fundraising 237.45 335.95 55.02 150.58 84.76 182.43 4.32
4. Advertising 437.97 626.85 233.61 494.13 71.36 205.36 1.87
5. Polling 26.12 35.01 11.34 273.23 71.25 14.78 2.30
6. Campaign Materials 37.78 56.36 22.62 78.72 64.60 15.16 1.67
7. Campaign Event 37.05 52.56 8.43 18.87 79.90 28.62 4.40
8. Transfers 24.63 148.19 1.26 15.06 80.99 23.37 19.55
9. Loan Repayments 13.80 57.60 16.66 170.75 29.99 -2.86 0.83
10. Refunds of Contributions 7.94 13.51 2.46 150.58 81.41 5.48 3.23
11. Political Contributions 116.23 222.36 3.39 18.70 91.92 112.84 34.29
12. Donations 61.70 118.05 1.96 10.81 87.09 50.89 31.48
Observations 1928 1928
Note: All amounts adjusted to 2010 dollars. Inc Share denotes the average percentage of spending by measure in each race that is due to the
incumbent.
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Total Direct No Admin Comm Advert Total Direct No Admin Comm Advert
30-40 2292.77 2192.36 1358.80 1199.00 832.28 2571.36 2481.01 1686.72 1547.89 1284.93
40-50 2675.43 2560.92 1969.83 1781.58 1394.09 1905.58 1836.87 1277.01 1154.49 906.75
50-60 2052.60 1880.84 1263.12 1121.20 788.49 997.06 937.64 651.38 595.13 462.39
60-70 1235.44 983.57 567.59 467.64 220.85 231.70 218.00 136.34 120.78 78.65
70-80 1085.02 770.55 445.20 340.71 120.58 67.90 62.77 36.41 31.16 18.15
80-90 1169.97 733.02 374.35 275.51 53.35 114.11 110.48 79.60 74.25 15.36
90-100 1246.90 821.10 485.25 360.30 128.49 21.30 18.91 13.07 10.88 5.84
Total 1536.52 1299.34 831.89 713.20 437.97 534.78 506.24 343.77 311.25 233.61
Note: Spending amounts adjusted to 2010 dollars.
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Table 1.8: Mean Spending by Incumbent Seniority
Freshman (Term=1) Sophomore (Term=2) Senior (Term≥3)
Inc Chal Inc Chal Inc Chal
Spending Measures (000's)
Total 1868.47 905.95 1467.63 617.29 1462.82 417.72
Direct 1721.17 865.29 1294.65 568.33 1188.09 396.75
No Admin 1159.62 590.89 829.61 384.67 745.16 269.07
Comm 1034.67 536.23 723.41 350.90 625.48 242.74
Advert 725.70 414.67 472.93 268.27 353.97 177.99
Indirect 147.30 40.65 172.99 48.97 274.73 20.96
Observations 347 347 277 277 1304 1304
Note: Spending amounts adjusted to 2010 dollars. Sample is split based on incumbent seniority.
Freshman (Term=1) represents races where the incumbent is seeking reelection for the very rst
time. Sophomore (Term=2) represents races where the incumbent is seeking reelection for the
second time. Senior (Term≥3) represents races where the incumbent seeking reelection for at least
the third time.













Note: This gure presents 2 scenarios of word-category frequencies. The values in the tables indicate
the frequencies. For example, the top left cell of the matrix in Scenario 1 with value 100 indicates
that word w is associated with category c 100 times in the sample.
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CHAPTER 2 Disaggregated Campaign Spending Eects  Ev-
idence from the U.S. House of Representative
Elections
2.1 Overview
This chapter continues the discussion on the role of money by presenting empirical
evidence on the eect of campaign spending on election outcomes using the spending
measures developed in Chapter 1. The goal of this chapter is to capture the dierential
impacts of campaign money based on their usage upon candidates' vote shares.
To do this, I estimate two empirical specications. The dependent variable for
both models is the incumbent's share of votes going to the top two candidates. The
models dier in the functional form of the spending variables. The rst specication
assumes that spending is additive and separable in incumbency status and is used
by most studies in the literature. This feature allows the eect of spending to vary
for incumbents and challengers. In the second specication, candidates' spending
is represented by a single independent variable, which is the incumbent's share of
expenditure incurred by himself and his challenger. This model thus estimates the
eect of relative spending between the incumbent and the challenger on vote shares.
To identify the dierential impact of spending by purpose, I separately estimate each
specication for each measure developed in Chapter 1. In other words, I obtain 5
dierent estimates based on total, direct, no administrative, communication, and
advertising spending for each specication. To identify the components to candidate
spending that inuence an election, I further breakdown direct spending into its 7
individual categories and estimate each specications assuming that the components
enter in an additive and separable manner.13
13The components of direct spending are: administrative/salary, travel, fundraising, advertising,
polling, campaign materials, and campaign event expenditures.
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There are obvious concerns of endogeneity bias with this approach. Previous
studies have attempted to address 2 sources. The rst is simultaneity bias, where
money does not only aect the incumbent's vote share, but it is also aected by the
expected closeness of a race. The second source of endogeneity stems from unobserved
candidate characteristics. For example, high quality challengers who have the ability
to raise more money will also be spending more on average. As a result, incumbents
might also respond by increasing their spending. Both biases drive down the estimates
of incumbent and challenger spending in the rst specication. On the other hand,
the eect of the bias in the second specication is ambiguous as it depends on the
magnitude of candidates' responses to changes in unobservables. However, I show
that the estimates in this model are not signicantly aected by the bias due to
unobserved challenger quality by using the repeated challenger strategy developed by
Levitt (1994).
I show that the estimates for incumbent spending on his vote shares in the rst
specication are negative for all measures despite my best eorts to control for reverse
causality through the use of covariates. Since previous studies have tried to estimate
the same specication repeatedly, my ndings reveal that past estimates might also be
plagued by the same problem. Without a good identication strategy, it is dicult to
uncover the causal eect of incumbent's and challenger's spending upon vote shares.
Using the second specication, I show that the incumbent's vote share increases
in his share of spending on fundraising, advertising, campaign events (such as rallies,
speeches, and canvassing activities) and indirect expenditures. I also found that an
increase in the relative share of administrative expenditures towards the incumbent
increases the incumbent's vote share by enhancing the eectiveness of money spent
on labor-intensive activities, such as fundraising and campaign events, but has no
eect on the eectiveness of advertising spending. I also investigate how the eec-
tiveness of spending changes with electoral and candidate characteristics. I found that
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Democratic incumbents appear to gain more from increasing their spending shares in
fundraising and canvassing eorts compared to Republican incumbents, all else equal.
I also found that there is no discernible dierence in the marginal eect of advertising
spending share on incumbent's vote share. This result can be explained through the
role of administrative spending. I found that ratio of campaign sizes between an in-
cumbent and the challenger, as proxied by administrative expenditure, is signicantly
larger for Democrats. If campaign sizes have a non-trivial eect only on labor-oriented
activities, then this serves as an explanation as to why we see the dierence in results
between advertising and other types of spending. I also found that redistricting after
the 2010 Census eliminates a large portion of the incumbent's spending advantage.
Moreover, I can not reject the hypothesis that advertising spending has no impact
on the incumbent's vote share at the 10% level. This implies that the redrawing of
district borders have largely leveled the playing eld between the incumbents and
challengers, which encourages political competition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief
literature review. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical specications in detail. Section
2.4 shows the main estimates. Section 2.5 shows results from restricting the sample to
repeated challenger races to control for unobserved candidate characteristics. Section
2.6 discusses several robustness checks and nally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There is a host of articles on the impact of money in elections, and most studies
have used total spending as their measure of candidate expenditures. The literature
started with Jacobson (1978) who found that challenger's spending appears to have
high eectiveness in increasing one's own vote share while incumbent's spending does
not. In fact, Jacobson (1978) found that incumbent's vote share decreases in the
incumbent's total spending in certain specications. Subsequent articles have pointed
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out that Jacobson's estimates are plagued by endogeneity bias due to reverse causality
and unobserved candidate characteristics. However, attempts to solve this problem
have so far been unsatisfactory and results are highly dependent on the empirical
technique.
On the one hand, there are papers that found an insignicant eect of incumbent's
spending on vote share. Abramowitz (1991) builds on Jacobson (1978) by adding
in more covariates such as race forecast published by Congressional Quarterly to
control for race expectation. However, the eect of incumbent's spending on votes
remains small and insignicant. Levitt (1994) controls for unobserved challenger
quality through the means of candidate xed eects on the sample of races where
an incumbent faces a challenger repeatedly. Not only does he nd that incumbent's
spending is still small and insignicant, he also found that challenger's spending
has virtually no impact on vote shares, with point estimates of an order of magnitude
lower than previous studies. However, as I show in Section 2.5, the sample of repeated
challengers has a peculiarity that eliminates the eectiveness of candidate spending
even without appropriate controls for unobserved candidate quality.
On the other hand, there are also many papers that found a signicant eect of
incumbent spending. Erikson and Palfrey (2000) developed a theoretical model of
candidate spending behavior to show that simultaneity bias is minimal when elec-
tions are close. Splitting the sample by vote shares, they found that incumbent and
challenger spending are identical in strength and signicant in inuencing votes in
races where the incumbent achieved less than 52% of the vote. Green and Krasno
(1988) used lagged incumbent spending as an instrument for incumbent spending
and controls for candidate quality through the use of a self developed measure. They
conclude that incumbent spending is eective in pulling votes. However, lagged in-
cumbent spending might be aected by both district and candidate characteristics in
past elections which violates the exclusion restriction for a valid instrument. Gerber
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(1998) studied candidate spending in Senate elections instead of House elections. He
proposed 3 instruments for candidate spending, which consists of challenger wealth,
state voting age population, and sum of lagged spending by Senate incumbents and
challengers. He ran a two stage least squares estimation for each instrument to iden-
tify the eect of spending on outcomes. He found that both incumbent and challenger
spending signicantly increases each of their vote shares. However, as he pointed out
that Exactly how campaign spending leads to more votes is an ongoing research
question, and that Relatively little is known about how money is spent opens up a
window of opportunity for researchers to conduct a more thorough study on the use
of campaign money. This chapter addresses those concerns.
Unfortunately, there has been minimal research done on the eect of campaign
money by usage. Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994) uses a detailed expenditure data set
on House candidates in 1990 to develop two alternative measures of expenditures. The
rst, which they term general campaign expenditures, contains only money directly
spent on the candidate's own campaign, such as advertising, polling and overhead
expenditures. The second, which they term communications expenditures relates
to money used for direct voter contact. They found that total spending understates
the eect of incumbent spending on vote shares, but the sign of their estimates are
negative even after eliminating spending that are unrelated to one's own campaign.
However, two shortcomings of their paper is the use of cross-sectional data, which
does not suciently control for time varying district characteristics, and the use of
simple OLS to identify the eects. My work extends the analysis to more recent
campaign spending data (from 2004 to 2016) that has the advantage of a larger sam-
ple and the ability to control for unobserved electoral and candidate characteristics
through the inclusion of district and election cycle xed eects. My research is most
closely related to Schuster (2015). We use a similar data set on candidate spending,
but dier in data usage and empirical strategies. As mentioned in chapter 1, there
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is an apparent problem with missing spending categories. While Schuster (2015)
does not go to great lengths to address this problem, I present a statistical based
methodology which is similar in spirit to Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) to impute
missing spending categories in the data. On the front of empirical strategy, Schuster
(2015) estimates the eect of campaign spending on individual's self reported vote
using survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) conducted
in 2012. He exploits the timing of spending to identify the causal eect of money
through the variation of spending and the change in the voters' reports. There are
potentially several drawbacks to this empirical strategy. First, the timing of spending
might not be exact which introduces systematic measurement error that could bias
the estimates. Second, the problem that shrouds most survey data is the reliability
of self-reported answers. In particular, Abelson et al. (1992) stated that about 25%
of the responses of turnout from the National Election Survey are inconsistent with
the respondents' voting records. This percentage could very well have decreased over
time with more innovative changes to the survey structure, but it would be dicult
to conclusively claim that voter responses are completely free of such error.14 My
paper estimates the eects of spending on vote shares by using the variation in the
incumbent's spending share across elections and election cycles, which immune to
these errors. Moreover, I show the estimates on the incumbent's share of spending
are not aected by unobserved candidate characteristics. I also uncover the types of
spending that signicantly aects an incumbent's vote share.
More recent articles have focused on targeted spending where they estimate the
eect of a specic spending purpose, such as get-out-the-vote mobilization eorts
(Gerber and Green (2000)), television advertising in the United States (Spenkuch and
Toniatti (2016)) and radio advertising in Mexico (Larreguy et al. (2014)), on electoral
outcomes such as voter turnout and candidate vote shares. My paper contributes
14See Bernstein et al. (2001) for a study on the reasons individual misreports their voting behavior
and how it can aect empirical results.
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towards this front of the literature by identifying the types of spending that are
crucial in aecting an election outcome, and hence suggesting areas of future research
2.3 Empirical Strategies
I estimate two empirical models to identify the spending components that inuence
an election. The rst specication, which is used in most works in the campaign
spending literature, is given as follows:
IncV oted,t = β0 + β1IncSpendd,t + β2ChalSpendd,t + ΘZd,t + γt + δd + εd,t (3)
A unit of observation in equation (3) is an election at the district-year level. Con-
gressional districts are denoted with a subscript d while election cycles (or years)
are denoted with a subscript t. The dependent variable IncV ote denotes the incum-
bent's share of the vote going to him and his nearest challenger in the race. For that
reason, my sample does not include open races. In this model, it is assumed that
candidate spending enters the equation in an additive and separable manner. This
allows the incumbent's vote share to depend dierentially on the incumbent's and the
challenger's spending. IncSpend and ChalSpend are generic spending variables that
vary depending on the measure used. Specically, I estimate equation (3) separately
for each spending measure developed in Chapter 1 to study the dierential impact
spending types upon vote share. I also estimate equation (3) using the natural log
of spending instead of linear spending to allow for diminishing marginal returns to
expenditure. Whenever the spending amount is 0, I replace it with the lowest positive
log amount for that spending category.15 Z is a vector of district by year level control
variables. It includes transfers made by party committees such as the Democratic
National Committee and the Republican National Committee to the candidates, the
15My results are also robust to replacing the 0 expenditure values with $200 or by shifting all
spending amounts up by $200.
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lagged vote share of the presidential candidate from the incumbent's party at the
congressional district level, and Cook Political race ratings. γ is the year xed eect,
which captures national shocks to election such as the systematic midterm punish-
ment eect for the president's party (Alesina and Rosenthal (1989)). δ is the district
xed eect, which captures local level factors such as the constituents' preferences.
The second empirical specication that I estimate is
IncV oted,t = α0 + α1IncShared,t + ΘZd,t + γt + δd + νd,t (4)
where d and t once again represent district and year respectively and other variables
are dened similarly as equation (3). IncShare is the percentage of spending in the
race that is due to the incumbent, i.e. Inc$
Inc$+Chal$
% where Inc$ and Chal$ denotes the
spending amount by the incumbent and challenger respectively. As in previous cases,
this variable is measure specic. This means that the percentage of spending is only
computed for the spending measure in question. α1 is interpreted as the marginal
eect of increasing the percentage of incumbent spending in the race on incumbent's
vote share. In other words, equation (4) captures the eect of incumbent spending
relative to his challenger on vote shares.
2.3.1 Challenges to Identication
For the coecient estimates to be interpreted as the causal eect of money on incum-
bent's vote share, the spending variables have to be exogenous to other unobserved
factors that aect the incumbent's vote share, conditional on covariates. Formally,
this implies that the condition E(ε|Z, γ, δ, IncSpend, ChalSpend) = 0 for equation
(3) and E(v|Z, γ, δ, IncShare) = 0 for equation (4) must be satised. However, there
are two identied sources of endogeneity that might render these assumptions invalid.
First, the causal mechanism can go in the opposite direction. Not only does spend-
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ing inuence the number of votes cast, the candidates' optimal spending strategy is
also determined by race expectations. In particular, incumbents in races that are
expected to be close may have to incur high amounts of spending in order to per-
suade and mobilize voters. Without appropriate controls for reverse causality, the
regression estimates of β1 and β2 will be biased downwards. However, the sign of the
bias on α1 is ambiguous. It is likely that incumbents increase spending by more than
their challengers in the event of an adverse shock to their election prospects since in-
cumbents often face a much easier time raising funds. However, the direction of this
bias on α1 depends on the proportion of increase in spending relative to their initial
amount of expenditure and not the level itself. Thus, even if an incumbent responds
by spending more than the challenger, if the proportion of increase is similar for both
candidates with respect to their initial spending levels, then IncShare should not
change.
Historical attempts to correct for simultaneity bias has been unsatisfactory. The
most convincing strategy which employs the the use of instrumental variables, is by
Gerber (1998). He uses 3 instrumentschallenger wealth, state population, and sum
of lagged spending by the incumbent and challenger. However, these instruments
might not satisfy the exclusion restriction. For example, challengers are more likely
to run when they are wealthy simply because they are also more inuential and better
known to the public, which directly aects their vote share. Also, highly populated
areas have higher chances of producing more competent challengers. Finally, spend-
ing in the previous election can be inuenced by many external factors that also
decide an election outcome, such as the systematic midterm punishments suered by
incumbents from the president's party.
In the absence of good instrumental variables for spending, I attempt to minimize
the bias by using 3 proxies of expected closeness as controls. The rst is the lagged
vote share of the presidential candidate at the district level. Expectations are driven
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by constituents' preferences. To the extent that voter composition remains fairly
constant over time and voters are strongly attached to a political party, the vote
share of the presidential candidate in the most recent presidential election serves
as a decent proxy for voter composition. One caveat is that voters can engage in
split-ticket voting (Campbell and Miller (1957); Chari et al. (1997)). If there is
substantial variation in the population who votes for candidates of dierent parties
for president and Congress, past presidential vote share is insucient to control for
expected closeness. I include a second control, which is the total amount of funds
that party committees transfer to a candidate to mitigate this concern. Each party
committee is subjected to a $5,000 contribution limit per election to a candidate.16
Figure 2.1 shows that party contributions are highly concentrated around the 50%
incumbent vote share threshold, suggesting that contributions are made only when
candidates are facing a tough election. Furthermore, an election is a collective game
for political parties who seek to maximize their chances of gaining a majority share of
seats at the national level. Hence, party committees will be expected to lend a hand
to the incumbents in close races. Another reason for using party contributions is that
it also indirectly incorporate private information within the party that are otherwise
not known to the public. This could aect how much a candidate spends and in
turn aect election outcomes. My third proxy for expected closeness of election is
the race ratings published by the Cook Political Report. The report categorizes each
congressional district as either a safe, lean, likely, or toss-up race associated to one
party. I use monthly ratings from August to November of an election year and recode
each race on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 being safest race for the incumbent, i.e. if a
Democratic incumbent is in a safe Democratic district or a Republican incumbent is
in a safe Republican district, and 7 being the least safe district for the incumbent,
i.e. a Democratic incumbent in a safe Republican district or a Republican incumbent
16Taken from http://www.fec.gov/pdf/partygui.pdf. Primary, runo, and general elections are
considered as separate elections.
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in a safe Democratic district.17 Since the exact methodology for classication is not
released to the public, one should be skeptical about the credibility of these subjective
ratings. In particular, the ratings might be colinear with the spending variables if
they are based o of candidate spending. The regression estimates reported in Section
2.6.1 provide support to this claim.
The second identied source of endogeneity is unobserved challenger quality. High
quality challengers are dened in Levitt (1994) as candidates who have high intrinsic
vote-getting ability. These candidates are able to obtain campaign funds more eas-
ily than a typical challenger and also have high voter appeal. For example, in the
2016 election, Josh Gottheimer, a Democrat, challenged Republican incumbent Scott
Garrett in New Jersey's 5th congressional district. Gottheimer was a former aide to
ex-president Bill Clinton and had also worked with John Kerry in his 2004 presidential
campaign. He raised $4.8 million and spent almost the entire budget, signicantly
more than an average challenger, which helped him defeat Scott Garrett. Once again,
inadequately controlling for unobserved candidate quality will biased both β1 and β2
downwards, while the sign of the bias on α1 is ambiguous. Following Levitt (1994),
I reestimate the eect of spending on vote shares by restricting the sample to only
races where an incumbent faces a challenger more than once. Assuming that candi-
date quality is constant over time, taking a xed eects transformation of equation
(3) and (4) will eliminate the omitted variable bias due to unobserved challenger qual-
ity. I also show that the estimates of α1 before and after controlling for candidate
quality are not signicantly dierent from each other at the 5% level for all measures,
suggesting that the bias due to unobserved candidate characteristics is negligible for
equation (4). If anything, α1 in equation (4) is under-estimated since the point es-
timates of 4 out of the 5 measures have increased after appropriately controlling for
candidate quality.
17The ratings are published at irregular periods, but at least once a month starting from August.
I use the ratings published at the beginning of the month for each month.
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2.3.2 Comparison of Models
There are several dierences in the features of both models.
Firstly, implicit in equation (4) is the feature of diminishing marginal returns to
spending. Since IncShare normalizes incumbent spending by total expenditure in the
race, the eectiveness of an additional dollar of spending for the incumbent relative
to his challenger is higher when total expenditure in the race is low compared to when
the total expenditure in the race is high. On the other hand, one has to explicitly
specify a functional form such as the natural log for the spending variables in (3) to
achieve this.
Secondly, the identication of β1 and β2 in (3) relies on the variation in the levels
of incumbent and challenger spending while the identication of α1 in (4) relies on
the variation in the incumbent's spending relative to the challenger's spending. This
fundamental dierence might appear to be quite important if what really matters
in a race is not how much a candidate spends, but rather how much they spend
compared to one another. Figure 2.2 depicts the partial correlation plots between the
candidates' total spending and the incumbent's vote share. The top 2 panels, (a) and
(b), show the relationship between the incumbent's vote share and the natural log of
total spending for incumbents and challengers, respectively. It can be seen that total
spending varies negatively with incumbent's vote share. Panel (c) plots the dierence
in total spending between the incumbent and the challenger in each race on election
outcomes. The correlation between the two variables are still negative, but with a
atter slope. Panel (d) plots the incumbent's vote share against the incumbent's
spending share in a race and shows a strong positive correlation. Going from panel
(c) to (d), notice that the correlation between vote share and spending turns from
negative to positive. This is due to the fact that the spending amounts in panel (d)
are normalized by the total expenditure in the race whereas spending in panels (a),
(b), and (c) are not. Hence, this suggests the normalization of the spending variables
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could be crucial to our results.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Incumbent and Challenger Spending
In this section, I present results from the estimation of equation (3), which is the spec-
ication where incumbent and challenger spending are assumed to enter the spending
equation in an additive and separable manner.
Table 2.1 reports the estimates of the eect of total spending, the traditional
measure used in the campaign spending literature, on incumbent's vote share. All
spending variables are in units of $10,000. First, note that the estimates of incum-
bent spending are negative. Taking this observation at face value, it implies that
the incumbents are lowering their chances of getting reelected by increasing their
spending, which is puzzling. However, as mentioned previously, the estimates are
likely to be plagued by simultaneity bias that drives the point estimates downwards.
The fact that the sign of the estimates are reversed from our expectations indicate
that this bias is severe. Nonetheless, going through the results might prove useful in
understanding how the estimates depend on covariates and spending measures.
Columns 1 though 4 of Table 2.1 report the estimates on linear total spending,
while columns 5 through 8 report estimates on the natural log of total spending.
Column 1 reports the results from a regression without any controls and xed eects
and shows that an increase in 1 standard deviation of incumbent's total spending (an
increase of about $1.38 million) decreases the incumbent vote share by 0.83 percentage
points. On the other hand, an increase in challenger spending by 1 standard deviation
(an increase of $0.91 million) decreases the incumbent vote share by 4.56 percentage
points, which is a large eect. To allow for diminishing marginal returns to spending,
column 5 takes a natural log transformation of total spending and shows that the
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estimated eects for both the incumbent and challenger are much closer to each other
in their magnitudes. In particular, an increase in $100,000 in total spending for
incumbent decreases his vote share by 0.13 percentage points on average, while an
increase in $100,000 in total spending for challenger decreases the incumbent's vote
share by 0.46 percentage points on average.
Comparing the estimates in columns 1 and 2 (and also 5 and 6), adding in election
cycle and district xed eects decreases the magnitude of the challenger total spending
estimate by about 30% while leaving the incumbent spending estimate unchanged.
If challengers choose to run in an election as a response to a negative shock to the
incumbent's electoral chances, then the estimate of challenger spending in column 1
will be biased upwards (in a negative sense), which is what we observe. Columns 3
and 7 add in party committee contributions to candidates as a control for expected
closeness of the election. As mentioned previously, party committees such as the DNC
and the RNC contribute to a candidate when the election is tight. The magnitude
of the spending estimates of incumbent and challenger are now smaller compared
to columns 2 and 6. Columns 4 and 8 further include lagged vote share of the
presidential candidate who is from the the same party as the incumbent. We see
that the magnitudes of the spending estimates are further decreased. The points
estimates in column 4 indicate that an increase in $100,000 in incumbent spending
decreases the incumbent's vote share by 0.05 percentage points on average, while the
same increase in challenger spending decreases the incumbent's vote share by 0.27
percentage points. Using log total spending, the estimated eects report in column 8
indicates a decrease of 0.10 percentage points for incumbent spending and a decrease
of 0.29 percentage points for challenger spending on average when expenditures go up
by $100,000. To summarize, even with our best eorts to control for reverse causality,
the estimates of incumbent's total spending are all negative and signicant at the 90%
condence level and beyond. Next, I investigate whether this bias is caused by the
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usage of the spending measure.
I reestimate equation (3) separately for each measure developed in section 1.4.
Table 2.2 presents the results and shows that there is little evidence to support this
claim. The estimated incumbent spending eects are once again negative regardless
of the measure used, indicating that the bias is not specic to total spending. In
fact, I suspect that the bias is increasing in the neness of the spending measure, i.e.
from total to advertising spending. In particular, the incumbent spending estimates
increase in size going from column 1 to 5 and from column 6 to 10. This is not in
line with the observation that incumbents view political advertising as being their
primary means of increasing vote shares. On the other hand, the challenger spending
estimates are fairly consistent across the linear spending panel. Comparing the point
estimates of challenger spending between columns 1 and 5 (total spending at -0.027
and advertising spending at -0.023), political advertising alone can account for about
85% of the eectiveness of challenger's spending. This would probably explain why
challengers highly prioritize advertising expenditures at all levels of race closeness.
To further examine how dierent categories of spending dierentially inuence
the election outcome, I break down direct spending into its individual components
and assume that they are additive and separable. There are 7 components in to-
taladministrative, travel, fundraising, advertising, polling, campaign materials and
campaign events.18 Table 2.3 reports the estimates from breaking up direct spending
into these components, and further controlling for indirect expenditures. Findings
appear to be consistent that incumbent spending doesn't help the incumbent at
all. Columns 2 and 3 controls for indirect expenditures and surprisingly, transfers
made to external parties, such as party committees and other federal candidates,
help the incumbent. These could be true as there might be positive spillover eects
from spending in neighboring districts or if that the transferred funds are being used
18The reader can refer to Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 for the detailed description of each category.
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for coordinated party expenditures within the district, such as distribution of iers
and door-to-door canvassing activities by party volunteers on behalf of the candi-
dates. More strikingly, taking the estimates of column 3 at face values, spending
components that matter in election (advertising, polling, campaign material and ad-
ministrative spending) seems to have a negative impact on incumbent's vote share,
which is again not in line with conventional wisdom that direct voter contact strate-
gies increases one's votes. However, these results should be treated with skepticism
since evidently, simultaneity bias is not completely eliminated even after controlling
for electoral expectation by including more covariates.
2.4.2 Incumbent's Spending Share in Race
Rather than being conclusive, the estimates in the previous section should be viewed
as the baseline results for comparison to estimates obtained from estimating a dier-
ent empirical model. In this section, I present estimates from the second specication,
which is given by equation (4). Instead of assuming that incumbent and challenger
spending are linearly separable, the spending variable takes the form of $Inc
$Inc+$Chal
%,
where $Inc and $Chal denote the incumbent and challenger spending respectively,
which in turn depends on the spending measure in question. The coecient of the
spending term then captures the eect of incumbent's spending relative to the chal-
lenger's spending on incumbent's vote share.
Table 2.4 shows the results from the estimation of equation (4). In particular,
incumbent's vote share is regressed on incumbent's spending share with district and
year xed eects, lagged presidential vote share and party committee contributions
as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level since districts within the
same state might be aected by state-level policies. Odd numbered columns report
the linear estimates of incumbent's spending share while the even numbered columns
report the estimates of a quadratic specication. Column 1 indicates that as the
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incumbent's spending share rises by 1 percentage point, his vote share is expected to
increase by 0.19 percentage points. Although the estimates are not easily interpreted
in terms of spending levels, putting it in perspective of the average total spending
level can give us a better understanding on the size of this eect. Recall from table
1.5 that the mean share total spending due to the incumbent is about 82.63% and
the average sum of both candidates' total spending is approximately $2.07 million.
Hence, for an incumbent who faces this scenario, a 1% increase in his share of spending
corresponds to approximately an increase of $130,000 in total spending, holding the
challenger's spending amount xed.19 Thus, this equates to an increase of about
8% from his total spending amount (of an implied $1.71 million in total spending),
which is expected to drive his vote share up by 0.19 percentage pointsa moderately
sized eect. As we focus on more rened measures, the magnitude of the estimates
go down. In particular, looking at advertising spending (column 9) and taking the
point estimates at face value, a 1 percentage point increase in incumbent's share
of advertising spending in the race is expected to only bring in an additional 0.029
percentage points in vote share. Going through the same exercise as before, this
corresponds to an increase of roughly $24,000 in advertising expenditure. To obtain
a 1 percentage point gain in vote share, the incumbent has to spend an additional of
over $1 million in advertising expenditures, which is a very large amount.20 However,
this nding is consistent with many studies that found a minimal impact of TV
19The exact calculation is done as follows. The implied incumbent's spending level (denoted by
IncSpend∗) at the mean of incumbent's total spending share in percentage (denoted by IncShare)
and the mean of total expenditure in a race (denoted by Total) is computed from:
IncSpend∗ = IncShare× Total
Let ε be the increase in incumbent's spending that is required to increase the incumbent's spending
share by 1 percentage point from the mean level. The closed form solution to ε is then given by:
ε =
(IncShare+ 0.01)Total − IncSpend∗
0.99− IncShare
20Recall that there is diminishing marginal returns to spending. So the actual required amount
depends on the relative spending amounts between the incumbent and the challenger.
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advertising on turnout (e.g. Ashworth et al. (2007); Krasno and Green (2008)),
that it persuades rather than mobilizes the electorate (Spenkuch and Toniatti (2016);
Larreguy et al. (2014)) but has very short-lived eects on voters (Gerber et al. (2011)).
There is also an increase in the intensity of negative campaigning in the form of attack
advertisements over the years (Fowler and Ridout (2012)) that also contributes to
the fall in vote turnout (Ansolabehere et al. (1994)). Taking these eects together, it
seems as if advertising spending, while having a positive impact on vote shares, has
an extremely small eect.
The even numbered columns in Table 2.4 reports the estimates from a quadratic
specication, where the squared term IncShare2d,t is included in the spending equa-
tion. This allows us to test if there is a dierential eect of incumbent's spending
share upon vote share at dierent levels of the incumbent's share of spending. The es-
timated coecients for the quadratic spending share term are positive and signicant
for all spending measures, indicating that the benets of expanding the incumbent's
share of spending is higher when he is already doing most of the spending in a race
compared to when his spending share is low. Note that this does not imply that
there is increasing marginal returns in incumbent's spending levels. Quite the con-
trary, marginal returns to spending could still very well be diminishing as the amount
of spending required to expand the incumbent's expenditure share by 1 percentage
point is increasing at an exponential rate, whereas the benet of this expansion is
only increasing at a linear rate. Figure 2.3 shows the predicted vote shares as a
function of incumbent's spending share in the race for all spending measures. First,
notice that the standard errors of the prediction is large for low values of incumbent's
spending share. This is due to sparse observations in this range. From Table 1.5,
we can see that the average incumbent's spending share is within the range of 70-85
percent for all measures. Hence, the sample is heavily dense in the upper end of the
distribution. As a result, the standard errors of the predictions are much tighter for
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higher levels than lower levels of the incumbent's spending share. Second, notice that
the predicted vote share for advertising expenditure has the least curvature among
all spending measures. This is consistent with my previous argument that there are
minimal eects of advertising spending. There is also a huge dierence in the pre-
dicted values going from direct to no administrative spending, indicating that the
share of administrative expenditures do contribute signicantly to an incumbent's
vote share. One explanation could be that the eectiveness of each dollar that is
being spent is dependent upon the size of the campaign. Activities like fundraisers,
rallies, and canvassing can be carried out more eciently when there are signicantly
more campaign stas and volunteers. I test this hypothesis by including interaction
terms of the spending share variables and the incumbent's share of administrative
spending. The results are reported in Table 2.5. The estimated coecients of the
interaction term IncShare2 ∗ AdminShare are positive and signicant for 2 out of
the 3 spending measuresno administrative and communication spending but not for
advertising spending. The results indicate that the relative size of the campaign be-
tween an incumbent and challenger does matter for the eectiveness of money used
in labor-intensive activities, such as fundraising and canvassing eorts, but not for
spending that can be carried out independently of the campaign size, such as TV and
radio advertising.
The remainder of this section analyzes the dierential impact of spending by
electoral and candidate characteristics from the perspective of the second specication
 using the incumbent's spending share.
2.4.3 Breaking Down the Eects by Spending Components
To better understand the types of spending that drive the eects in the previous
section, Table 2.6 reports spending estimates broken down to the category level. Col-
umn 1 is identical to column 2 of Table 2.4 and is included as reference. Column 2
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additionally controls for incumbent's share of indirect expenditures, which includes
fund transfers to other political committees, loan repayments and contribution re-
funds. The estimated eect on indirect spending is positive and signicant, implying
that external spending does indeed contribute to an incumbent's chances of getting
reelected.21 Column 3 breaks down the direct spending share into its components. I
nd that the incumbent's vote share is increasing in administrative and advertising
spending shares, which is consistent with previous results. Additionally, I also nd
that the eect of increasing the incumbent's fundraising and campaign events ex-
penditures relative to his challenger is statistically signicant at the 95% condence
level and beyond. Fundraising might be positively correlated with incumbency ad-
vantage and political experience (Krebs (2001)). Hence, it may be the case that an
increase in fundraising eorts relative to his challenger does not directly increase the
incumbent's vote share, but the act of raising more funds may signal his popularity
in the electorate, which in turn increases his vote share. Campaign events consist of
speeches, rallies, and get-out-the-vote activities which have direct vote contact. This
positive nding is in line with previous studies on voter engagement eorts, such as
personal canvassing (Gerber and Green (2000)) and candidate personal appearances
(Shaw (1999)).
On the other hand, I found no signicant eects of traveling, polling, and campaign
materials spending on vote shares. If anything, increasing the incumbent's share of
traveling expenditure decreases his vote share, but the eect is not signicant at the
10% level. Excessive traveling by candidates can be viewed negatively by the voters,
especially if it is unnecessary. An increase in polling expenditures by the incumbent
relative to his challenger seems to have a positive but small and insignicant eect,
suggesting that polling is less useful in aecting a candidate's vote share. Moreover, if
21As a robustness check, I exclude loan repayments and contribution refunds from indirect ex-
penditures since one can argue that the nature of these 2 spending categories dier from other
components such as transfers and donations. The estimates of the coecient on this new indirect
spending variable remain positive and signicant.
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conducted carelessly, the candidate's campaign strategy might be led astray. Finally,
the eect of campaign materials spending also have a positive but insignicant eect.
Campaign materials consist of banners, lawn signs, and pamphlets distributed to
voters. However, there is little evidence that voters pay much attention to these.
2.4.4 Party Eects
Now, I examine how the eectiveness of each spending measure dier by electoral
and candidate characteristics. I start with looking at the dierential impacts of the
incumbent's spending share by the incumbent's party identity. Formally, I estimate
the following empirical model:
IncV oted,t = α0+α1IncShared,t+α2Repd,t+α3IncShared,t∗Repd,t+ΘZd,t+γt+δd+νd,t
(5)
where Repd,t is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the incumbent in district d
and year t is a Republican. It equals to 0 if he is a Democrat. α2 thus captures
the advantage of simply being a Republican over a Democrat (or the disadvantage
if α2 is negative) and α3 captures the dierence in spending eectiveness between a
Republican and a Democratic incumbent.
Table 2.7 shows the estimated coecients. In columns 1 and 2, we do not see
a discernible advantage in terms of party identication (Rep) and spending eec-
tiveness (Rep ∗ IncShare) when we focus on total and direct spending. However,
in column 3, a Republican incumbent has a 4.25 percentage points base advantage
in vote share over a Democratic incumbent. Despite this advantage, I found that
Democrats are more eective in their spending when campaign money is measured
in terms of no administrative or communication spending. On the contrary, I do not
nd any signicant dierences in the eectiveness of advertising spending between in-
cumbents from opposing parties. Going from columns 2 to 3, notice that the positive
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and signicant eect in column 3 is driven entirely from eliminating the incumbent's
administrative spending share from the measure. This is indeed consistent with our
previous ndings that higher administrative spending shares enhances the eective-
ness of labor-intensive spending. Taking a look at the data, Democratic incumbents
on average spend a larger portion of administrative expenditures in a race (at about
81.5%) compared to a Republican incumbent (at about 79.5%) and this dierence is
signicant at the 95% condence level. Thus, removing administrative spending from
our measure creates a gap in the eects that should favor the Democrats. This is
indeed the casethat we found that Republicans are on average less eective in their
spending when focusing on no administrative and communication spending shares.
In column 5, the fact that the spending estimates revert back to being insignicant
for advertising spending can be tied back to my previous nding that administrative
spending have no impact upon the eectiveness of political advertisements.
2.4.5 Candidate Expenditure Levels
Next, I investigate whether the spending eects vary with the level of expenditure
in the race. In particular, one might wonder if it is the case that an increase in
incumbent's share of spending would net a lower percentage of votes in high spending
races due to diminishing marginal returns to spending. I test this hypothesis by
estimating the spending model that allows the eect of incumbent's spending share
to dier by total expenditure in a race. Formally, I estimate:
IncV oted,t = α0+α1IncShared,t+α2$Sumd,t+α3IncShared,t∗$Sumd,t+ΘZd,t+γt+δd+νd,t
(6)
where $Sumd,t denotes the sum of the incumbent's and challenger's expenditure in
district d and year t, depending on the measure used. α3 would then capture the
dierential impact of incumbent's spending share by spending levels.
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The estimates are shown in Table 2.8. I nd that eectiveness of incumbent's
percentage of the spending do not vary by spending levels for all measures except
for advertising spending. The estimates of the coecients for the interaction term
IncShare ∗ $Sum are small and very tightly estimated for the rst four spending
measures. Moreover, they can not be signicantly dierentiated from 0 at the 10%
level. On the other hand, it appears that the eect of increasing the incumbent's
advertising expenditure relative to his challenger diminishes in the amount of adver-
tising spending done in the race. The incumbent's political strategy might backre
if he engages in excessive political advertising. This is especially true if the number
of attack advertisements increases with the spending level, which could potentially
discourage voter turnout (Ansolabehere et al. (1994)).
2.4.6 Closeness of Election
In this section, I analyze how the incumbent's vote share changes in his spending
share by electoral closeness. To do this, I partition my sample into 3 groups based on
ex-post vote shares. The rst sample contains races where the incumbent obtained
less than 60% of the two-party vote share. This sample can be viewed as closed
elections. There are 671 elections that fall within this category. The second sample
are races where the incumbent's vote share falls between 60 and 70 percent. They
can be thought of as races where the incumbents are favored to win, but not by an
overwhelming margin. There are 857 elections that belong to this category. Finally,
the third sample are races where the incumbents won by a landslide, i.e. received
more than 70 percent of the votes going to the top two candidates. There are 398
races in this group. I separately estimate equation (4) for each of the subsamples to
examine the dierences in the eectiveness of spending by electoral closeness. The
results presented below are robust up to a 3 percentage point dierence in the vote
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share boundaries.22
Table 2.9 reports the spending share estimates for each subsample and for each
measure. Panel A reports the eect of spending shares in close elections. The es-
timates for total and direct spending are both signicant and positive, and are not
signicantly dierent from each other. The eects become insignicant after throwing
out administrative spending, implying that the positive eects of incumbent spending
are driven entirely by administrative spending in close elections. Also, communica-
tion and advertising spending shares do not have a signicant impact on incumbent's
vote share in close elections. The standard errors are larger here than for previous
estimates due to the reduction in sample size. Taking the magnitudes of the point
estimates at face value, it seems that the incumbent's vote share increases in the
percentage of mobilization spending (communication), but decreases in advertising
spending. Although I can not reject the hypothesis of a null impact, a negative
advertising eect can sound puzzling at rst. Given that the election is close, incum-
bents and challengers are already spending a lot of money on political advertising (see
Table 1.5). In the previous section, we see that the eectiveness of incumbent's ad-
vertising spending relative to his challenger decreases in the level of total advertising
expenditure in the race. Therefore, we see that the marginal returns to advertising
spending have reached the point where an expansion in political advertising by either
candidate will hurt him instead.
The sample in Panel B looks at races where the incumbent achieved a comfortable
winning margin over the challenger. The spending share eects for incumbents are
positive and signicant at the 90% condence level and above for all spending mea-
sures in this intermediate range of vote shares. This is also the subsample where we
have the most statistical power, since that the number of observations is the largest
among all three panels. As a result, the standard errors for the estimates are also
22Full results for dierent vote share boundaries are available upon requests.
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the smallest among all three subsamples. We see that the incumbent benets from
increasing his spending share in all measures, including political advertising. This
is in contrast from the previous panel where elections are close. Hence, incumbents
in this range should pursue more of both mobilization and persuasion spending to
increase his vote share.
Finally, focusing on elections where the incumbent holds an overwhelming advan-
tage over the challenger (Panel C), I nd that incumbent spending does not help
increase his vote share. Surprisingly, campaign materials and events activities (cam-
paign rallies, canvassing, etc.) actually reduce an incumbent's vote share (columns 3
and 4), but is statistically insignicant. Standard errors of the point estimates are
large since the sample size is small. The incumbents in this subsample are most likely
to be established party members who hold important political roles. For example,
Nancy Pelosi, the leader of the House Democratic members, has always obtained a
vote share of at least 71 percentage points since 2004. Thus, it is unlikely that spend-
ing by these incumbents can bring in a signicant number of additional votes as a large
portion of the electorate are already supporting them. In addition, if the purpose of
spending is to convey information on the incumbents to the public, then nding a
minimal eect of spending is not surprising since these candidates are already well
known to the voters.
2.4.7 Redistricting
In the United States, congressional district boundaries are redrawn every 10 years in
order to equalize the population within a district. This is known as redistricting. Most
U.S states are subjected to redistricting except for Delaware, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Wyoming since they only have a single representative for the entire state
due to their low population count. Scholars have believed that gerrymandering, which
is the act of strategic manipulation in the drawing of district boundaries can provide
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an unfair advantage to a single party in elections, which usually means the incumbent.
They suspect that this played a major role in the pre-1960s House elections, which saw
an over representation of Republicans in Congress. However, Erikson (1972) noted
that there is little discernible evidence that partisan-inspired redistricting plans was
behind the Republican advantage. McCarty et al. (2009) studied elections from early
1970s to early 2000s and also concluded that gerrymandering has played little role in
deciding the election outcome.
I estimate the eects of redistricting for my sample of House elections, where
district borders were redrawn after the 2010 Census. To do this, I modify the model
to allow the spending eects to dier for elections in 2004 to 2010 from elections in
2012 to 2016. Formally, I estimate the following model:
IncV oted,t = α0 +α1IncShared,t +α2IncShared,t ∗ 2010t + ΘZd,t + γt + δd + νd,t (7)
where 2010t is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the year is 2012 and beyond
and equals to 0 if the year is 2010 and before. The base term of 2010t is not explicitly
included in the model as it is contained within the year xed eects γt.
The results are reported in Table 2.10. There is strong evidence that the spending
advantage held by an incumbent has decreased after district borders were redrawn.
In particular, the increase in vote shares due to a 1 percentage point increase in total
spending fell by 0.0667 percentage points from +0.2174 before 2010 . I also conduct
an F-test to test whether an increase in the incumbent's share of spending have a
signicant impact on his vote share post redistricting. The value of the test statistic
is reported in the middle panel of Table 2.10 just below the point estimates. The
results for the rst four spending categories, as reported in columns 1 through 4 are
qualitatively similar. While there is a decrease in the eectiveness of incumbent's
spending, their eects remain signicant beyond the 95% condence level. When we
66
focus our attention to advertising spending, the eect of incumbent's spending relative
to his challenger is signicantly reduced after redistrictingfrom a positive estimate
of 0.0507 to 0.0083 per increase of 1 percentage point of incumbent's advertising
spending share. Based on the F-test, this eect is not signicantly dierent from zero
(the p-value is 0.3645).
From the perspective of political competition, this is a positive nding. The re-
sults point towards a decrease in incumbency spending advantage for all spending
purposes. The advantage in political advertising for incumbents has also been com-
pletely eliminated by redistricting. This is in line with previous empirical ndings
that redistricting is not driven by partisan motivations (Erikson (1972); McCarty
et al. (2009)), but rather serves its purpose in balancing the electorate. This creates
a level playing eld between incumbents and challengers and could encourage more
citizens to run for oce.
2.5 Repeated Incumbent and Challenger Races
In Section 2.3, two sources of endogeneity problems are discussed. This section focuses
on addressing the problem of unobserved candidate quality. When the challenger is
of high quality, the incumbent is expected to raise his spending in fear of losing the
election. High quality challengers will also be able to attract more contributions from
the public and interest groups, which in turn increases their spending levels. As a
result, the eect of incumbent spending in the traditional model given by equation (3)
will be underestimated while the eect of challenger spending will be overestimated.
On the other hand, the direction of bias in the second specication is ambiguous since
it depends on the relative magnitude of the change in incumbent's spending to the
change in challenger's spending when there is a shock to the challenger's quality.
Levitt (1994) proposes a clever solution to this problem by focusing on races
where the incumbent faces the challenger more than once. The identication of the
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spending eect relies on the assumption that candidate quality is unchanged over
time. Hence, taking a rst-dierence or xed eects transformation of the model
will eliminate the need to estimate the eect of candidate quality upon vote shares,
but more importantly, the spending estimates will now be free of confounding eects
due to unobserved candidate characteristics. However, this assumption might not
hold if there is a learning-by-doing component to the challenger's campaign strategy.
Moreover, there might be selection bias within this more restricted sample. This
would be the case if the challengers choose to run against the same incumbent multiple
times as the latter is perceived as being weak. Hence, the estimates obtained using
this empirical strategy are local average treatment eects and might not be externally
valid. Nonetheless, this exercise allows us to gauge the severity of the bias due to
unobserved challenger quality.
To do this, I use a two-step approach. First, I reestimate equations (3) and (4)
using only observations in the repeated challenger sample. If the restricted sample
is representative of the full sample, then the results from this estimation step should
not be signicantly dierent from the ones obtained using the full sample. Any
discrepancies between the point estimates are caused by selection bias. To tease out
the bias due to unobserved candidate quality, I estimate the following empirical model
on the restricted sample as my second step and compare the results to the estimates
obtained in step 1:
IncV otep,t = ω0 + ΩXp,t + ΘZp,t + γt + δp + εp,t (8)
where p denotes the incumbent-challenger pair and X denotes a vector of spending
variables that can take on the form of either the incumbent's and challenger's spending
separately, or the incumbent's spending share in the race. I report results for both
models. δp is a vector of pair specic characteristics, which includes incumbent and
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challenger quality. These are assumed to be invariant over time. The δp term is
eliminated after taking a xed eects transformation on p, so there is no need to
estimate it and the spending variables will now be free from confounding eects due
to unobserved candidate quality.
There are a total of 181 incumbent and challenger pairs who met each other at
least twice from 2004 to 2016 and who I have full spending data on. The number of
observations is 385, indicating that most pairs met only twice in my sample period.
2.5.1 Incumbent and Challenger Spending Eects
First, I focus on the specication where incumbent and challenger spending enters
the spending equation separately, i.e. ΩXp,t = ω1IncSpendp,t + ω2ChalSpendp,t.
Recall that we obtained negative estimates for ω1 and ω2 in the full sample due to
endogeneity bias. This section provides insight on whether these results are primarily
driven by the bias due to unobserved candidate quality. My ndings do not suggest
this to be the case regardless of the adopted measure.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2.11. The top panel (A) shows results from
using raw spending levels while the bottom panel (B) uses the natural log-transformed
spending variables. The results are further split into two groupscolumns 1 through
5 report estimates from the rst step, i.e. by simply restricting the sample to races
where the incumbent faces the same challenger at least twice. Columns 6 through
10 report estimates from the second step, i.e. controlling for unobserved candidate
characteristics.
While there are some dierences between the point estimates in the restricted
sample (columns 1 to 5 of Table 2.11) from the ones in the full sample (Table 2.2),
they are not signicantly dierent from each other for the most parts. Standard
errors are also larger in the repeated challenger sample due to a reduction in sample
size. If anything, the eects of incumbent spending on vote share are made even
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more negative, suggesting that incumbents in this sample could be weaker. Also,
challenger spending appears to be less eective compared to the full sample. One
potential reason is that these challengers have stamped their mark in the political
scene and are relatively well known compared to many freshmen challengers in the
full sample. Thus, spending done past the rst election by these challengers could
have a lower eect on the incumbent's vote share since the constituents are now better
informed.
Focusing on columns 6 to 10, the estimates on incumbent spending are still neg-
ative after controlling for unobserved candidate characteristics, indicating that the
bias due to candidate quality is not the major driving force behind the negative
ndings of the eect of incumbent's spending. In the linear spending panel, the esti-
mates have remained relatively constant, except for the estimates on total spending,
which decreases by 50% in magnitude from -0.006 to -0.003. The standard errors of
the estimates of incumbent spending using direct, no administrative, communication
and advertising measures have also gone down, which increases the signicance of
the negative estimates. On the other hand, we see that the estimates on challenger
spending have signicantly decreased for all measures after controlling for candidate
quality, implying that the bias led to an overestimation of the challenger's spending
eects. Surprisingly, the eect is so large that challenger direct spending is no longer
signicant at the 10% level.
Using the log-transformed spending variables (Panel B), we observe the opposite
pattern: that the estimates on incumbent spending are signicantly reduced but the
estimates on challenger spending remain fairly constant. This result can be under-
stood through the dierent weighting scheme applied by the log transformation. In
particular, the log function assigns more weight towards incumbents who spend low
amounts of money in the race. Hence, if the magnitude of the bias due to unob-
served challenger quality is uniform across all spending levels, the log transformation
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exacerbates the bias for low-spending incumbents. The fact the the estimates remain
largely unchanged for the linear specication indicates that the bias could very likely
be of similar degrees at all incumbent's spending levels. On the contrary, the obser-
vation that the log estimates for challengers are fairly constant but not for the linear
estimates could suggest that the bias mainly aects high spending challengers.
2.5.2 Incumbent Spending Share Eects
Next, I turn my attention to the specication where candidate expenditure is captured
by the incumbent's spending share in a race, i.e. ΩXp,t = ω1IncSharep,t. The results
are reported in Table 2.12. First, notice that the signs of the estimates match those
of the full sample given in Table 2.4. However, the magnitudes are lower and many
of the estimates are not statistically signicant. If the sample of repeated challengers
consist of incumbents with lower than average quality compared to the full sample and
if the eectiveness of spending is positively correlated with incumbent quality, then
one should expect a lower estimate of incumbent spending in the restricted sample.
The results in Table 2.12 provide support for this hypothesis. Similarly, there might
also be selection bias for challengers where the restricted sample consist of higher than
average challenger quality. Thus, both eects work together to reduce the estimated
eect of incumbent's spending share.
Properly controlling for candidate quality (columns 6 through 10) raises the point
estimates of 4 out of the 5 spending measures (the exception being total spending),
but not in a statistically signicant manner. The standard errors have also increased,
which further reduces the precision of my estimates. Only direct spending share
has a marginally signicant positive impact on vote shares. The estimates seem to
point towards a null eect of incumbent's spending share, but I do not view this as
a conclusive evidence for two reasons. First, there is an apparent dierence in the
distribution of candidates between the two samples. As pointed out previously, the
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spending share eects signicantly decreased for all measures after restricting our
sample to races with repeated challengers. This implies that the restrictive sample
might not be representative of the true population. Second, the estimates suer from
small sample bias, given that there is only 385 races in the restricted sample.
Recall that while the estimates of incumbent and challenger spending in the tradi-
tional specication are unambiguously biased downwards due to unobserved candidate
quality, the direction of the bias on incumbent's spending share is ambiguous. For-
tunately, the results presented in the previous paragraph suggest that the bias has a
rather minor impact on our estimates and if anything, the magnitudes have slightly
increased after appropriately controlling for candidate quality, but not in a statisti-
cally signicant manner. Hence, the main takeaway of this exercise is to demonstrate
that the endogeneity bias due to unobserved candidate quality has minimal impact
on the estimates of incumbent's spending share.
2.5.3 A Note On Levitt (1994)'s Implementation Strategy
Levitt (1994) estimates a slightly dierent empirical model than then one given in
equation (3). The dierences between our specications are not critical to our results
and readers interested in the details of his model should refer Levitt (1994) instead.
Despite these dierences, the main idea remains the same: to control for candidate
quality, we restrict the sample to races where the incumbent repeatedly faces the same
challenger. However, Levitt (1994) overlooked a minor detail that could, in certain
cases, produce both qualitative and quantitatively dierent estimates. In particular,
when executing this empirical strategy, Levitt takes a xed eect transformation of
his model at the district level. This will not be a problem in districts where there is a
unique incumbent and challenger pair that face each other across all elections in the
sample period. However, when a district consists of multiple incumbent-challenger
pairs, simply taking a rst-dierence or xed eects transformation of the empiri-
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cal model does not suciently control for unobserved candidate quality. Dierent
candidates have plausibly dierent levels of abilities. Hence, the quality term is not
constant over time, which is a violation of the identication assumption. For exam-
ple, Kenneth Calvert, the Republican incumbent on California's 44th congressional
district faced Louis Vandenberg, a Democrat in 2004 and 2006. However, Mr Calvert
went on to face William Hendrick, also a Democrat in 2008 and 2010. It is dicult
to argue that the quality of Mr Vandenberg is the same as Mr Hendrick, so taking
a xed-eect transformation of the model will most likely introduce an additional
source of bias. To circumvent this problem, we have to redene each observation at
the pair-year level, instead of the district-year level.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 have implicitly showed the dierences in estimates using
the incorrect implementation (columns 1 through 5) and the correct implementation
(columns 6 through 10). The discrepancies in point estimates and statistical signif-
icance are by no means negligible. The point estimates can decrease by more than
half of its size (incumbent's log total spending estimates and challenger's linear spend-
ing estimates in Table 2.11), or that the signicance level of estimates can decrease
(incumbent's total and direct spending share estimates in Table 2.12) or increase (in-
cumbent's linear spending estimate in Table 2.11) because of this error. Hence, this
highlights the importance of careful selection of our panel variable, in which a minor
slip up can potentially lead us to very dierent conclusions.
2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I present two robustness checks, starting with using Cook Political
ratings as the set of controls for expected closeness to splitting spending estimates by
general and primary election spending.
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2.6.1 Cook Political Ratings
Besides using party committee contribution to the candidates and lagged presidential
vote shares in the congressional district as controls for expected closeness, I also
explore the use of race ratings published by the Cook Political Report. The ratings
are released on an irregular basis, with the time between updates becomes increasingly
shorter as the general election approaches. Fortunately, race ratings are available at
least once per month starting from August of the election year for every election cycle
in my sample. Hence, I compiled monthly ratings using the rst report available in
each month. Each race is classied as either a strong Democrat, likely Democrat, lean
Democrat, toss-up Democrat favored, toss-up Republican favored, lean Republican,
likely Republican, and strong Republican. I recode each rating on a scale of 0 to 7,
with 0 being the safest district for an incumbent, i.e. classied as a strong Democratic
district if the incumbent is a Democrat or classied as a strong Republican district if
the incumbent is a Republican, and 7 being the least safe district for the incumbent,
for example a strong Democratic district for a Republican incumbent.
Table 2.13 shows the results from a regression of the incumbent's vote share on
incumbent and challenger spending with the regular controls such as district and
year xed eects, lagged presidential vote share, party committee contributions and
a separate dummy variable for each rating category by month. The estimates on the
linear spending variables shown in Panel A have lower magnitude and signicance level
compared to those in Table 2.2. However, if Cook Political Reports are predicting
the closeness of each race based on the candidate's observed spending amount, the
dierence in estimates might be driven by multicolinearity. Unfortunately, the exact
criteria and methodology of race classication is not made available to the public.
Nonetheless, the estimated eect of incumbent's spending, although insignicant for
many parts, remain negative. Turning attention to the log spending eects in panel
B, the estimates are all negative and signicant regardless of measures used. This
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indicates that even with this many dimensions of covariates that attempt to control
for race expectations, the problem of simultaneity bias is not entirely solved.
Table 2.14 presents results on incumbent's spending share, with dummy variables
for Cook Political House ratings added as extra controls. The eects remain positive
but the magnitudes have decreased from those reported in Table 2.4. Multicollinearity
is again very likely to be a problem since we are now adding in 32 extra covariates into
the spending equation.23 Despite this setback, the estimates on incumbent spending
share remains positive, which is consistent with previous results.
2.6.2 General and Primary Election Spending
The dependent variable used in all models is the incumbent's share of the two-party
votes in general election. Thus, there might be dierential eects between money
spent before the primary election and after the primary election for a candidate. Pre-
primary election spending is primarily driven by the competitiveness of the primary
election and could have little impact on the general election results. There could also
be a long term impact of spending where the eect of spending done prior to the
primary election persist into the general election period. For example, candidates
may choose to start advertising heavily during the primary election in order to reach
out to a larger set of audience throughout their political campaign.
To identify if there is a timing dierential in spending, I split both incumbent and
challenger spending into primary and general election expenditures according to the
state primary dates. Since the actual date of the primary election could be dierent
across states, I normalize candidate spending by the number of days between any two
consecutive elections. Specically, for primary election spending, I count the number
of days from the start of the o-election year to the primary election day. Whenever
a runo election is held, I extend the period of primary election to the runo election
23There are 8 categories for each month and I use 4 months of House ratings.
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date. Pre-primary spending is then given by the sum of candidate spending up to
the primary election day normalized by the number of days in this period. Similarly
for general election spending, I count the number of days after the primary election
leading up to the general election and normalize the sum of candidate spending in
this period by the number of days. Hence, the spending variables in this section
are interpreted as the average candidate spending per day. I only use races between
2010-2016 since spending data is unavailable by date for several types of spending
such as transfers, political contributions and donations. I nd that the incumbent's
vote share is primarily aected by general election spending with little evidence that
primary election spending inuences outcomes. On the other hand, I nd that both
pre-primary and post-primary spending for challengers reduce the incumbent's general
election vote share.
Detailed results are presented in Table 2.15. Full indicates candidate spending
for the entire election cycle, i.e. candidate expenditures are not distinguish based
on their timing. GE indicates general election spending, which is spending done
between the primary and general election. PE indicates primary election spend-
ing, which is spending done from the start of the o-election year up to the primary
election. All spending variables are measured in units of $1000 and are normalized
by the number of days leading up to the election. For incumbents, the estimates
of general election spending are all signicant at the 95% condence level regardless
of measure, but it is insignicant for 4 out of the 5 measure for primary election
spending. Incumbent's primary election spending is only marginally signicant at
the 90% condence level (column 6), indicating that the spending eects reported in
previous sections are driven primarily by general election spending and not money
spent before the primary election. On the other hand, the challenger spending es-
timates are signicant for both general and primary election spending regardless of
measure. The discrepancy between the eectiveness of primary election spending for
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incumbents and challengers can be understood through the spread of information.
Incumbents are generally well known to the public and there might be little need to
convey additional information to the voters. On the other hand, a newcomer to the
election can benet from increased publicity early in the election cycle in order to
communicate her platforms to the voter. If we also think about the persistence in
spending eects, then this suggest that there is no long-lasting impact of campaign
money for incumbents, consistent with the view of Gerber et al. (2011), but this does
not apply to challengers.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the dierential impact of disaggregated campaign spending
on election outcomes. I also show that previous methods of estimating the impact
of incumbent and challenger spending separately suer from endogeneity bias using
data from more recent elections. I propose a separate empirical model using the
incumbent's spending share in the race as the main variable of interest that is arguably
less prone to such bias.
I go on to show that the incumbent's vote share increases in his share of spending
in fundraising, advertising, campaign events (e.g. rallies, GOTV eorts) and indirect
expenditures. I also found that administrative spending helps the incumbent to an
extent that it increases the eectiveness of money spent on labor intensive activities,
such as fundraising and campaign events, but does not aect the eectiveness of
advertising spending, which could be carried out independently of campaign size. I
also investigate how the eectiveness of spending change with several electoral and
candidate characteristics, such as the incumbent's political party, the total spending
level in a race, electoral closeness in the district, and the redrawing of district borders.
My work opens up several avenues of research on the role of campaign money in
elections. Previous studies have focused primarily on the eects of political advertis-
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ing (Larreguy et al. (2014); Spenkuch and Toniatti (2016)) and canvassing activities
(Gerber and Green (2000)). However, little research has been done to analyze the role
of indirect spending, such as the spillover eects of spending done in neighboring dis-
tricts on one's own district, or how the size of campaign might aect the eectiveness
of money on election outcomes.
Another direction of research that is equally important is to develop a convincing
empirical strategy to solve the problem of reverse causality. So far, none of the
previous studies have successfully address all the criticisms in the literature.
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Figure 2.1: Party Committee Contributions to Candidates
(a) To Incumbents
(a) To Challengers
Notes: This gure shows the amount of contributions made to a candidate by party committees by
the candidate's vote share. Panel (a) shows the scatter plot for incumbents while panel (b) shows
the scatter plot for challengers. Contribution amounts are in 2010 dollars and in units of $10,000s.
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Figure 2.2: Level vs Relative Spending
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the scatter plots of incumbent's vote share versus the natural log
of incumbent's spending and the natural log of challenger's spending respectively. Panel (c) shows
the natural log of the dierence between the incumbent's and the challenger's spending. Panel (d)
shows the incumbent's spending as a percentage of the spending sum by both the incumbent and
the challenger. The red line represents the best linear t line.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Vote Share by Incumbent's Spending Share for All Measures
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Table 2.1: Total Spending Eects on Incumbent Vote Share
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
Linear Spending Log Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inc Total -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗ -2.080∗∗∗ -2.269∗∗∗ -2.045∗∗∗ -1.625∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.347) (0.427) (0.421) (0.422)
Chal Total -0.050∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -2.690∗∗∗ -1.974∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ -1.694∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.137) (0.132) (0.139) (0.110)
Inc Party Contrib -0.393∗∗ -0.174 -0.377∗ -0.164
(0.178) (0.168) (0.198) (0.168)
Chal Party Contrib -1.959∗∗∗ -1.787∗∗∗ -1.348∗∗∗ -1.206∗∗∗
(0.339) (0.345) (0.261) (0.281)
President 0.313∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.070)
Constant 66.895∗∗∗ 63.244∗∗∗ 64.075∗∗∗ 45.526∗∗∗ 80.114∗∗∗ 79.125∗∗∗ 78.335∗∗∗ 59.154∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.440) (0.453) (4.560) (1.398) (1.802) (1.778) (5.205)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
District FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1928 1928 1927 1926 1928 1928 1927 1926
R2 0.312 0.702 0.712 0.740 0.451 0.746 0.751 0.775
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All spending measures are in units of $10,000. Party contrib denotes party
committee contributions to the candidate. President denotes the lagged vote share of the presidential candidate who is in the same party as the
incumbent. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.2: Spending Eects on Incumbent Vote Share for Various Measures
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
Linear Spending Log Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Direct No Admin Comm Advert Total Direct No Admin Comm Advert
Incumbent -0.005∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -1.625∗∗∗ -1.960∗∗∗ -1.273∗∗∗ -1.191∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.422) (0.355) (0.160) (0.150) (0.073)
Challenger -0.027∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -1.694∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗ -1.326∗∗∗ -1.272∗∗∗ -0.835∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.110) (0.097) (0.092) (0.083) (0.067)
Constant 45.526∗∗∗ 46.254∗∗∗ 44.902∗∗∗ 44.641∗∗∗ 44.929∗∗∗ 59.154∗∗∗ 60.372∗∗∗ 54.071∗∗∗ 53.279∗∗∗ 48.344∗∗∗
(4.560) (4.401) (4.347) (4.314) (4.332) (5.205) (5.115) (4.434) (4.424) (4.228)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925
R2 0.740 0.745 0.740 0.739 0.743 0.775 0.779 0.771 0.772 0.760
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All spending measures are in units of $10,000. All regressions include party
committee contribution and lagged presidential vote share as controls. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Spending Eects Broken Down Into Categories
Linear Spending Log Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inc Direct -0.008∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -1.960∗∗∗ -2.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.355) (0.339)
Chal Direct -0.028∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗ -1.441∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.097) (0.090)
Inc Indirect 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.227) (0.252)
Chal Indirect -0.003 -0.005 -0.017 -0.022
(0.006) (0.004) (0.044) (0.051)
Incumbent Challenger Incumbent Challenger
Admin -0.005 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.206) (0.143)
Travel -0.033 -0.031 0.067 0.027
(0.022) (0.050) (0.188) (0.046)
Fundraise 0.008 -0.009 0.374 -0.053
(0.006) (0.012) (0.232) (0.085)
Advert -0.021∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.542∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.104) (0.082)
Polling -0.173∗∗ -0.139 -0.093∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.066) (0.169) (0.051) (0.031)
Material -0.100∗∗∗ -0.010 0.016 -0.022
(0.026) (0.015) (0.070) (0.091)
Event 0.034 -0.259∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.111∗
(0.051) (0.091) (0.132) (0.057)
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925
R2 0.745 0.751 0.763 0.779 0.782 0.779
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All spending measures are in
units of $10,000. All regressions include party committee contribution and lagged presidential vote
share as controls. Indirect spending consists of transfers to another political committee,
contribution refunds, loan repayments and donations. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share, by Measure
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
IncShare 0.1900∗∗∗ -0.1385 0.1707∗∗∗ -0.1691∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ -0.2304∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ -0.2162∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ -0.1321∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0851) (0.0135) (0.0872) (0.0113) (0.0299) (0.0106) (0.0265) (0.0080) (0.0211)
IncShare2 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 29.6392∗∗∗ 41.3802∗∗∗ 30.2006∗∗∗ 42.3267∗∗∗ 34.4564∗∗∗ 44.6449∗∗∗ 35.1002∗∗∗ 44.4383∗∗∗ 37.7211∗∗∗ 42.2364∗∗∗
(4.2407) (5.0566) (4.0962) (4.3301) (4.4359) (4.2718) (4.3678) (4.1951) (4.4919) (4.8180)
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925 1925
R2 0.756 0.764 0.749 0.764 0.719 0.750 0.716 0.749 0.701 0.748
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party committee contribution and lagged presidential vote
share as controls. IncShare denotes the incumbent's spending as a percentage of the total expenditure in the race, depending on measure. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: The Eects of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Shares with Adminis-
trative Spending Share
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
Noadmin Comm Advert
IncShare 0.1611 0.0959 -0.1200
(0.1980) (0.1735) (0.1493)
IncShare × AdminShare -0.0036 -0.0027 0.0005
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0017)
IncShare2 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0010
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012)
IncShare2× AdminShare 0.00003∗∗ 0.00002∗ 0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
AdminShare 0.1690∗ 0.1496∗ 0.0944∗∗
(0.0887) (0.0775) (0.0447)
Observations 1926 1926 1926
R2 0.752 0.751 0.745
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All models include lagged
presidential vote share and party committee contributions as controls. AdminShare denotes the
incumbent's share (in percentage) of administrative spending in the race. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share Broken Down into
Spending Components




















Observations 1926 1926 1845
R2 0.749 0.753 0.753
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party
committee contribution and lagged presidential vote share as controls. Each spending variable
represents the percentage of total expenditure in the race for that measure that is attributed to the
incumbent. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share by Political Party
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Inc Share 0.2011∗∗∗ 0.1799∗∗∗ 0.1172∗∗∗ 0.1033∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0152) (0.0170) (0.0144) (0.0097)
Rep 1.9723 1.7203 4.2477∗∗ 3.8620∗∗ 1.2781
(2.0545) (1.8383) (1.7182) (1.5618) (1.1118)
Rep × Inc Share -0.0206 -0.0168 -0.0429∗ -0.0389∗ -0.0074
(0.0281) (0.0243) (0.0236) (0.0217) (0.0152)
Constant 28.4222∗∗∗ 29.0739∗∗∗ 31.3609∗∗∗ 32.2747∗∗∗ 36.5125∗∗∗
(4.7557) (4.5473) (4.9854) (4.8672) (4.7528)
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925
R2 0.757 0.750 0.722 0.718 0.702
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party
committee contribution and lagged presidential vote share as controls. IncShare denotes the
incumbent's spending as a percentage of the total expenditure in the race, depending on measure.
Rep is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the incumbent is a Republican and 0 otherwise. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share by Spending Level
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Inc Share 0.1803∗∗∗ 0.1485∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0241) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0097)
$Sum -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0120 -0.0112 -0.0115
(0.0059) (0.0078) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0094)
$Sum × Inc Share -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 32.0802∗∗∗ 34.9229∗∗∗ 39.8997∗∗∗ 40.2054∗∗∗ 42.6774∗∗∗
(4.5347) (3.8073) (4.2224) (4.0548) (4.0638)
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925
R2 0.764 0.764 0.750 0.749 0.748
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party
committee contribution and lagged presidential vote share as controls. IncShare denotes the
incumbent's spending as a percentage of the total expenditure in the race, depending on measure.
$Sum denotes the sum of incumbent and challenger spending by measure. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Eect of Incumbent Spending Shares, by Closeness
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Direct No Admin Comm Advert
Panel A:
Close Elections (Inc Vote Share≤60%)
Inc Share 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗ 0.0084 0.0049 -0.0005
(0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0150)
Observations 671 671 671 671 671
Panel B:
Incumbents Favored (60%<Inc Vote Share<70%)
Inc Share 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗ 0.0234∗∗ 0.0102∗
(0.0150) (0.0129) (0.0106) (0.0089) (0.0054)
Observations 857 857 857 857 857
Panel C:
Lopsided (Inc Vote Share≥70%)
Inc Share 0.0315 0.0293 -0.0061 -0.0071 0.0088
(0.0388) (0.0343) (0.0362) (0.0318) (0.0199)
Observations 398 398 398 398 397
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party
committee contribution and lagged presidential vote share as controls. The sample is split
according to the incumbent's vote share given in each panel. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
90
Table 2.10: Eect of Incumbent Spending Share on Vote Share: Redistricting
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Inc Share 0.2174∗∗∗ 0.1955∗∗∗ 0.1428∗∗∗ 0.1293∗∗∗ 0.0507∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0218) (0.0241) (0.0251) (0.0192)
2010 × Inc Share -0.0667∗∗ -0.0604∗ -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.0909∗∗ -0.0424∗
(0.0294) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0348) (0.0245)
Constant 26.7915∗∗∗ 27.6830∗∗∗ 29.7857∗∗∗ 30.6476∗∗∗ 35.7653∗∗∗
(3.4409) (3.0754) (3.2486) (3.1560) (3.8251)
F-Test
α1 + α2 = 0 38.20
∗∗∗ 39.83∗∗∗ 7.49∗∗∗ 6.37∗∗ 0.84
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925
R2 0.759 0.752 0.728 0.724 0.704
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party
committee contribution and lagged presidential vote share as controls. Inc Share denotes
incumbent's spending as a percentage of total expenditure in the race by measure. 2010 is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the year is between 2012 and 2016, and equals 0 if the year is
between 2004-2010. The F-test is conducted to test whether the eect of incumbent's spending
share upon incumbent's vote share is signicantly dierent from 0, i.e. α1 + α2 = 0. The test
statistics are reported for each spending measure. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Repeated Challengers - Eect of Incumbent and Challenger Spending
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
District Fixed Eects Pair Fixed Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Panel A: Linear Spending
Incumbent -0.006 -0.011 -0.015∗ -0.016∗ -0.021∗ -0.003 -0.010∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Challenger -0.019∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.020 -0.021 -0.028 -0.006∗∗ -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Panel B: Log Spending
Incumbent -2.316∗ -1.908∗∗∗ -1.396∗∗∗ -1.364∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -1.034 -1.185∗∗∗ -1.207∗∗∗ -1.200∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗
(1.259) (0.491) (0.335) (0.305) (0.146) (0.847) (0.344) (0.254) (0.233) (0.100)
Challenger -1.120∗∗∗ -1.045∗∗ -1.053∗∗∗ -0.999∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗∗ -0.868∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.396) (0.246) (0.236) (0.163) (0.242) (0.284) (0.156) (0.143) (0.102)
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party committee contribution and lagged presidential vote
share as controls. Columns 1 to 5 uses district level xed eects. The results are from an estimation that reduces the sample to races where there is
a repeated challenger, but do not suciently control for unobserved candidate quality. Columns 6 to 10 reports the estimates in the model that uses
pair xed eects, which now eliminates the confounding eects on the spending variables. Panel A reports the estimation results from the
specication where incumbent and challenger spending are in terms of their levels. Panel B resports the estimation results from after taking a
natural log-transformed variables on incumbent and challenger spending. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: Repeated Challengers - Eect of Incumbent Spending Share
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
District Fixed Eects Pair Fixed Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Inc Share 0.152∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.036 0.024 0.009 0.121 0.108∗ 0.044 0.029 0.009
(0.076) (0.048) (0.022) (0.018) (0.011) (0.088) (0.057) (0.028) (0.018) (0.012)
Observations 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All regressions include party committee contribution and lagged presidential vote
share as controls. Sample is restricted to only races where the incumbent faces a challenger more than once. Columns 1 to 5 uses district level xed
eects. The results are from an estimation that reduces the sample to races where there is a repeated challenger, but do not suciently control for
unobserved candidate quality. Columns 6 to 10 reports the estimates in the model that uses pair xed eects, which now eliminates the confounding
eects on the spending variables. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Cook Political Ratings - Eect of Incumbent and Challenger Spending
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Panel A: Linear Spending
Incumbent -0.002 -0.004∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Challenger -0.011∗∗ -0.011∗ -0.011 -0.010 -0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Panel B: Log Spending
Incumbent -0.686∗ -1.154∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.251) (0.140) (0.129) (0.061)
Challenger -1.332∗∗∗ -1.209∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -0.993∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.122) (0.089) (0.081) (0.058)
Lagged Pres Y Y Y Y Y
Party Contrib Y Y Y Y Y
Cook Ratings Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1926
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All spending measures are in
units of $10,000. All models include lagged presidential vote share, party committee contributions,
and dummy variables for each category of the coded Cook Political House Ratings from August to
November of the election year as controls. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.14: Cook Political Ratings - Eect of Incumbent Spending Share
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Inc Share 0.118∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
Constant 39.149∗∗∗ 40.134∗∗∗ 44.417∗∗∗ 44.990∗∗∗ 47.086∗∗∗
(6.010) (5.483) (5.557) (5.439) (5.346)
Lagged Pres Y Y Y Y Y
Party Contrib Y Y Y Y Y
Cook Ratings Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926 1925
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All models include lagged
presidential vote share, party committee contributions, and dummy variables for each category of
the coded Cook Political House Ratings from August to November of the election year as controls.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.15: Eect of Incumbent and Challenger Spending: General and Primary Election
Dependent Variable: Incumbent's Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert Total Direct Noadmin Comm Advert
Inc Full -0.428∗ -0.660∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ -1.332∗∗∗ -2.612∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.297) (0.303) (0.336) (0.289)
Chal Full -1.391∗∗∗ -1.472∗∗∗ -1.434∗∗∗ -1.352∗∗ -0.774
(0.352) (0.462) (0.569) (0.580) (0.565)
Inc GE -0.532∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗ -1.410∗∗∗ -1.733∗∗∗ -3.014∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.311) (0.412) (0.531) (0.529)
Inc PE -0.144∗ -0.161 -0.624 -0.889 -1.033
(0.082) (0.099) (0.442) (0.649) (0.689)
Chal GE -1.839∗∗∗ -1.721∗∗∗ -1.733∗∗∗ -1.521∗∗∗ -1.095∗
(0.427) (0.482) (0.611) (0.637) (0.660)
Chal PE -0.899∗∗ -0.786∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -0.640∗
(0.433) (0.401) (0.288) (0.339) (0.380)
Observations 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All models include lagged presidential vote share and party committee
contributions as controls. Spending variables are measured in units of $1,000 per day. Full denotes spending per day for the entire election cycle.
GE denotes general election spending, which is the sum of candidate spending after primary election up to general election, normalized by the
number of days in this period. PE denotes primary election spending, which is the sum of candidate spending at the start of the o-election year
up to the primary election, normalized by the number of days in this period. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 3 Ideology, Uncertainty, and Checks and Balances
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great diculty lies in this: you must rst enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place,
oblige it to control itself."
 James Madison, The Federalist 51, 1788
3.1 Introduction
There are two contradictory yet important parts to this famous quote. First and
foremost, the government should be allowed freedom to take any political actions.24
If the government is a benevolent social planner who seeks to maximize aggregate
citizen welfare, there would be little argument against this claim. More realistically, in
a democratic society, a government with little power defeats the purpose of elections,
which serve as a mechanism to aggregate voters' preferences.25 In such situations,
bills in favor of the majority will be hard to pass and the majority will lose its
representation. Hence, governmental authority is important to enable implementation
of policies supported by the majority.
However, men are no angels and are susceptible to greed. Once elected to power,
politicians can freely decide on policies if there are no external forces that prevent
them from doing so. Hence, Madison's second point concerns nding the proper insti-
tutional structure to balance the government's power. Formally, checks and balances
(CBs hereafter)a system where government branches are empowered to restrain each
24This statement might sound controversial as it implies that the government should be given
dictatorial power. However, in a democratic society, the government is chosen by the majority of
voters and hence should (arguably) represent them. Moreover, there has been a vast literature
that argues that politicians hold superior information and make better collective decisions (e.g. see
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996); Condorcet (1785); Maskin and Tirole (2004)).
25As an example, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
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other from becoming too powerful, is incorporated into the U.S. constitution to pre-
vent branches from single-handedly taking selsh political actions. For example, the
War Powers Resolution of 1973 was introduced as a control on the president's power
over the military during the periods of the Vietnam war. Prior to the passing of the
resolution, the president can choose to deploy troops in war zones at their discre-
tion. The resolution shifts political power away from the Executive by requiring the
president to seek Congress' approval prior to taking any military actions without a
declaration of war. President Nixon, not surprisingly vetoed the bill but the Congress
gathered enough support to overturn the veto.26
The literature on checks and balances has traditionally focused on studying the
benets of the system, which is in line with Madison's intents. Persson et al. (1997)
studies a rent-seeking problem and showed that CBs unambiguously benet the citi-
zens on average if there are sucient checks on the Executive. In a follow up paper
(Persson et al. (2000)), they went on to show, using a public nance model, that the
amount of rents extracted by politicians decreases as the decision-making power over
spending and taxes are split across government branches.
However, in October 2013, the US federal government was forced to a 16-day
shutdown when the two chambers of Congress failed to agree on the appropriations
bill for scal year 2014. This was largely due to political stalemate between the
Democratic-led Senate and the Republican-led House of Representatives on the fund-
ing of the Aordable Care Act. The cost to this shutdown was substantial. The Oce
of Management and budget estimated that the 4th quarter real GDP growth was low-
ered by 0.2-0.6 percentage points.27 Most government employees are also furloughed
26There are also controversies over the War Powers Resolution. President Nixon pointed out in
his veto statement that the law is unconstitutional as it imposes a strict limit on the president,
who serves as the commander-in-chief of the U.S. army himself. He further argues that Congress
will have too much power if this resolution passes since the Legislature already has constitutional
checks on the president's power with its appropriations power. The statement can be accessed at:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4021.
27The report can be accessed at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/les/omb/reports/impacts-
and-costs-of-october-2013-federal-government-shutdown-report.pdf
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and remain uncertain on their job security throughout this period of time. Further-
more, most agencies suered from huge negative productivity shocks. Data access
from government website was temporarily curtailed, preventing ground-breaking re-
searches from taking place. To the best of my knowledge, this points to a gap in
the literature on the undesirability of CBs that has yet to be lled and this article
attempts to address this concern.
An element that is missing in the literature, yet important to explain such events
is a measure of ideological dierences among politicians. Although CBs was not in-
tended as a system to control the liberals and the conservatives, the dierence in
policy preferences across political parties arguably plays a major role when deciding
whether to exercise one's veto power. In the US for example, the amount of checks
that the Congress has over the President is ultimately determined by the voters. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows the number of regular vetoes of non-private bills per congress from
1945 to 2008 (79th to 110th congresses), which I pull directly form Cameron (2009).
Notice that there is a stark dierence in the frequency of Presidential vetoes over leg-
islation between unied and divided government. In particular, divided government
leads to higher usage of veto power. This is not surprising. As the government moves
from unied to divided, conict of interest between branches rises and the President
more frequently resorts to exercising his veto rights to drive outcomes in favor of
his party. This shows that ideological dierences, or in other words, disagreement
between branches of government is an important factor in understanding the eects
of CBs.
While Persson et al. (1997) fails to quantitatively estimate the degree of conict
of interest (due to ideological dierences) between government branches, this chapter
accounts for this by constructing a model with horizontal dierences in ideology on
a single policy space. I also allow ideological dierences within members of the same
political party conditional on that they lie in the same half of the political spectrum.
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This captures the dierential intensity in ideologies among the members. For example,
Zell Miller, the former Governor of Georgia and also a senator, is well known for his
conservative views although he originates from the Democratic party. This feature of
the model implies that there will still be disagreement between branches in a unied
government, which can lead to vetoes and gridlock. This is in line with Figure 3.1
and Krehbiel (1996) where he notes that gridlock occurs due to moderate status quo
and its relative location to the ideal policies of political pivots, and not because of
the distinction between unied and divided government.
The reader should bear in mind that this article does not attempt to distinguish
the implications of dierent forms of CBs on citizens' welfare. The model presented
can be easily extended to study this alternate question. Thus, I employ the simplest
form of CBs where I assume that there is a single veto player (known as the checker)
who has the power to block proposed bills (written by the proposer). The problem
faced by the single representative voter is to select the optimal form of government
(distributions of proposal and veto powers across political parties).
I nd that CBs reduce the welfare of extremist voters when the status quo and
the checker are suciently moderate relative to the proposer. The reason is that
CBs promotes power sharing between government branches whenever they disagree
on policies. As a result, a compromise has to be reached and the resulting policy
will lie further away from the extreme voters' bliss points. Conversely, moderate
voters benet from such a system due to policy moderation. When the status quo
is extreme, it loses its eectiveness as a threat point, which reduces the degree of
power sharing between government branches. For suciently extreme status quo, CBs
become irrelevant as the proposer can now unilaterally implement his ideal policy.
More often than not, voters are uninformed about the exact political stand of
candidates (Austen-Smith and Banks (1996); Budge (1994); Callander (2008); Maskin
and Tirole (2004)). This plays a huge role in election and could sway votes in one way
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or another depending on the information on the candidates' ideology that the voters
possess. Therefore, I analyze the costs and benets of CBs on voter expected welfare
when either the Executive's ideology or the Legislature's ideology is unknown.28 In
these models, the only information that voter has is the party of each candidate, so
he knows that a Democratic (Republican) politician is left (right) wing but is unsure
about the intensity of her preferences. In other words, the voter knows which half the
candidates lie on the political spectrum but is unable to pinpoint the exact location
of their ideologies.
I nd that the eectiveness of CBs diers depending on which channel the uncer-
tainty operates on. In particular, I nd that uncertainty on the Legislature's ideology
may exacerbate the detrimental eects of CBs on extremist voters. In particular this
happens whenever the status quo lies between the checker and the proposer's bliss
points, with the proposer's ideal policy closest to the middle. Without uncertainty,
the voter knows that the status quo will be maintained. However, when he is unsure
about the checker's bliss point, moderate policies might arise (such as the proposer's
ideal policy) which decreases his expected welfare. On the other hand, uncertainty
on the Executive's preferences enhances the benets of CBs to all voters regardless of
their ideology. This is mainly due to the reduction in policy uncertainty when a veto
player with known ideology is introduced to the policy-making game. As a result, the
system of CBs weakly increases the expected welfare of all citizens
The rest of the chapter is organize as follows: Section 3.2 contains a brief literature
review on veto players and checks and balances. It also lists the contributions of this
chapter. Section 3.3 lays out the general model. Section 3.4 analyzes the model
with one-sided variation on the checker's bliss point. It also contains a comparison
of results between a model with complete information and a model where voter is
uncertain about the checker's bliss point. This allows us to distinguish the eects
28The case where both branches' ideologies are unknown has yet to be solved. I briey discuss on
this in the conclusion.
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on uncertainty from the eects of having a veto player on expected voter welfare.
Section 3.5 takes a similar approach to Section 3.4 but the variation is now on the
the proposer's side. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Contribution
3.2.1 Checks and Balances
The literature on checks and balances is limited and has traditionally been focused on
the benets of the system. Persson et al. (1997) one of the rst to analyze the benets
of CBs in a rent-seeking model. They nd that the system unambiguously improves
on voter welfare when there are sucient checks on the Executive branch. My work
takes on a new approach in analyzing the costs and benets of CBs when politicians
are attached to political parties and have dierent ideologies. There are two reasons
that make this approach interesting. The rst is that Persson et al. (1997) fails to
account for cases where the system of CBs reduces voter's utility, which I argued in
the introduction, occurs in real life. The second is that CBs crucially depends on
political stands of the government ocials. For example, political gridlock happens
more frequently when the government is divided and parties are highly polarized. This
chapter accounts for that by modeling ideologies on a uni-dimensional policy space.
This allows us to measure the degree of polarization or conict of interest between
government branches by simply computing the distance between their bliss points.
Introducing this feature in the model generates cases where CBs is detrimental to
the public, which serves as a rst step in understanding the negative aspects of the
system.
To the best of my knowledge, Acemoglu et al. (2013) was the rst paper to study
the negative eects of CBs. They argue that countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and
Venezuela chose to dismantle checks on the Executive branch to make it harder for rich
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lobbies and elites to bribe politicians. My work does not build on their framework, but
rather complements it by providing a more fundamental reasonideological dierences,
on why CBs may be undesirable. On top of that, this chapter also ties the model closer
to the real world by studying the impact of ideological uncertainty on the eectiveness
of CBs. I show that the channel of uncertainty is important as it generates very
dierent implications depending on which side it operates on. In general, most voters
gain from CBs when uncertainty is on the proposer's bliss point whereas some voters
are hurt from CBs when uncertainty is on the checker's bliss point.
3.2.2 Veto Players and Gridlock
The approach of this work is very similar to Tsebelis (2002). He studies the structure
of political systems, specically about the number of veto players with ideological
distances between them on the policies that may arise in the policy-making game.
However, his analysis on gridlock is non-standard in the literature as he employs
non-game theoretic approach to explain his ndings. This article, on the other hand,
oers an equilibrium explanation to the implications of veto players which allows us to
perform standard comparative static exercises to further understand the importance
of each parameter in the model. Therefore, readers who seek a more formal treatment
on the costs and benets of granting veto rights to a decision-maker will nd this
chapter more appealing.
Krehbiel (1996) looks at a comparative theory of political outcomes under unied
and divided government. He argues that political stalemate happens far too often
even under strong partisanship in a unied government (see Figure 3.1). This chapter
supports his view that gridlock is not an implication of unied or divided government,
but is rather a result driven by the relative distances between ideologies of Legislative
pivots and the status quo. This provides yet another reason on why government
ocials' ideologies (and their distance from the status quo) matter when analyzing
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the costs and benets of CBs.
3.3 Model
I start out with providing the description of the general model, and in subsequent
sections analyze specic forms of this model. Policies are uni-dimensional and repre-
sented by the real line R. There is a single representative voter who prefers the policy
τ̃ , that is, τ̃ is the unique policy which gives him the highest level of utility. I refer
to this as his bliss point. There are two political parties R and D (representing the
Republican and the Democratic party, respectively) with a continuum of members in
each party. The preferred policy (bliss point) of each member i in party R, τ̃ iR, is uni-
formly distributed on the interval [α−γ, α+γ], i.e. τ̃ iR ∼ U [α−γ, α+γ], where α > 0
is party R's mean bliss point and 0 < γ ≤ α is a measure of the party members' ideo-
logical dispersion, which can be interpreted as the strength of party synergy or party
discipline. Likewise, bliss points for members in party D is uniformly distributed on
the interval [−α − γ,−α + γ], i.e. τ̃ iD ∼ U [−α − γ,−α + γ], where party D's mean
bliss point is −α.29 Figure 3.2 depicts the distribution of party members' bliss points
along the political spectrum.
3.3.1 Checks and Balances
There are two government branches: the Executive (E) and the Legislature (L). The
executive holds proposal power and can propose a bill τ̂ . The legislature, depending on
the constitutional structure, may hold veto power to block the executive's proposals.30
29The assumption that γ ≤ α implies that the intersection of the two intervals is empty. If we
think about the policy space as representing the political spectrum, then this assumption means
that any member from party D is guaranteed to be more left-wing than any member from party
R. I nd this assumption to be relatively harmless as recent empirical ndings show that there is
increased political polarization between the Democrats and the Republicans.
30In the U.S. however, the roles of government branches are reversed. It is the Congress who
proposes bills and the President who vetoes. The main reason that the model is formulated this way
is to be consistent with Persson et al. (1997).
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There are two states of the world. In the rst state V = 0, the constitution
species that the legislature holds no veto power and cannot block bills proposed
by the executive. We refer to this as a government without checks and balances.
In the second state V = 1, the constitution species that the legislature can veto
bills proposed by the executive. We refer to this as a government with checks and
balances. Under this state, if the legislature chooses to block the bill τ̂ , the status
quo policy S ∈ R will be triggered. If he chooses to accept the bill, it will then be
implemented.31
3.3.2 Utilities
The utility for the voter and each member of a party depends on the actual imple-
mented policy and their respective bliss points. For any policy τ , the utility function





) = −(τ − τ̃ i)2
The voter's utility function takes on a similar structure and is given by:
V (τ, τ̃) = −(τ − τ̃)2
3.3.3 Strategies
In each state V = 0, 1 the voter chooses the winner vector {EV, LV} where EV ∈
{D,R} and LV ∈ {D,R} represent the parties who win the Executive and Legislative
seat in state V respectively. This vector then represents the form of government
chosen by the voter.32
31An alternative model where only the Executive branch is present under no checks and balances
can be formulated. All results in this chapter remain the same independent of this modeling choice.
32If in state V, the voter's choice is EV = LV, the government will be unied. If EV 6= LV, then
the government is divided.
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After election, the winning parties select, for each seat that they win, a repre-
sentative from among its members as the branch leader.33 The identities of the two
representatives (one for each branch) are then publicly announced to the voter. In
other words, the voter will learn, through this announcement, the bliss points of the
representatives and all uncertainty will be resolved at this point of time. Let τ̃ p and
τ̃ c denote, respectively, the bliss points of the representative for the Executive branch
(known as the proposer p) and the representative for the Legislative branch (known
as the checker c). The proposer p then proposes a policy τ̂(τ̃ p|S, τ̃ c) ∈ R and the
checker decides on the action d(τ̃ c, τ̂ |S) ∈ {a, b} where a is the acceptance while b is
the blockage of proposal τ̂(·). In state V =0 where CBs are not present, the checker's
decision has no eect on the nal policy, i.e. τ(τ̂ , d|V =0, S) = τ̂ . In state V =1
where CBs are present in the government, the status quo S will be triggered if the
checker chooses to block the proposal whereas the proposal will be implemented if he
chooses to accept it.
3.3.4 Timeline of Events
The layout of events are as follows. In state V = 0 (1):
1. Voter selects the winning party for the Executive E0 (E1) and the Legislature
L0 (L1).
2. For each government branch, the winning party randomly selects a represen-
tative as the branch leader. The bliss points of the two ocials are publicly
announced.
3. The proposer proposes a policy τ̂ .
33This might seem odd as we usually know the identity of the running candidates prior to elections.
However, the idea here is to capture uncertainty of the elected ocial's preferences, which might be
dierent from the platforms that they choose to run on. An alternative interpretation is that this
captures uncertainty of implemented policies.
106
4. Upon observing τ̂ , the checker chooses to accept or block the proposal.
5. In V = 0, τ̂ is always implemented. In V = 1, τ̂ is implemented i the checker
accepts it. Status quo S is triggered otherwise.
6. All utilities are realized.
3.3.5 Equilibrium
Given the state of the world V = 0, 1 and the status quo S, an equilibrium of the
game is a vector of votes {E∗V, L∗V}, proposed policies {τ̂ ∗V(τ̃ p|S, τ̃ c)}, and veto decisions
{d∗V(τ̃ c, τ̂ |S)} such that in state V :
1. The government {E∗V, L∗V}maximizes the representative voter's expected utility:





c, τ̂ ∗V)|V, S), τ̃)dFe(τ̃ p)dGl(τ̃ c) (9)
where Fe represents the bliss point distribution of a proposer from party e and
Gl represents the bliss point distribution of a checker from party l.
2. The proposal τ̂ ∗V(τ̃
p|S, τ̃ c) maximizes the proposer's utility:
τ̂ ∗V(τ̃





c, τ̂V|S)), τ̃ p) (10)
3. Given the proposal τ̂ , d∗V(τ̃
c, τ̂ |S) maximizes the checker's utility:
d∗V(τ̃
c, τ̂ |S) = argmax
dV∈{a,b}
U c(τ(τ̂ , dV|S), τ̃ c) (11)
In Section 3.4, I analyze a simple version of the general model where the only varia-
tion is on the checker's bliss point. I further separate the model into two cases: One
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with complete information where the voter knows the exact position of both repre-
sentatives' bliss points prior to voting and the other where he is uncertain about the
checker's preferences. In Section 3.5, I analyze a similar model to the one in Section
3.4 but now the only variation is on the proposer's bliss point.
3.4 One-sided Variation on Checker's Ideology
I rst start with analyzing the eects of a single channel of ideological variation on
the Legislative branch. Formally, I assume that γ = 0 on the Executive branch so
that the distribution of the proposer's ideology collapses down to a single element,
which is the party mean. This implies that if the voter casts his vote for party D
for the Executive position, the representative's (proposer's) bliss point is known to
be −α with probability 1. Similarly, if party R is to win the Executive election, the
representative's ideal policy is known to be α with certainty. To simplify the analysis,
I further assume that the checker's bliss point can vary on the largest distributional
support, i.e. γ = α. This implies that a Democratic checker has ideal policy drawn
from U [−2α, 0] while a Republican checker's ideal policy is drawn from U [0, 2α].
3.4.1 No Checks and Balances (V =0)
Without CBs, the Executive holds absolute power in policy-making. Since he faces no
resistance or threat from the Legislature, he will exercise his authority in equilibrium
by proposing (and implementing) his bliss point, i.e. τ̂ ∗0 (τ̃
p) = τ̃ p. The checker's
action does not inuence policies, so any decision that he makes can be part of an
equilibrium for the game.
The voter's decision problem then boils down to just choosing the party for the
Executive branch to maximize his utility. In equilibrium, he casts his vote for the
proposer from the party which his bliss point τ̃ is closer to. Recall that since the
proposer's ideology is xed at the party mean (no variation), a Democratic proposer's
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bliss point is −α whereas a Republican proposer's bliss point is α. This implies that
he votes for party D for the Executive position whenever τ̃ ≤ 0 and votes for party
R whenever τ̃ > 0. Proposition 1 characterizes all possible equilibria.
Proposition 1. Without checks and balances (V =0), the equilibrium when the voter
is uncertain about the Legislature's ideology is given by:
{E∗0 , L∗0, τ̂ ∗0 (τ̃ p), d∗0(τ̃ c, τ̂)} =
 {D,L0, τ̃
p, d0} if τ̃ ≤ 0
{R,L0, τ̃ p, d0} if τ̃ > 0
for any L0 ∈ {D,R} and d0 ∈ {a, b}.
Proof. In text.
The representative voter's pre-election expected welfare in equilibrium is given by:
EVV=0(τ
∗, τ̃) =
 −(α + τ̃)
2 if τ̃ ≤ 0
−(α− τ̃)2 if τ̃ > 0
(12)
3.4.2 Checks and Balances (V = 1)
When CBs are present, the Legislature's problem becomes non-trivial. Specically,
the outcome depends on whether the checker chooses to exercise his veto rights. Due
to the symmetry of the model, I can without loss of generality focus on status quo
policies that are on the left of the spectrum, i.e. S ≤ 0. All results presented in this
chapter holds for S > 0 when the parameters are ipped around 0. I rst provide a
general characterization of equilibrium policies that may arise when there is one-sided
variation in the checker's preferred policy and then discuss each case in greater detail.
The checker's problem trivial. He simply accepts the proposal τ̂ if it generates a
higher utility to him compared to the status quo S. Given his utility function, this
happens if and only if τ̂ lies closer to his bliss point τ̃ c compared to S. Formally, his
109
equilibrium strategy is given as follows:
d∗1(τ̃
c, τ̂ |S) =
 a if |τ̂ − τ̃
c| ≤ |S − τ̃ c|
b if |τ̂ − τ̃ c| > |S − τ̃ c|
(13)
Since the proposer is fully aware of the checker's preferences when he decides
on a proposal, he chooses a policy that is weakly preferred by the checker over the
status quo S in equilibrium.34 As a result, 3 types of policies can be generated in the
policy-making game. They are (and cases where they occur follows after):
1. Proposer's bliss point τ̃ p: Arises when the checker's bliss point is closer
to the proposer's bliss point than to S, i.e τ̃ c ≤ τ̃ p ≤ S or S ≤ τ̃ p ≤ τ̃ c or
(τ̃ p ≤ τ̃ c ≤ S and |τ̃ p− τ̃ c| ≤ |S− τ̃ c|) or (S ≤ τ̃ c ≤ τ̃ p and |τ̃ p− τ̃ c| ≤ |S− τ̃ c|).
2. Compromise policy 2τ̃ c−S: Arises when the checker's bliss point is between
S and the proposer's bliss point, and the checker's bliss point is closer to S than
to the proposer's bliss point, i.e. (τ̃ p ≤ τ̃ c ≤ S and |τ̃ p − τ̃ c| > |S − τ̃ c|) or
(S ≤ τ̃ c ≤ τ̃ p and |τ̃ p − τ̃ c| > |S − τ̃ c|).
3. Status quo S: Arises when S is between the checker's and the proposer's bliss
point, i.e. τ̃ p < S < τ̃ c or τ̃ c < S < τ̃ p.
Figure 3.3 provides a visualization of the cases under which each type of policy arises
in equilibrium.
In case 1 above, the Executive has full reign over the policy choice since he knows
that the checker will prefer his platform over the default policy S. He can then exploit
the political situation and implement his preferred policy. In the rest of the cases,
the relative positions of the status quo and the policy-makers' platforms forces the
Executive to share political power. As a result, a compromise will be reached between
34There are multiple equilibria when the maintenance of the status quo S is Pareto optimal. The
proposer can propose any policy that is not preferred by the checker over S and it will always be
blocked, triggering the status quo S.
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the branches and the resulting policy can either be the status quo S or the alternative
`compromise' policy 2τ̃ c − S. The latter policy occurs whenever S lies very far from
the proposer's ideal policy and the checker can utilize it as a threat point. As a result,
the proposer chooses the policy 2τ̃ c−S which is weakly preferred by the checker over
S, but is much closer to his bliss point than S is. Therefore, he is made strictly better
o by proposing 2τ̃ c − S than simply choosing to maintain S.35Note that the degree
of power-sharing depends on the relative positions of both bliss points and S. If the
checker refuses to accept the proposer's ideal policy (cases 2 and 3 above), the shift
of power towards the checker increases as S tends towards τ̃ c.
Given these proposals, the checker cannot be better o by blocking the implemen-
tation of the bills in any cases. Thus, in equilibrium, the checker will never exercise
his veto rights.36
We are now in line to analyze the voter's optimal strategy. I split the analysis
into two parts. In the next subsection, I study the case where there is complete
information. That is, the exact location of the checker's bliss point is known to the
voter before the election. This corresponds to reshuing the order of events in Section
3.3.4 by swapping items #1 and #2 and the announcement is made on all candidates'
(one per branch per party) ideal policies. In the subsequent section, I analyze the
model with events consistent with the initial timeline listed in Section 3.3.4. Splitting
up the analysis into two allows us to disentangle the eects of uncertainty and its
importance on the impact of CBs on the voter's welfare.
35It is also true that the proposer can choose not to compromise in case 2. However, equilibrium
policy outcomes will still be the same as the checker will simply exercise his veto power and this
triggers the status quo. We can eliminate such concern by introducing a small ε > 0 cost for the
proposer (or both parties) if the checker chooses to block the proposal.
36In the model, both branches are fully aware of each others' bliss points. This mirrors the
open-amendment rule where both parties bargain until a compromise is reached.
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3.4.3 Checks and Balances (V =1) with Complete Information
As mentioned prior to this, the model that I analyze here has a dierent information
structure than the one presented in Section 3.3.4. Specically, the voter knows the
bliss points of the candidates for each government branches prior to making a deci-
sion.37 This implies that he would also know the resulting unique policy that will
arise in equilibrium for every form of government (E1, L1). Recall that there are 3
dierent types of policies that can be implemented as listed in Section 3.4.2 (and in
Figure 3.3). Further recall that under one-sided variation on the checker's ideology, a
party D (R) proposer's bliss point is known to be −α (α) and a party D (R) checker's
bliss point is distributed uniformly on [−2α, 0] ([0, 2α]) with its realization known
since the voter has complete information. Policy outcome largely depends on the
position of the status quo S. For that, I consider 3 distinct regions on S: Centrist S
(−α ≤ S ≤ 0), moderate-left S (−2α ≤ S < −α), and extreme-left S (S < −2α).
Table 3.1 show the dierent policies that will arise in equilibrium for all 3 cases,
respectively.
In Table 3.1a, the status quo is near middle of the political spectrum. We see that
the proposer is able to implement his ideal policy only under a unied government
((D,D) and (R,R)). The reason is straightforward. In a divided government setting
((D,R) or (R,D)), the status quo S lies between the proposer's and the checker's bliss
point in most cases. The proposer can never propose his preferred policy as S serves
as a threat point that the checker can use against the proposer by exercising his veto
rights. Therefore, the proposer is pinned down to S and this eectively causes political
power to be shifted from the proposer to the checker. When S is not between the bliss
points, the proposer can always choose the policy 2τ̃ c − S that is weakly preferred
by the checker to S and yet strictly benets himself. Under the government (D,D),
37Recall that each party is only allowed to eld 1 candidate for each branch, so there can be at
most 2 candidates running for the same seat.
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the proposer holds full executive power whenever the checker lies suciently close to
the proposer in terms of ideology. This happens when −2α ≤ τ̃ c ≤ S−α
2
. Similarly,
the proposer holds full executive power under the government (R,R) whenever the
checker is suciently right-wing (α+S
2
≤ τ̃ c ≤ 2α).
When S is moderate and not too far left from the Democratic proposer's bliss point,
i.e. −2α ≤ S < −α (Table 3.1b), we see that the proposer can hold full executive
power in all forms of government. A Republican checker always prefers the proposer's
bliss point policy over S regardless of which party the proposer originates from. In
contrast to the previous case (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), the status quo S now loses its eectiveness
as a threat point as it is more left-wing than a Democratic proposer. Therefore, there
will be no power sharing in the case where the voter selects a Republican checker.
As S moves further to the left on the spectrum and becomes extreme, i.e. case
in Table 3.1c (S < −2α), power sharing eectively disappears and CBs become
irrelevant. A checker from party D will even choose to accept a right-wing policy if S
is too extreme (S < −5α).
Voter's Optimal Strategy and Welfare Comparison between States
To simplify the analysis and exposition, I assume that τ̃ cD = −τ̃ cR so that a Demo-
cratic checker's bliss point is always symmetric to a Republican checker's bliss point
around 0. The voter's problem is to select a form of government (E1, L1) to maximize
his utility. Given that there is no uncertainty in the candidates' bliss points, this
amounts to selecting the optimal policy. Since there is a 1-1 mapping from govern-
ment to policy type as shown in Table 3.1, the voter prefers the government (e, l)
over (e′, l′) if his bliss point τ̃ lies closer to the policy that arises under (e, l) than the
policy that arises under (e′, l′). Formally, let τ(e, l) and τ(e′, l′) denote the unique
policy under governments (e, l) and (e′, l′) respectively. The voter then prefers (e, l)
if τ̃ lies on the same side of the spectrum as τ(e, l) where the policy space is divided





The voter's equilibrium strategy is characterized as follows: Let (τ1, ..., τk) be the
sorted (from left to right) vector of distinct policies that arise under all forms of




R = −τ̃ cD, and where
2 ≤ k ≤ 4 (k = 2 when proposer holds full power regardless of the structure of
government and k=4 when policies are all dierent for every form of government).
Dene the k+ 1 vector of midpoints as (m0,m1, ...,mk−1,mk) where m0 = −∞, mj =
τj+τj+1
2
for j = 1, ...k − 1, and mk = ∞. The proposer then selects the government
which gives rise to τj if and only if his bliss point mj−1 < τ̃ < mj where j = 1, ...k.
As an example, consider the case where S ∈ [−α, 0] (see Table 3.1a), τ̃ cD ∈
[−2α, S−α
2
] and τ̃ cR = −τ̃ cD ∈ [α−S2 , 2α]. There are k = 3 distinct policies that can arise:
τ1 = −α from (D,D), τ2 = S from (D,R) or (R,D), and τ3 = α from (R,R). In equilib-




(D,R) or (R,D) i m1 ≤ τ̃ ≤ m2 = S+α2 , and (R,R) i τ̃ > m2.
Proposition 2 compares the representative voter's welfare between the two states
V =0 (no CBs) and V =1 (CBs) when there is complete information.
Proposition 2. Under one-sided variation in checker's ideal policy and complete
information:
1. Checks and balances strictly reduce voter's welfare only if S is centrist (−α ≤
S ≤ 0). In particular, the voter is strictly hurt by CBs under the government
(D,D) when the voter is far-left (τ̃ < τ(D,D)−α
2
, where τ(D,D) is the equilibrium
policy under (D,D)) and when the checker is moderate (τ̃ cD ∈ [S−α2 , 0] and τ̃
c
R =
−τ̃ cD ∈ [0, α−S2 ]). The voter is strictly hurt by CBs under the government (R,R)
when the voter is far-right (τ̃ > τ(R,R)+α
2
, where τ(R,R) is the equilibrium
policy under (R,R)) and the checker is a centrist (τ̃ cD ∈ [max{−α+S2 , S}, 0] and
τ̃ cR = −τ̃ cD). For all other cases, CBs weakly increase voter's welfare when S is
centrist.
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2. Checks and balances weakly increases voter's welfare if S is suciently ex-
treme (S < −α).
The results are symmetric for S > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The general idea that drives the result above is that equilibrium policies may dier
depending on the location of S when blocking rights are assigned to the checker. In
the rst case where S is near middle, centrist voters (voters with ideology close to 0)
benets from the maintenance of S. On the other hand, far-left voters will suer as
the presence of a checker with veto power eectively drives the policy closer towards
the center. In other words, a Democratic proposer who initially has full executive
power under the state where there is no CBs (V =0) is now forced to share power
and reach a compromise with the checker who is more moderate than himself. This
results in the decrease in welfare of a far-left voter. Similarly, a far-right voter will
also be hurt by the system of CBs if the Republican checker is a centrist due to the
same compromise eect that works against him.
When S is more extreme than a Democratic proposer, maintenance of the status
quo now works in favor of the far-left voters who were hurt under a more moderate S.
This group of voters would benet from the assignment of veto power to the checker
whose ideal policy is closer to theirs as this allows the selection of a government that
gives rise to extreme policies. On the broader picture, all voters will never be hurt by
CBs because there always exist a choice for them to select a government under CBs
that perfectly mimics the system without CBs. Referring back to Table 3.1b, the
divided government (D,R) under CBs is identical to that of a Democratic proposer
under no CBs. Similarly, the unied government (R,R) under CBs mimics the case
of a Republican proposer without CBs. Note that this is solely due to the location of
the status quo policy which now loses its eectiveness as a threat point. As a result,
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the checker is unable to control the proposer and the Executive has free reign over
policy outcomes.
3.4.4 Checks and Balances (V =1) with One-sided Uncertainty on Checker's
Bliss Point
I now relax the assumption that the identity of the candidates are known before
the election. The dierence between this model and the one in Section 3.4.3 is the
reversion of the sequence of events (and hence, the information structure) to that
listed in Section 3.3.4. Given that there is no variation in the proposer's bliss point,
the voter is able to perfectly pinpoint his ideal policy (−α for a Democratic pro-
poser and α for a Republican proposer). Also, recall that a Democratic (Republican)
checker's ideal policy is distributed uniformly on [−2α, 0] ([0, 2α]). In this section, I
compare the expected welfare of a voter under the government without CBs (V =0)
and under the system with CBs (V = 1) when the representative voter is uncertain
about the checker's bliss point prior to electing a government. At the end of the
section, I disentangle the eects of assigning veto rights to a decision-maker and the
eect of uncertainty on the voter's expected welfare by comparing the implications
of CBs across the two models with dierent information structure. This enables us
to understand the importance of ideological uncertainty on the eectiveness of CBs.
Policies that will be implemented in equilibrium (once uncertainty is resolved), is
identical to that given in Table 3.1. Therefore, it is one again convenient to split the
values of S into 2 broad categories: Centrist status quo (−α ≤ S ≤ 0) and left-wing
status quo (S < −α).
Centrist status quo (−α ≤ S ≤ 0)
A rational voter computes his expected welfare under each case and chooses the
optimal form of government (E∗1 , L
∗
1) consistent with (9). Dene τ̄
e′,l′
e,l as the ide-
ology of a voter who is indierent between forms of government (e, l) and (e′, l′),
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for (e, l), (e′, l′) ∈ {(D,D), (D,R), (R,D), (R,R)} and (e, l) 6= (e′, l′).38 The voter's
equilibrium strategy can then be characterized by 3 cutos: τ̄D,RD,D , τ̄
R,D








(D,D) if τ̃ ≤ τ̄D,RD,D
(D,R) if τ̄D,RD,D , < τ̃ ≤ τ̄
R,D
D,R
(R,D) if τ̄R,DD,R , < τ̃ ≤ τ̄
R,R
R,D
(R,R) if τ̃ > τ̄R,RR,D
(14)
The closed form of each cut points is given in the Appendix. Proposition 3 char-
acterizes the equilibrium of the game for a centrist S. All results are ipped (including
the diagram in Figure 3.4) for S > 0.
Proposition 3. When there is uncertainty on the checker's bliss point and when
the status quo is near the center (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), the vector of optimal proposal
τ̂ ∗1 (τ̃
c|S, τ̃ p) given in Table 3.1a, the checker's veto decision d∗1(τ̃ c, τ̂ |S) given in (13)
and the voter's choice (E∗1 , L
∗
1) given in (14) constitute an equilibrium of the game.
Results are symmetric for 0 ≤ S ≤ −α.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 3.4 shows the dierent forms of government that are chosen by the voter.
The next result compares the expected voter welfare across both systemswith and
without CBs when S is near the middle.
Proposition 4. When there is uncertainty on the checker's bliss point and when the
status quo is centrist (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), checks and balances strictly hurts the voter on
average if he is an extremist (τ̃ < τ̄DnoCBsD,D or τ̃ > τ̄
Rno CBs
R,R ) , and strictly benets the
voter on average if he is a moderate (τ̄DnoCBsD,D ≤ τ̃ ≤ τ̄
R,R
R,D). Results are symmetric for
0 ≤ S ≤ −α.








This result and the dierent regions are made clear in Figure 3.4. To see why
CBs strictly hurt the extremists, we need to understand how the system changes
policy outcomes. In the rst double-lined region where the voter is left-wing (τ̃ <
τ̄Dno CBsD,D ), party D wins both the Executive and the Legislative branches. Although
both proposer and checker are from the same political party, a center-left status
quo means that there are possibilities where both sides will be in disagreement with
each other over the policy choice. This eectively creates a shift in power from the
Executive to the Legislature and results in policy moderation.39 The extremists are
hurt because the status quo is now further away from their ideal policy compared to
the proposer's platform −α. This group of voters would prefer full executive power
for party D, as in the case of no CBs, but the position of the status quo means
that this cannot be achieved in any form of government when there are CBs. A
similar reasoning applies to the case where the voter is extreme-right whose ideal
policy is located within the second double-lined region (τ̃ > τ̄Rno CBsR,R ). Under the
unied government (R,R), a checker who is moderately right-wing prefers S over the
proposer's policy α since S is located close to 0. Once again, CBs allocates power
to the checker which forces the proposer to choose a more moderate policy in order
to reach mutual agreement on policy outcomes. Since these situations occur with
positive probability, the extremist voters are hurt in expectation by the resulting
policy moderation.
The voters who benet from the system of CBs are those with bliss points close
to the middle of the spectrum (τ̄Dno CBsD,D ≤ τ̃ ≤ τ̄
Rno CBs
R,R ). This group of voters is
represented by the solid-lined region in Figure 3.4. All forms of governmentDD, DR,
RD and RR result in the policies that lie closer towards the middle of the spectrum
39Recall that a Democratic checker's bliss point is uniformly distribution on [−2α, 0] so S will lie
in the middle of the proposer's and the checker's preferred policy if S < τ̃ c ≤ 0.
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for certain range of the checker's platform (see Table 3.1a for such policies). Therefore
on expectation, policy moderation due to CBs works in favor of centrist voters.
Left-wing status quo (S < −α)
When the status quo is more left-wing than a Democratic proposer (S < −α), the
eect of policy moderation diminishes. The left-wing voters who were hurt by the
system of CBs under a centrist status quo (−α ≤ S ≤ 0) will now benet from the
implementation of a more extreme status quo policy.
Proposition 5. When there is uncertainty on the checker's bliss point and when the
status quo is suciently left wing (S < −α), checks and balances is weakly benecial
to all voters on average.
Proof. In text.
The intuition is straightforward. When the status quo is extreme, a change is
highly desirable. Thus, having a checker in most cases does not alter the distribution
of political power. The proposer who holds absolute power in these situations will
implement his bliss point without fear of being blocked by the checker.
A key to understanding the welfare implications of checks and balances in this
case lies in the alignment of interests between the proposer and the checker. Consider
the divided government (D,R) where the Executive branch is controlled by party D
and the Legislative branch is controlled by party R. When the status quo is more
extreme than that of a Democratic proposer (S < −α), a Republican checker will
always agree on a change in the default policy as long as the bill is to the right of S.40
Hence, the proposer can implement his bliss point −α and it will not be blocked by
the Republican checker. In equilibrium, there will be no conict of interest between
government branches in the divided government (D,R).
40Recall that a checker from party R always has platform to the right of 0.
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This important observation implies that the voter can always provide the Demo-
cratic party full executive power by choosing (D,R), which isn't possible when the
status quo is center left. Moreover, note that he can choose to give the Republican
party full power by selecting (R,R). Coincidentally, these two forms of government
have the same welfare implications as a voter who prefers a Democratic proposer and
a Republican proposer under no CBs (V =0) respectively. Since there is always a
mechanism in which the voter can achieve identical levels of utility across the two
systems, he can never be worse o.
The benets of such a system, then rely on the existence of conict of interest and
hence, the degree of power sharing between both branches of government. If the status
quo is not too extreme, i.e −2α ≤ S < −α, there will be a shift in proposal power
in the unied government (D,D). Very left wing voters (extremists) will benet from
having a checker since this encourages the maintenance of the status quo. However, as
S becomes more extreme, i.e. moves further to the left on the political spectrum, the
degree of power shift decreases as there will be less conict of interest. The Executive
will once again have full political power and the benets of CBs disappear.
Combining the results, we get the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. When there is uncertainty on the Legislature's ideology, CBs strictly
hurt the voters on average only if the status quo lies between the Democratic Execu-
tive's and the Republican Executive's bliss points, i.e. τ̃ pD < S < τ̃
p
R.
Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 4 and 5, and the symmetry of the model.
As noted before, moderate status quo induces an eective shift in power and
extremists voters will suer from increased policy moderation.
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3.4.5 Disentangling the Eects of Uncertainty and Veto Power on Voter
Welfare
With one-sided uncertainty on the checker's ideology, I have shown that the system of
CBs negatively aects voters who are extremists when the status quo S is moderate.
In all other cases, CBs weakly benets the voter. However, it remains unclear whether
these eects are due to assigning veto power to a decision-maker or that it is coming
from the voter's uncertainty about the checker's bliss point. In order to separate these
eects, I compare the expected welfare of a voter in Section 3.4.3 where information is
complete and in Section 3.4.4 where there is uncertainty on the checker's bliss point.
I can then conclude that the dierence in welfare is solely due to the uncertainty
eect. Figure 3.5 summarizes the basic idea and Proposition 6 provides a necessary
condition under which the uncertainty eect lowers the voter's expected welfare for
moderate S and when the degree of ideological extremism of representatives from
both parties are identical, i.e. τ̃ cD = −τ̃ cR. Once again, all results are hold and are
symmetric around 0 when S > 0.
Proposition 6. When the status quo S is moderate (−α ≤ S ≤ 0) and the checkers'
bliss points are symmetric around 0 (τ̃ cD = −τ̃ cR), uncertainty on the checker's bliss
point decreases voter's expected welfare only if the closest checker's bliss point under
complete information is not too far from the voter's most preferred policy τ̃ (refer to
the Appendix for the cuto distance).
Proof. See Appendix.
Under complete information, the voter is essentially selecting the actual policy
when choosing the government. However, when the voter is uncertain about the
position of the checker's bliss point, he assigns probability weights to the set of policies
that could arise under each potential checker when computing his expected utility.
Therefore, the eect of uncertainty on the voter's expected welfare depends on two
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channels: the manner in which the weights are distributed across potential policies
in a given form of government and the distance of each policy from the voter's ideal
point.
Proposition 6 provides a big picture of when uncertainty on the checker's bliss
point negatively aects the voter. This occurs only when the voter is suciently
satised with the policy outcome under complete information and uncertainty forces
the redistribution of the probability weights from this policy to alternative policies
which he dislike. Therefore, when he knows that checker's preferences is very much
aligned with his preferences, i.e τ̃ c close to τ̃ , electing the checker will most likely lead
to a policy closer to the voter's bliss point. Removing this information leaves the voter
in the dark as he is now unsure about the actual policy that will be implemented.
Therefore, when a representative whose bliss point is much further away to τ̃ is elected
as the checker, this might result in a policy that is also further away from τ̃ and the
voter is hurt by this uncertainty.
An example will perhaps help in illustrating this point. Consider the case where
under complete information, the Democratic checker is the most extreme representa-
tive from party D, i.e. τ̃ cD = −2α. Under the unied government (D,D), the proposer
holds full power and implements his ideal policy −α since S lies to the right of −α.
When τ̃ cD is unknown, the probability weights are distributed among all 3 policy types
(see Table 3.1a). Note that both the status quo S and the compromise policy 2τ̃ c−S
are closer to 0 than −α is. For suciently extreme voters with bliss point τ̃ < τ̄Dno CBsD,D
(where −α < τ̄Dno CBsD,D , see Figure 3.4), the redistribution of probability weights re-
duces their expected utility because these policies lie further away from their bliss
point.
In contrast with the eects of veto power, uncertainty on the checker's bliss point
can also decrease the expected welfare of a moderate voter. This occurs whenever a
centrist compromise policy is reached under complete information but under incom-
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plete information, a more extreme policy that lies further from τ̃ (for instance, the
proposer's bliss point whenever he holds full executive power) can arise under the
same form of government. However, from Proposition 4, we see that the benets of
assigning a veto player in the decision-making game outweighs the costs of uncertainty
on the moderate voter's expected welfare, so that they weakly benet from CBs.
The next result ties down the eect of uncertainty when S is more extreme.
Proposition 7. When the status quo S is left-wing (S < −α), the cost of uncertainty
on the checker's bliss point, if any, is less than the benets of the inclusion of veto
power to the checker.
Proof. Comparing the results in Proposition 2 and 5, we see that the voter will never
be hurt even after uncertainty is introduced on the checker's side.
As S moves further to the left (S < −α), the maintenance of status quo is now
preferred by far-left voters. They are hurt when uncertainty is introduce precisely
because of the redistribution of probability weights to more moderate policies when
computing expectations. However, the overall eect points towards the direction of
increased welfare because the allocation of veto rights allow the implementation of a
more extreme policy (S) which would otherwise not be possible if the proposer holds
full power. Uncertainty merely dampens the degree of benets of the system but is
not sucient to drive it in the opposite direction.
3.4.6 Discussion
A necessary condition for CBs to aect the representative voter's welfare is that
conict of interest between the Executive and the Legislative branch must exist. This
result is in line with Krehbiel (1996) where he notes that the distinction between
unied and divided government does not give rise to political gridlocks. Moreover,
the founding fathers of the U.S. did not include the system of CBs as a mean to
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control the Democrats and the Republicans. Rather, its main purpose is to act as a
mechanism which provides government branches means to prevent each other from
taking selsh political actions.
When voters are uncertain about the political stand or decisions that will be
taken by the veto player prior to electing him, they face a non-trivial problem in
trying to balance the stability of policies (uncertainty eect) and the positions of
the policies relative to their preferred point (veto eect). These two eects in turn
depends crucially on the position of the status quo relatively to the proposer's and
the checker's ideal policies. Hence, the dierential voter welfare as a result of CBs
lies in the position of the status quo, not the competition between political parties.
3.5 One-Sided Variation on Proposer's Ideology
Reversing the channel of variation, I now analyze the model where the checker's bliss
point is xed at the party mean but the proposer's bliss point is allowed to vary.
Recall that the bliss point for a proposer from party D (R) is now drawn from the
Uniform distribution U [−2α, 0] (U [0, 2α]) whereas the bliss point for a checker from
party D (R) is known to be located at the party mean −α (α).
3.5.1 No Checks and Balances (V =0) with Asymmetric Information on
Proposer's Ideology
Without CBs, the problem for the voter is to select the optimal party that holds
proposal power. Before this, when the sole variation in ideology is on the checker's
side, uncertainty plays no role when there is no CBs because the checker's decision is
irrelevant in policy making. However, when the voter is unsure about the proposer's
ideology, his decision is based on the expected policy that arises under each party, not
the actual policy. Hence, the dierence in results in this model from that in Section




, which captures the utility loss due to the uncertainty in
policy outcome. The equilibrium strategy is identical to that given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 8. Without checks and balances (V =0), the equilibrium when the voter
is uncertain about the Executive's platform is given by:
{E∗0 , L∗0, τ̂ ∗0 (τ̃ p), d∗0(τ̃ c, τ̂)} =
 {D,L0, τ̃
p, d0} if τ̃ ≤ 0
{R,L0, τ̃ p, d0} if τ̃ > 0
for any L0 ∈ {D,R} and d0 ∈ {a, b}.
Proof. Identical to proof of Proposition 1.
The representative voter's pre-election expected welfare in equilibrium is given by:
EVV=0(τ
∗, τ̃) =
 −(α + τ̃)
2 − α2
3
if τ̃ ≤ 0
−(α− τ̃)2 − α2
3
if τ̃ > 0
(15)
3.5.2 Checks and Balances (V =1) with Complete Information
Once again, the symmetry of the model buys us no loss of generality in analyzing the
model where the status quo policy is on the left half of the political spectrum, i.e.
S ≤ 0. I rst start with analyzing the model where the realization of the candidates'
bliss points are publicly announced before the election. In this model, the same
3 types of policies listed in Section 3.4.2 may arise in equilibrium. They are: the
proposer's bliss point τ̃ p which can now vary, the status quo S, and the compromise
policy 2τ̃ c − S.
Similarly, the checker will never exercise his veto rights in equilibrium because he
gains nothing by triggering the status quo. We split the values of S into 3 separate
regions. Table 3.2a characterizes the types of policies that arise in equilibrium when
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S is center-left (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), while Tables 3.2b and 3.2c look at the case where S is
moderate-left (−2α ≤ S < −α) and extreme left (S < −2α) respectively.
Comparing the policies across Tables 3.1 and 3.2, both models share a common
feature that CBs loses its eectiveness of controlling the proposer as S becomes more
extreme. Furthermore with the checker's bliss point now xed at the party mean, the
proposer is able to retain its political power much easier since he knows that there
won't be an extreme checker who can block his policies.
One important feature of the equilibrium policies worth mentioning is that cer-
tain forms of government produce identical policies under dierent values of S. For
example, consider the policies that arise under the divided government (R,D) when S
is centrist (Table 3.2a) and when S is moderate left (Table 3.2b). In the former case,
the status quo S is maintained. In the latter case, the proposer and checker reaches
a compromise and implements the policy −2α− S. Although these two policies look
dierent at face value, they are in fact the same (with the exact same location on the
spectrum) when S is chosen appropriately under both cases. To see this, choose any
centrist S from the interval [−α,0]. Next, select an S ′ = −2α− S ∈ [−2α,−α] to be
the moderate left status quo. In the latter case, the policy that arises in equilibrium
is a result of the compromise between the government branches, −2α−S ′. Rewriting
what this policy in terms of S, we get that −2α−S ′ = S, so the implemented policy
under both cases are in fact identical. This happens because the proposer (from party
R) never gets full power in the divided government (R,D) and hence chooses a policy
that is closest to his preferred point. This policy will always be weakly preferred by
the Democratic checker over the threat point S. Therefore, for every value of a centrist
S (in [−α, 0]), there exists a unique moderate-left S' (in [−2α,−α]) where (R,D) gives
rise to the same policy under both status quo. In particular, S' is the policy that
is symmetric to S around the checker's bliss point. Similarly, one could also show
that (D,D) shares this same feature. This observation is important in explaining the
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results when the voter elects the government prior to learning the proposer's ideology,
which we analyze in Section 3.5.3.
The characterization of the voter's equilibrium strategy is identical to that in
Section 3.4.3 and I omit the details here. The next result compares the represen-
tative voter's welfare across the two states V = 0 (no CBs) and V =1 (CBs) when
information is complete.
Proposition 9. Under one-sided variation in proposer's ideal policy and complete
information, checks and balances strictly hurt the representative voter if and only if he
is suciently left-wing (τ̃ <
τ(D,D)+τ̃pD
2
, where τ(D,D) is the equilibrium policy under
government (D,D)), the proposer is suciently extreme (τ̃ pD ∈ [−2α,min{S,−2α −
S}] and the status quo is moderate (S ∈ [−2α, 0]). For all other cases, checks and
balances weakly benets the voter. The result is symmetric for S > 0.
Checks and balances induce power sharing between the government branches when
the status quo is moderate and the proposer's bliss point is far away from the checker's
ideal policy. As a result, the extremist proposer is forced to implement a more moder-
ate policy which hurts a voter who is far-left. For all other cases, there exists at least
a form of government that gives the proposer full power which mimics the system
where CBs are absent. Hence, the voter cannot be worse o.
One notable dierence between the results in Proposition 2 (when the variation
is on the checker's ideology) and 9 is that far-right voters are no longer hurt by CBs
when ideological variation is on the proposer's side. This group of voters would choose
(R,R) in equilibrium in both scenarios and the dierence in voter welfare is due to
xed ideological extremeness of the checker in the latter case. Put it dierently,
a Republican checker is known to be moderate-right (with bliss point at α) when
there is no variation in her preferences and she will always prefer a right-wing policy
implemented by the Republican proposer over the left-wing status quo. This means
that the proposer has relatively free reign over policy outcome in this scenario. This,
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however, is not true when the checker is a centrist (when her ideology can vary).
Under certain cases, the left-wing status quo will be maintained and far-right voters
will suer.
3.5.3 Checks and Balances (V =1) with One-Sided Uncertainty on Pro-
poser's Bliss Point
I now study the case where the voter is uncertain about the proposer's preferred policy
prior to selecting a government. Since there is no variation in the checker's bliss point,
it is known to the voter that a Democratic (Republican) checker's most preferred
policy is −α (α). On the other hand, he only knows that a Democratic (Republican)
proposer's bliss point is distributed uniformly on [−2α, 0] ([0, 2α]). Following the
same structure of Section 3.4.3, I rst present welfare results of this model and then
separate the eects of veto power and uncertainty towards the end.
Policies that arise when uncertainty on the proposer's bliss point is added to the
model do not change and are identical to the cases given in Table 3.2. Once again,
it is convenient to split the range of S into 3 distinct regions: Centrist status quo
(−α ≤ S ≤ 0), moderate-left status quo (−2α ≤ S < −α) and far-left status quo
(S < −2α).
Centrist Status Quo (−α ≤ S ≤ 0)
If the status quo is centrist, we know from previous results that there will be
power sharing between government branches in most cases.41
Taking the equilibrium outcomes as given, a rational voter solves (9) and we obtain
41The exception is the Republican unied government where all political power rests on the Ex-
ecutive branch. This is due to our assumption that the status quo S is left-wing, i.e. S ≤ 0.
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(D,D) if τ̃ ≤ τ̄R,DD,D
(R,D) if τ̄R,DD,D < τ̃ ≤ τ̄
D,R
R,D
(D,R) if τ̄D,RR,D < τ̃ ≤ τ̄
R,R
D,R
(R,R) if τ̃ > τ̄R,RD,R
(16)
Interestingly, left-wing voters will prefer a divided government with a Republican
Executive over a divided government with a Democratic Executive. The reasoning
lies entirely within the policy outcomes in each form of divided government. Referring
to table 3.2a, the status quo will always be maintained in (R,D) independent of the
proposer's platform. The reason its that the Democratic checker will never accept a
right-wing policy given that the default policy S is closer to her bliss point. On the
other hand, the (D,R) government allows cases where the Executive holds full proposal
power. This happens whenever the status quo lies to the left of the proposer's bliss
point, τ̃ pD. Given that this only occurs when the proposer is a centrist, the expected
policy when the Executive holds full power will be closer to the middle than S is.
Therefore, a left-wing voter would rather go with (R,D) as it generates less policy
moderation. The equilibrium of the game is given in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10. When there is uncertainty on the proposer's platform and when the
status quo is near the center of the political spectrum (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), the vector of op-
timal proposal τ̂ ∗1 (τ̃
c|S, τ̃ p) given in Table 3.2a, the checker's veto decision d∗1(τ̃ c, τ̂ |S)
given by (13), and the voter's choice (E∗1 , L
∗
1) given in (16) constitute an equilibrium
of the game. The result is symmetric for S > 0.
Figure 3.6 shows the equilibrium forms of government. The next result gives us
the welfare comparison between both systemswith and without CBs when the status
quo S is near middle.
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Proposition 11. When there is uncertainty on the proposer's preferred policy and
when the status quo is centrist (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), checks and balances is weakly benecial
to all voters on average.
Proof. See Appendix.
To help in the exposition of these results, I isolate the eects of uncertainty on
the proposer's bliss point on extremist voters when CBs are present.
Corollary 2. When the status quo is near center (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), one-sided uncer-
tainty on the proposer's bliss point increases the expected welfare of a far-left voter
(τ̃ < τ̄Dno CBsD,D ) when checks and balances are present.
Proof. Direct comparison of Proposition 9 and 11.
Proposition 11 and Corollary 2 imply that the uncertainty eect eliminates re-
gions where a far-left voter is strictly hurt by CBs under complete information. To
understand why ideological uncertainty on the proposer benets this group of voters,
we need to consider 2 channels. The rst is the utility loss due to uncertainty in pol-
icy outcomes (a term similar to −α2
3
in (15)) which uniformly decreases every voter's
expected welfare. The second channel is the redistribution of probability weights to-
wards policies that can potentially rise under a given form of government. If sucient
weights are transferred to a policy that lies closer to the voter's bliss point, then the
benets of the second channel outweighs the cost of policy uncertainty. For example,
consider the case where the voter is far-left with bliss point τ̃ = −2α and when the
status quo is in [−2α,−α]. Referring back to Proposition 9, he is hurt by the system
of CBs under complete information if the proposer is suciently left-wing (τ̃ p < S).
The happens because the allocation of veto rights to the checker forces the proposer
to maintain the status quo, which by construction, is more moderate than −2α = τ̃ pD.
Once uncertainty on the proposer's ideology is introduced, the voter suers from an
immediate decrease in expected utility due to policy uncertainty when there is no
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CBs. Granting veto rights to the checker helps ameliorate the degree of uncertainty.
Moreover, this voter further gains from the possibility that a more extreme policy (S)
than −α is implemented. Together, these two eects act in a way that net eect of
CBs with uncertainty on proposer's ideology is a weak improvement over all citizens'
expected welfare.
Moderate Left Status Quo (−2α ≤ S < −α)
For status quo that are moderately left, or more precisely, more left-wing than the
Democratic checker (with ideal policy −α), most of the equilibrium outcomes will be
identical to that under a centrist S.
As noted in Section 3.5.2, the compromise policy 2τ̃ c−S and the status quo S are
always symmetric around the checker's platform. For governments (D,D) and (R,D),
although there exists a technical dierence in terms of types of policies that may
arise when S is centrist and when S is moderate left, this dierence has no real eect
on the voter's expected welfare. Put it dierently, for every S in [−α, 0], there is a
unique S ′ in [−2α,−α] such that the policy outcome under the governments (D,D) or
(R,D) is identical under both status quo. Furthermore, the proposer always holds full
power in (R,R) regardless of the position of S. Hence, there exists no real dierences
in expected utility of the voter for all 3 forms of government (D,D), (R,D) and (R,R)
under a centrist S and a moderate-left S.
Proposition 12. When there is uncertainty on the proposer's bliss point and when
the status quo is moderately left (−2α ≤ S < −α), checks and balances are weakly
benecial to all voters on average.
Proof. See Appendix.
Following the reasoning above, any changes in the welfare implications should
all be attributed to situations where (D,R) is the optimal form government under
a centrist S. First note that as S becomes more extreme, the expected utility for
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moderate voters decreases as S now lies further away from their ideal policies. If S
is suciently extreme, the loss in utility is large enough such that moderate voters
switch from choosing (D,R) to (R,D) since the latter implements a more moderate
policy. This switch has two eects: Increased policy stability and increased policy
moderation. Policies are more stable because the only type of policy that arise under
(R,D) is the compromise policy −2α − S. There is policy moderation because this
policy is closer to 0 than S is. Both eects work in favor of a centrist voter hence he
will be better of with CBs.
For the remaining forms of government, I have argued that expected welfare of
the voter is identical to that of a more moderate S. By Proposition 11, the voters
cannot be worse o under CBs.
Extreme Left Status Quo (S < −2α)
Proposition 13. When there is uncertainty on the proposer's bliss point and when
the status quo is extreme left (S < −2α), checks and balances are weakly benecial to
all voters on average.
Proof. In text.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When the status quo is extreme,
a change to the default policy is desirable. In most cases, the Executive holds full
proposal power. The voters who benet from CBs are the moderate voters who would
choose the government (R,D) to achieve a centrist policy, provided that the status
quo is not too far o from the Democratic checker's ideal policy, i.e. S > −2α − τ̃ p.
CBs becomes irrelevant if S is too extreme, i.e. S < −2α− τ̃ p.
3.5.4 Discussion
Corollary 3. When voters are uncertain about the Executive's ideology but has full
information on the Legislature's bliss point, checks and balances are weakly benecial
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to all voters on average, independent of their ideologies.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 11-13 and the symmetry of the model.
There are substantial dierences of the eect of CBs across the two models with
one-sided ideological variation. In particular, I nd that CBs may be detrimental to
the voter on average if there is heterogeneity in the Legislature's policy preferences
whereas it will only benet the voter on average if the ideological variation lies within
the Executive branch, who holds proposal power. By separating out the eects of veto
power and ideological uncertainty on voter's expected welfare, the channel through
which CBs alter voter's welfare can be made clear. In the model where ideological
uncertainty lies solely within the Legislative branch, we see that the uncertainty
eect can exacerbate the negative impact CBs on extremist voters. However, when
ideological uncertainty lies within the Executive branch, CBs benet all voters on
average by increasing policy stability. Put it dierently, uncertainty on the proposer's
ideology plays a huge role in that it enhances the eectiveness of CBs such that every
citizen, regardless of his/her ideology weakly benets from the system.
3.6 Conclusion and Further Research
By including the system of CBs when rst designing the U.S. constitution, Madison
hoped that it could prevent government branches' from committing selsh deeds.
However, little did he know that parties might abuse this shared power. Motivated by
recent events such as the impact of the 2013 government shutdown on the well-being
of government employees, I seek an explanation as to why such a system performed
so poorly in recent years.
Persson et al. (1997) studied a rent seeking model that does not explain why the
system of CBs are bad for the public. This chapter contributes to the literature by
pointing out one such reason: ideological dierences across politicians. By looking at
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a simple model where ideology is represented as elements on the real line, I show that
the inclusion of a decision-maker with veto power can hurt certain groups of voters. In
particular, I nd that it is the extremists who are hurt by this system when the status
quo is suciently moderate. Furthermore, I close the gap between the details in the
model and the real world by introducing one-sided uncertainty on either the checker's
or the proposer's ideology, but not both. Uncertainty operates very dierently across
the two scenarios and have substantially dierent implications on voter's expected
welfare. When the Legislature's ideology is unknown, the detrimental eects of CBs
on the extremists might be exacerbated. However, if the uncertainty lies within the
Executive branch, CBs are desirable for every voter regardless of his ideology as it
increases policy stability.
Although this chapter provides an analysis of the costs and benets of CBs in a
simple framework, its predictions are not consistent with certain real world events. For
example, it fails to explain why Ted Cruz, a Republic Senator for Texas so strongly
opposes the Aordable Care Act which lead to the government shutdown in 2013.
Supposed that the status quo, the government shutdown, is bad for a majority of
the U.S citizens, why did he still remain rm in his pursuit of defunding the ACA?
Therefore, I view this chapter as a rst-step towards understanding these events by
providing a general setup for future studies. More research has to be conducted on
the eects of political polarization (and competition) and the use or misuses of veto
power to generate predictions that are closer to the real world.
It is also interesting to look at the implications of the model when there is two-
sided uncertainty (on each branches' preferences). We have seen that with uncer-
tainty on the proposer's policy preference, CBs will unambiguously benet the voters
whereas it might hurt the voters if the checker's preference is unknown. The net eect




This appendix contains proofs of Lemmas and Propositions in Chapter 3.
3.7.1 One-Sided Uncertainty on Checker's Platform
In this section, I provide proofs for Propositions 2-4 and 6.
Proposition (2). Under one-sided variation in checker's ideal policy and complete
information:
1. Checks and balances strictly reduce voter's welfare only if S is centrist (−α ≤
S ≤ 0). In particular, the voter is strictly hurt by CBs he is far-left (τ̃ <
τ(D,D)−α
2
, where τ(D,D) is the equilibrium policy under (D,D)) and when the
checker is moderate (τ̃ cD ∈ [S−α2 , 0] and τ̃
c
R = −τ̃ cD ∈ [0, α−S2 ]). The voter is
also strictly hurt by CBs when he is far-right (τ̃ > τ(R,R)+α
2
, where τ(R,R)
is the equilibrium policy under (R,R)) and the checker is a centrist (τ̃ cD ∈
[max{−α+S
2
, S}, 0] and τ̃ cR = −τ̃ cD). For all other cases, CBs weakly increase
voter's welfare when S is centrist.
2. Checks and balances weakly increases voter's welfare if S is suciently ex-
treme (S < −α).
The results are symmetric for S > 0.
Proof. I rst show the checks and balances cannot reduce voter welfare when it is
suciently extreme, i.e. S < −α. Consider the sub-case where S lies in [−2α,−α).
From Table 3.1b, the divided government (D,R) gives the Democratic proposer full
power to implement his ideal policy τ̃ pD = −α even when there are CBs. Similarly,
the unied government (R,R) gives rise to the Republican proposer's ideal policy
τ̃ pR = α under CBs. Since these two forms of government provide full power to the
proposer, the voter can always resort to choosing one of them to mimic the policy
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outcome under the absence of CBs. Therefore, the voter cannot be worse o under
CBs. When S < −2α, (D,R) and (R,R) are not the only forms of government which
always provide the proposer with full power to implement his preferred policy, but is
sucient to guarantee that voters will not be hurt under the system of CBs.
Conversely, when S ∈ [−a, 0], there is no form of government that always provide
the proposer free reign to choose his ideal policy (refer to Table 3.1a). Therefore
outcomes under CBs may be distinct from that when there are no CBs. As a result,
voter's welfare might change. Thus, it is sucient to show that there is at least one
case that decreases voter welfare in order to proof the necessary condition. Suppose
that S = −α
2





. We also know that the proposer's bliss point
is located at the party mean, so τ̃ pD = −α and τ̃
p
R = α. Referring to Table 3.1a the
policies that arise under this parameter conguration and CBs are: Status quo S
under (D,D) and (D,R), the compromise policy 2τ̃ cD−S under (R,D), and the Repub-
lican proposer's bliss point α under (R,R). When there are no CBs, the Democratic
proposer implements −α while the Republican proposer implements α. Consider the
voter with bliss point τ̃ = −α. He would be worse o under CBs as S = −α
2
is further
away from his ideal policy. This concludes our proof of the necessary condition.
What remains is to show the cases in #1 under which the voter is strictly hurt
by CBs. I have argued previously that when −α and α can be achieve under certain
forms of government, CBs will never reduce voter welfare. This occurs whenever
τ̃ cD ∈ [−2α, S−α2 ] when S is centrist. Focusing on the case where the checker is
moderate, i.e. τ̃ cD ∈ (S−α2 , 0] and τ̃
c
R = −τ̃ cD, Table 3.3 shows the policy that arise
under each form of government for every parameter conguration. Note that for any
given set of parameter values, there are always 3 policies that arise in equilibrium.
Note that the rst midpoint m1, as dened in Section 3.4.3, is always τ̃
c
D < 0, whereas
the second midpointm2 is given by
τ(R,D)+τ(R,R)
2
, where τ(e, l) denotes the equilibrium
policy that arises under government (e, l).
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When S ∈ [−α,−α
3
) (Table 3.3a) and τ̃ cD ∈ [S−α2 , S], voters with ideal policy
τ̃ < m1 = τ̃
c
D vote for (D,D), τ̃
c
D < τ̃ < m2 =
S+α
2
vote for (D,R) or (R,D), and
nally, τ̃ > S+α
2
vote for (R,R). Comparing expected utilities, we see that voters





are strictly hurt by CBs, voters with bliss
point τ(D,D)−α
2




strictly benet from CBs, and voters with bliss
point τ̃ > τ(R,R)−α
2
are not aected by CBs. Similarly, when τ̃ cD ∈ (S, −α−S2 ], voters
with ideal policy τ̃ < m1 = τ̃
c
D vote for (D,D) or (D,R), τ̃
c
D < τ̃ < m2 =
2τ̃cD−S+α
2
vote for (R,D), and nally, τ̃ >
2τ̃cD−S+α
2













strictly benets from CBs, and voters with bliss point τ̃ >
τ(R,R)−α
2
are not aected by CBs. Finally, when τ̃ cD ∈ (−α−S2 , 0], voters with ideal
policy τ̃ < m1 = τ̃
c
D vote for (D,D) or (D,R), τ̃
c
D < τ̃ < m2 = −S vote for (R,D),





strictly hurt, voters with bliss point τ(D,D)−α
2






benets, and voters with bliss point τ̃ > τ(R,R)−α
2
are strictly hurt by CBs.
Performing the same analysis for S ∈ [−α
3
, 0], we get that voters are strictly
hurt by CBs if their ideal policies are τ̃ < τ(D,D)−α
2
for all τ̃ cD ∈ [S−α2 , 0] or when
τ̃ > τ(R,R)+α
2
for τ̃ cD ∈ [−α−S2 , 0]. Combining these results completes the proof.
Lemma 1. When there is uncertainty on the checker's platform and for −α ≤ S ≤ 0,
the ideology τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l for the voter indierent between forms of government (e,l) and (e',l')
where (e, l) 6= (e′, l′) is given in Table 3.4.42
Proof. The voter's expected utility for each form of government
(e, l) ∈ {(D,D), (D,R), (R,D), (R,R)} as computed based on equilibrium out-
42See footnote 38 for formal denition of the inequality operator.
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comes given in Table 3.1a is:








































EVD,R(τ, τ̃) = −(S − τ̃)2






















































The ideology for the indierent voter τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l is then computed by setting the expected
utility for government (e, l) equal to the expected utility for government (e′, l′), i.e.
EVe,l(τ, τ̂) = EVe′,l′(τ, τ̂)
Tedious but straightforward algebra yields the cutpoints in Table 3.4.










Proof. We rst show that τ̄D,RD,D < τ̄
R,D
D,D . Note that since S ∈ [−α, 0], we can rewrite
the status quo as S = −kα, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 so S is a convex combination of the
upper and lower bound of the support. Rewriting the cutos, we get
τ̄D,RD,D =




−10 + 3k + 12k2 − 9k3
3(7− 10k + 7k2)
α
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Note that the denominators are both positive and moreover, the denominator of
τ̄D,RD,D is smaller than the denominator of τ̄
R,D
D,D since
7− 10k + 7k2 < 7− 10k + 7k = 7− 3k < 7− 2k
Therefore, it is sucient to show that
τ̄D,RD,D =
−10− 7k + 5k2
3(7− 2k)
α <




−10 + 3k + 12k2 − 9k3 = −10− 7k + 5k2 + k(10 + 7k − 9k2)
> −10− 7k + 5k2 + k(1 + 7k)
> −10− 7k + 5k2
So, τ̄D,RD,D < τ̄
R,D










−10 + 3k + 12k2 − 9k3





0 < (2k2 − 10)(k − 1)
and the expressions in both parentheses are negative. Rewriting τ̄R,RD,D =
2+3k−5k3
3(15−2k+9k2)α









2 + 3k − 5k3
3(15− 2k + 9k2)
α = τ̄R,RD,D
0 < k(18− 10k) + 4k3 + 2











2 + 3k − 5k3





17k3 − 33k2 + 57k − 41 < 0
and note that
17k3 − 33k2 + 57k − 41 < 17k − 33k2 + 57k − 41
= (k − 1)(41− 33k) < 0
Finally, rewriting τ̄R,RR,D =
3−3k2+k3
3(2+2k−k2)α and comparing it to τ̄
R,R








3− 3k2 + k3
3(2 + 2k − k2)
α = τ̄R,RR,D
k2(k − 3) < 0
Proposition (3). When there is uncertainty on the checker's bliss point and when
the status quo is near the center (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), the vector of optimal proposal
τ̂ ∗1 (τ̃
c|S, τ̃ p) given in Table 3.1a, the checker's veto decision d∗1(τ̃ c, τ̂ |S) given in (13)
and the voter's choice (E∗1 , L
∗
1) given in (14) constitute an equilibrium of the game.
Results are symmetric for 0 ≤ S ≤ −α.
Proof. The proofs of d∗1(τ̃
c, τ̂ |S) and τ̂ ∗1 (τ̃ c|S, τ̃ p) are trivial and hence omitted. In
what follows, we show the optimal government structure (E∗1 , L
∗
1) chosen by the voter




for all (e, l) 6= (D,D). Using cutos in Lemma 1 and the expected utilities given
in (17), it is easy to show that the voter prefers (D,D) over (D,R) if τ̃ < τ̄D,RD,D , prefers
(D,D) over (R,D) if τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,D , and prefers (D,D) over (R,R) if τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
D,D. Therefore,
(D,D) is the preferred type of government for voters with ideology







where the equality follows by Lemma 2.
Moving on, the voter prefers (D,R) over (D,D) if τ̃ > τ̄D,DD,R , prefers (D,R) over
(R,D) if τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,R , and prefers (D,R) over (R,R) if τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
D,R . Therefore, (D,R) is the
preferred type of government for voters with ideology







where the equality follows by Lemma 2.
The voter prefers (R,D) over (D,D) if τ̃ > τ̄D,DR,D , prefers (R,D) over (D,R) if
τ̃ > τ̄D,RR,D , and prefers (R,D) over (R,R) if τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
R,D . Therefore, (R,D) is the preferred
type of government for voters with ideology
max{τ̄D,DR,D , τ̄
D,R
R,D } = τ̄
D,R
R,D < τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
R,D
where the equality follows by Lemma 2.
Finally, the rest of the voters prefer (R,R), which implies that they have ideology
τ̃ > τ̄R,DR,R .




e′,l′ yields the results.
Proposition (4). When there is uncertainty on the checker's bliss point and when
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the status quo is centrist (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), checks and balances strictly hurts the voter
on average if he is an extremist (τ̃ < τ̄DnoCBsD,D or τ̃ > τ̄
Rno CBs
R,R ) , and strictly benets
the voter on average if he is a moderate (τ̄DnoCBsD,D ≤ τ̃ ≤ τ̄
R,R
R,D). Results are symmetric
for 0 ≤ S ≤ −α.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 1 that under no CBs, the voter chooses a Democratic
executive i τ̃ < 0. Hence to compare welfare between the 2 regimes, we need the signs
of each ideology cuto in 14. Referring to Table 3.4, τ̄D,RD,D < 0 since the numerator is
negative:−10α2+7αS+5S2 < −10α2+7α(0)+5α2 = −5α2 < 0 and the denominator
is positive: 3(7α + 2S) > 3(7α− 2α) > 0.
τ̄R,DD,R < 0 since the numerator is negative: −10α3−3α2S+12αS2+9S3 < −10α3−
15α2S + 9S3 < −10α3 − 6α2S < 0 and the denominator is positive: 3(7α2 + 10αS +
7S2) = 3(7(α + S)2 − 4αS) > 0.
τ̄R,RR,D > 0 since the numerator is positive: 10α
3−3α2S−12αS2−3S3 > −13α2S−
12αS2 − 3S3 > 0 and the denominator is also positive: 3(7α2 − 10αS − S2) > 0.
Next, we compare the voter's expected utility between the state V =0 where
there is no CBs and the state V =1 where there is CBs ∀τ̃ . Starting with far-left
voters who prefers (D,D) in V =1 and (D,·) in V =0, i.e. τ̃ < τ̄D,RD,D , we nd that






















(S − τ̃)2 > −(α+ τ̃)2
or that
τ̃ >
−2α2 + 5αS − 5S2
3(α− 3S)
≡ τ̄DnoCBsD,D





−2− 5k − 5k2
3(1 + 3k)
α <




or that 5k3 + 9k2 + (4 − 2k) > 0 which is always true. Therefore, for voters
are strictly worse o with CBs as τ̃ < τ̄DnoCBsD,D and strictly better o with CBs as
τ̄DnoCBsD,D < τ̃ < τ̄
D,R
D,D .
Similarly, comparing voters who prefer (D,R) in V =1 and (D,·) in V =0, i.e.
τ̄D,RD,D < τ̃ < τ̄
R,D
D,R , we nd that EVD,R(V =1) > EVD,·(V =0) i






Comparing τ̄DnoCBsD,R and τ̄
D,R









−10− 7k + 5k2
3(7− 2k)
α = τ̄D,RD,D
or that 4k2 + k + 1 > 0 which is always true. Therefore, all voters are strictly
better o with CBs if they prefer (D,R) in V =1.
Next, comparing voters who prefer (R,D) in V =1 and (D,·) in V =0, i.e. τ̄D,RR,D <















> −(α + τ̃)2
or that
τ̃ >
−3α3 + 3αS2 + S3
3(2α2 + 2αS + S2)
≡ τ̄DnoCBsR,D
Comparing τ̄DnoCBsR,D and τ̄
D,R






−3 + 3k2 − k3





or that k2 + 2k − 3 < 0 which is always true. Therefore, all voters are strictly
143
better o with CBs if they prefer (D,R) in V =1 and whose ideologies are situated on
the left half of the political spectrum, i.e. τ̃ < 0.
For voters who are moderate-right, that is 0 < τ̃ < τ̄R,RR,D , (R,D) is still the preferred
form of government under CBs. However, this group of voters would've chosen a
Republican executive under the state of the world where CBs do not exist. Therefore,


















3α3 − 3αS2 − S3
3(2α2 − 2αS − S2)
≡ τ̄RnoCBsR,D
Comparing τ̄RnoCBsR,D and τ̄
R,R




R,D , so all voters under
(R,D) are made strictly better o when there are CBs.
Finally, for far-right voters (τ̃ > τ̄R,RR,D) comparing their expected utility un-
der (R,R) when CBs are present and (R,·) when CBs are absent, we nd that






















Comparing τ̄RnoCBsR,R and τ̄
R,R




R,R . So that voters with
ideal point τ̃ ∈ [τ̄R,RR,D , τ̄
RnoCBs
R,R ] strictly benets from CBs while voters with ideal point
τ̃ > τ̄RnoCBsR,R are made strictly worse o under CBs, which completes the proof.
Proposition (6). When the status quo S is moderate (−α ≤ S ≤ 0) and the checkers'
bliss points are symmetric around 0 (τ̃ cD = −τ̃ cR), uncertainty on the checker's bliss
point decreases voter's expected welfare only if the closest checker's bliss point under
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complete information is not too far from the voter's most preferred policy τ̃ (refer to
the Appendix for the cuto distance).
Proof. The idea for the proof is that if the checker is close to the voter, then electing
him is benecial under complete information. Once this information is taken away,
the voter will no longer have a reliable politician to push for policies in his favor.
Here, we need to consider all congurations of policies that can arise when there is
complete information (as shown in Table 3.3) and compare voter's expected utility
between the scenarios where the checker's bliss point is known and when it is unknown
(as given in 17).
First note that when the same policy always arises under the same form of govern-
ment regardless of the information structure, then uncertainty does not alter voter's
expected welfare. This happens under (D,R) where the status quo S is always main-
tained. We rst start with S ∈ [−α,−α
3
]. When the checker's bliss point is known to
be an element in [−2α, S−α
2
], policies that arise are: −α under (D,D), S under (D,R)
and (R,D), and α under (R,R) when there is complete information. Therefore, CBs
under complete information is ineective under (D,D) and (R,R) because the pro-
poser is free to choose his preferred policy. Therefore, comparing expected utilities
across models where the information structure diers is the same as comparing ex-
pected utilities of the voter where there are and there aren't CBs. As shown in proof
of Proposition 4, CBs hurt voters who chose (D,D) when τ̃ < τ̄Dno CBsD,D . This implies
that the same set of voters is hurt when uncertainty is introduced under CBs as the
expected policy is now more moderate. Similarly τ̃ > τ̄Rno CBsR.R voters are hurt when
they are unsure about the Republican checker's ideal policy. When voters choose S as
the policy outcome under complete information (which corresponds to voters having
bliss point between S−α
2




< τ̃ < τ̄D,RD,D voters will vote for (D,D)
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under asymmetric information. Comparing their expected utilities, we see that






















(S − τ̃)2 > −(S − τ̃)2
whenever τ̃ < −10α
2+7αS+5S2
21α+9S
≡ τ̄DD(S). Given that τ̄D,RD,D < τ̄DD(S), these voters
always benet from uncertainty. For τ̄R,DD,R < τ̃ <
α+S
2
voters, they benet from a
known S policy whenever:















> −(S − τ̃)2
or that τ̃ > S
3
. Given that S
3
< τ̄R,DD,R , these voters always benet from uncertainty.
When the checker's bliss point is known to be an element in [S−α
2
, S], policies
that arise under complete information are: 2τ̃ cD −S under (D,D), S under (D,R) and
(R,D), and α under (R,R). The only dierence between this case and the case before
is when (D,D) is selected under complete information. This occurs for voters with
bliss point τ̃ < τ̃ cD. In this case, the voter's expected utility under uncertainty is
higher whenever:






















(S − τ̃)2 > −(2τ̃ cD − S − τ̃)2
Using Mathematica to solve, we get that this occurs whenever:
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1. τ̃ cD ∈ [S−α2 ,
−10α2+7αS+5S2
21α+9S





, τ̃ cD] or
2. τ̃ cD ∈ [−10α
2+7αS+5S2
21α+9S






When the checker's bliss point is known to be an element in [S, −α−S
2
], policies that
arise under complete information are: S under (D,D) and (D,R), 2τ̃D−S under (R,D),
and α under (R,R). Voter benets from uncertainty under (D,D) if






















(S − τ̃)2 > −(S − τ̃)2
which we have already shown to be true for all voters τ̃ < τ̄D,RD,D . Voter does not
benet under (D,R) because S is always the implemented policy even after uncertainty
is added. Voter benets from (R,D) whenever:















> −(2τ̃ cD − S − τ̃)2
Using Mathematica to solve, we get that this occurs whenever:
1. τ̃CD ∈ [S, τ̄
R,D





, τ̄R,RR,D ] or











Finally, when the checker's bliss point is known to be an element in [−α−S
2
, 0], policies
that arise under complete information are: S under (D,D) and (D,R), 2τ̃D −S under
(R,D), and −2τ̃ cD − S under (R,R). The dierence between this case and the one
before is in the (R,R) government, so looking at this case, uncertainty benets the
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voter if:
















> −(2τ̃ cD + S + τ̃)2
Using Mathematica to solve, we get that this occurs whenever:






















Combining these results, we see that uncertainty benets the voter only if he lies
suciently far away from the checker's known ideal policy. In particular, voters who
are suciently left-wing and who vote for (D,D)





}) are strictly hurt when
there is ideological uncertainty on the checker if the checker's ideal policy, under
complete information, is to the left of −10α
2+7αS+5S2
21α+9S
. On the other hand, voters who






, τ̄Rno CBsR,R }) are strictly hurt by uncer-




and recall that τ̃ cR = −τ̃ cD). Voters who are moderate and who vote for (R,D) are
also made strictly worse o when uncertainty is present whenever the checkers are
suciently moderate as seen above.
3.7.2 One Sided Variation on Checker's Platform
In this section, I provide proofs for Proposition 9-12. Some of these require us to solve
for roots of quartic (4th order polynomial) equations. The closed form of these roots
are too complicated and buy us little to no tractability in determining the ideology
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cutos. Instead, I present the methods in estimating these roots using Mathematica.
For a more formal treatment, see King 1996.
Numerical Estimation Methodology of Quartic Equation Roots
The relevant form of quartic equations to solve is of the the form aα4+bα3S+cα2S2+
dαS3 + eS4, where a, b, c, d, e are some real constants. α > 0 is the spread of party
ideology while S < 0 is the status quo. The problem involves solving for the quartic
roots of S. Note that similar to the previous section, S can be written as a contraction
of expansion of the Democratic party mean −α, that is S = −kα for k ≥ 0. Rewriting
the status quo within the quartic equation, we get:
(a− bk + ck2 − dk3 + ek4)α4 = 0
or simply:
a− bk + ck2 − dk3 + ek4 = 0
Hence by rewriting S in the way describe above, the two parameter problem is
reduced to a single dimension problem. Since the values for the coecients a, b, c, d, e
are known, we can use any software to numerically estimate the real roots of the quar-
tic equation. Our choice of software is MATHEMATICA. The numerical estimations
provided are correct up to 4 decimal digits.
Lemma 3. When there is uncertainty on the proposer's platform and for −α < S < 0,
the ideology τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l for the voter indierent between forms of government (e,l) and (e',l')
where (e, l) 6= (e′, l′) is given in Table 3.5.
Proof. The voter's expected utility for each form of government
(e, l) ∈ {(D,D), (D,R), (R,D), (R,R)} as computed based on equilibrium out-
149
comes given in Table 3.2a is
EVD,D(τ, τ̃) = −
∫ −2α−S
−2α




























































EVR,D(τ, τ̃) = −(S − τ̃)2




The ideology for the indierent voter τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l is then computed by setting the expected
utility for government (e, l) equal to the expected utility for government (e′, l′), i.e.
EVe,l(τ, τ̂) = EVe′,l′(τ, τ̂)
Tedious but straightforward algebra yields the cutpoints in Table 3.5.










Proof. We rst show that τ̄R,DD,D < τ̄
D,R
D,D . Note that since S ∈ (−α, 0), we can rewrite
the status quo as S = −kα, where 0 < k < 1 so S is a convex combination of the
upper and lower bound of the support. Rewriting the cutos, we get
τ̄D,RD,D =
−8 + 12k2 − 6k3
3(4− 4k + k2)
α
τ̄R,DD,D =





















−8 + 12k2 − 6k3





0 < (4k2 − 8)(k − 1)
















−8k < 3k2 − 2k3
















2k4 − k3 − 9k2 + 8 > 0
which is always satised since
2k4 − k3 − 9k2 + 8 > 2k4 − 10k2 + 8
= 2(−2 + k)(−1 + k)(1 + k)(2 + k) > 0
where the rst two terms in the parentheses are negative while the last two terms
are positive.
Finally, rewriting τ̄R,RD,R =
8−6k2+2k3
3(4+4k−k2)α and comparing it to τ̄
R,R









8− 6k2 + 2k3
3(4 + 4k − k2)
α = τ̄R,RD,R
k2(k2 + 4k + 4) > 0
and the last inequality holds true.
Proposition (10). When there is uncertainty on the proposer's platform and when
the status quo is near the center of the political spectrum (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), the vec-
tor of optimal proposal τ̂ ∗1 (τ̃
c|S, τ̃ p) given in Table 3.2a, the checker's veto decision
d∗1(τ̃
c, τ̂ |S) given by (13), and the voter's choice (E∗1 , L∗1) given in (16) constitute an
equilibrium of the game. The result is symmetric for S > 0.
Proof. The proofs of d∗1(τ̃
c, τ̂ |S) and τ̂ ∗1 (τ̃ c|S, τ̃ p) are trivial and hence omitted. In
what follows, we show the optimal government structure (E∗1 , L
∗
1) chosen by the voter
in equilibrium. The voters who most prefer (D,D) over the other forms of government
must satisfy:
EVD,D(·) > EVe,l(·)
for all (e, l) 6= (D,D). Using cutos in Table 3.5 and the expected utilities given
in (18), it is easy to show that the voter prefers (D,D) over (D,R) if τ̃ < τ̄D,RD,D , prefers
(D,D) over (R,D) if τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,D , and prefers (D,D) over (R,R) if τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
D,D. Therefore,
(D,D) is the preferred type of government for voters with ideology







where the equality follows by Lemma 4.
Moving on, the voter prefers (D,R) over (D,D) if τ̃ > τ̄D,DD,R , prefers (D,R) over
(R,D) if τ̃ > τ̄R,DD,R , and prefers (D,R) over (R,R) if τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
D,R . Therefore, (D,R) is the
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preferred type of government for voters with ideology
max{τ̄R,DD,R , τ̄
D,D
D,R } = τ̄
R,D
D,R < τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
D,R
where the equality follows by Lemma 4.
The voter prefers (R,D) over (D,D) if τ̃ > τ̄D,DR,D , prefers (R,D) over (D,R) if
τ̃ < τ̄D,RR,D , and prefers (R,D) over (R,R) if τ̃ < τ̄
R,R
R,D . Therefore, (R,D) is the preferred
type of government for voters with ideology







where the equality follows by Lemma 4.
Finally, the rest of the voters prefer (R,R), which implies that they have ideology
τ̃ > τ̄D,RR,R .




e′,l′ yields the results.
Proposition (11). When there is uncertainty on the proposer's preferred policy and
when the status quo is centrist (−α ≤ S ≤ 0), checks and balances is weakly benecial
to all voters on average.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 8 that under no CBs, the voter chooses a Democratic
executive i τ̃ < 0. Hence to compare welfare between the 2 regimes, we need the




S ∈ (−α, 0). By Lemma 4, τ̄R,DD,D < 0 as well. τ̄
R,R
D,R > 0 since the numerator is
positive: 8α3 − 2αS2 − 2S3 > 2α3 − 2S3 > 0 and the denominator is also positive:
3(4α2 − 4αS − S2) > 0.
Next, we compare the voter's expected utility between the state V =0 where there
is no CBs and the state V =1 where there is CBs ∀τ̃ . Starting with far-left wing
153
voters who prefers (D,D) in V =1 and (D,·) in V =0, i.e. τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,D , we nd that








































is positive and therefore a
concave up function with minimum occurring at τ̃ = −α. Hence, if we can show that
at the minimum the function value is positive, then we can conclude that the function































Hence, EVD,D(V =1) > EVD,·(V =0) ∀τ̃ .
Similarly, comparing voters who prefer (R,D) in V =1 and (D,·) in V =0, i.e.
τ̄R,DD,D < τ̃ < τ̄
D,R
R,D , we nd that EVR,D(V =1) > EVD,·(V =0) i








Comparing τ̄DnoCBsR,D and τ̄
R,D













or that k2(2k − 5) < 0 which is always true. Therefore, all voters are strictly
better o with CBs if they prefer (R,D) in V =1.
Next, comparing voters who prefer (D,R) in V =1 and (D,·) in V =0, i.e. τ̄D,RR,D <























(S − α) ≡ τ̄DnoCBsD,R
Comparing τ̄DnoCBsD,R and τ̄
D,R












Therefore, all voters are strictly better o with CBs if they prefer (D,R) in V =1
and whose ideologies are situated on the left half of the political spectrum, i.e. τ̃ < 0.
For voters who are moderate-right, that is 0 < τ̃ < τ̄R,RD,R , (R,D) is still the preferred
form of government under CBs. However, this group of voters would've chosen a
Republican executive under the state of the world where CBs do not exist. Therefore,





















8α3 − 6αS2 − 2S3
3(4α2 − 4αS − S2)
≡ τ̄RnoCBsD,R = τ̄
R,R
D,R
So these voters are always strictly better o under CBs. Finally, the expected
utility for far-right voters (τ̃ > τ̄R,RD,R) is the same across both states V =0, 1 since the
executive always holds full power regardless of whether the checker holds veto power.
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Therefore CBs have no eect on voter's welfare in this region. This completes the
proof.
Lemma 5. When there is uncertainty on the proposer's platform and for −2α ≤ S <
−α, the ideology τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l for the voter indierent between forms of government (e,l) and
(e',l') where (e, l) 6= (e′, l′) is given in Table 3.6.
Proof. The voter's expected utility for each form of government
(e, l) ∈ {(D,D), (D,R), (R,D), (R,R)} as computed based on equilibrium out-
comes given in Table 3.2b is
EVD,D(τ, τ̃) = −
∫ 0
−2α−S





























































EVR,D(τ, τ̃) = −(2α + S + τ̃)2
EVR,R(τ, τ̃) = −(α− τ̃)2 −
α2
3
The ideology for the indierent voter τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l is then computed by setting the expected
utility for government (e, l) equal to the expected utility for government (e′, l′), i.e.
EVe,l(τ, τ̂) = EVe′,l′(τ, τ̂)
Tedious but straightforward algebra yields the cutpoints in Table 3.6.























S ∈ [(−4 + 2
√










R,R when S ∈
[−2α, (−4+2
√
2)α), where −pα is the root for −80α4−32α3S+80α2S2+48αS3+7S4
for 1 < p < 2.
Proof. Using MATHEMATICA to numerically estimate the value of p, I get that
p ≈ −1.1233. First now that when S ∈ [−pα,−α], the rank of the cutpoints are
identical to the ones in Lemma 4. We can once again rewrite S as −kα, where


















−4 + 12k − 9k2 + 2k3
12
α = τ̄R,RD,D
or that 2k3 − 9k2 + 4k + 12 > 0 which is satised for 1 < k < 2.
Next, τ̄R,RD,R < τ̄
R,D
R,R for S ∈ [−2α,−pα] since:
τ̄R,RD,R =
8− 6k2 + 2k3
3(4 + 4k − k2)
α <
−8 + 12k − 3k2
6(3− k)
α = τ̄R,DR,R
or that 7k4− 48k3 + 80k2 + 32k− 80 > 0. Using MATHEMATICA to numerically
solve for a root between 1 and 2, we obtain k∗ = p ≈ −1.1233 and it is satised for
p < k < 2.
Next, we show that for S ∈ [−2α, (−4 + 2
√











−2(12− 12k + k3)
3(8− 8k + k2)
α <




The denominator of τ̄R,DD,R is positive only when 1 < k < 4− 2
√
2. Under this case,
the inequality cannot hold as it requires 8− 24k + 22k2 − 8k3 + k4 > 0 which cannot
hold for all 1 < k < 2. Therefore, it must be that 4 − 2
√





−4 + 12k − 9k2 + 2k3
12
α <
8− 6k2 + 2k3
3(4 + 4k − k2)
α = τ̄R,RD,R
or when 7k4 − 48k3 + 80k2 + 32k − 80 > 0, which we know is satised for p < k < 2.
This completes the proof for the rst case.




−8 + 12k − 3k2
6(3− k)
α <
−2(12− 12k + k3)
3(8− 8k + k2)
α = τ̄R,DD,R
The denominator of τ̄R,DD,R is positive only when 1 < k < 4 − 2
√
2. In this range,
the inequality is satised whenever 7k4−48k3 +80k2 +32k−80 > 0 which we know is
satised for p < k < 2. Therefore, τ̄R,DR,R < τ̄
R,D
D,R if p < k < 4− 2
√
2. Which completes
the proof of the rest of the cases.
Proposition (12). When there is uncertainty on the proposer's bliss point and when
the status quo is moderately left (−2α ≤ S < −α), checks and balances are weakly
benecial to all voters on average.
Proof. In Section 3.5.2, I showed that the governments (D,D) and (R,D) generate
the same expected utility to the voter under a centrist S (−α ≤ S ≤ 0) and a
moderate-left S' (−2α ≤ S ′ < −α) for appropriately chosen S and S ′. In particular,
if S ′ = 2τ̃ c − S then the claim holds. Therefore, voters who chose (D,D), (R,D) and
(R,R) as their optimal government under the centrist S will fare no worse under the
moderate-left S ′. This corresponds to τ̃ < τ̄D,RD,D and τ̃ > τ̄
R,D
D,R under a centrist S
(−α ≤ S ≤ 0). Hence we only need to show that voters who chose (D,R) under a
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centrist S (τ̄D,RD,D < τ̃ < τ̄
R,D
D,R ) are not made worse o under CBs. From Table 3.4, we






. Hence, it suces
to show that voters with bliss point τ̃ < 0 (since S
3
< 0) weakly benets from CBs.
When S ∈ [−2α,−pα), where p ≈ −1.1233 as shown in Lemma 6. It is easy to
show that voters choose (D,D) when τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,D and voters with τ̄
R,D
D,D < τ̃ < 0 choose
(R,D) as their optimal form of government (identical to the proof of Proposition 3).
For the voters who chose (D,D), they benet from CBs whenever





















(S − τ̃)2 > −(α + τ̃)− α
2
3
or that α(2α + S)2(α + 2S) < 0, which is always satised. Hence extreme voters
(τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,D) strictly benet from CBs.
For voters who chose (R,D), they benet from CBs whenever
EV1(R,D) > EV0(D, ·)





−8α2 − 12αS − 3S2
6(α + S)
= τ̄Dno CBsR,D




−8 + 12k − 3k2
6(1− k)
α <
−2− 2k + k2
3
α = τ̄R,DD,D
or that (−2 + k)2(−1 + k)(−1 + 2k) > 0, which is always true. So voters who
selected (R,D) strictly benet from CBs.
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For S ∈ [−pα,−α], voters who choose (D,D) are τ̃ < τ̄R,DD,D , (R,D) are τ̄
R,D
D,D < τ̃ <
τ̄R,DD,R and (D,R) are τ̄
R,D
D,R < τ̃ < 0. We have shown that voters under (D,D) and (R,D)
strictly benet from CBs. What remains is to show that voters under (D,R) cannot
be worse o under CBs. They benet from CBs whenever:































−2(12− 12k + k3)
3(8− 8k + k2)
α = τ̄R,DD,R
or that (8− 8k + k2)(4− 12k + 7k2) < 0, which is satised for 1 < k < p. Hence,
voters under (D,R) strictly benets from CBs. This completes the proof.
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Figure 3.1: Presidential Vetoes of Non-Private Bills for 1945-2008
Notes: This gure is an exact copy of Figure 1 in Cameron (2009) The Presidential Veto. All credit
should be given to Charles Cameron.
161
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Party Members' Bliss Points
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium policies
(a) τ̃p < S
(b) τ̃p > S
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Figure 3.4: Expected welfare comparison between V =0 and V =1 under one-sided
uncertainty on checker's bliss point, when S is center-left (−α ≤ S ≤ 0)
Figure 3.5: Methodology on disentangling the eects of uncertainty and veto power
on voter welfare
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Figure 3.6: Expected welfare comparison between V =0 and V =1 under one-sided
uncertainty on proposer's bliss point, when S is center-left (−α ≤ S ≤ 0)
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium policies under one-sided variation on checker's bliss point τ̃ c.
(a) Centrist S: −α ≤ S ≤ 0
Policy
Government (E1, L1) P: τ̃
p CP: 2τ̃ c − S SQ: S




< τ̃ c < S S ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0
D,R - - 0 ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 2α
R,D - S < τ̃ c ≤ 0 −2α ≤ τ̃ c ≤ S
R,R α+S
2
≤ τ̃ c ≤ 2α 0 ≤ τ̃ c < α+S
2
-
(b) Moderate-left S:−2α ≤ S < −α
Policy
Government(E1, L1) P: τ̃
p CP: 2τ̃ c − S SQ: S
D,D S−α
2
≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0 S < τ̃ c < S−α
2
−2α ≤ τ̃ c ≤ S
D,R 0 ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 2α - -
R,D S+α
2
≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0 S < τ̃ c < S−α
2
−2α ≤ τ̃ c ≤ S
R,R 0 ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 2α - -
(c) Extreme left S: S < −2α
Government Policy
(E1, L1) P: τ̃




≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0 if −3α ≤ S < −2α
−2α ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0 if S < −3α
−2α ≤ τ̃ c < S−α
2
if −3α ≤ S < −2α -




≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0 if −5α ≤ S < −2α
−2α ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 0 if S < −5α
−2α ≤ τ̃ c < S+α
2
if −5α ≤ S < −2α -
R,R 0 ≤ τ̃ c ≤ 2α - -
Notes: P=Proposer's Bliss Point, CP=Compromise Policy, SQ=Status Quo
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Table 3.2: Equilibrium policies under one-sided variation on proposer's bliss point τ̃ p.
(a) Centrist S: −α ≤ S ≤ 0
Policy
Government (E1, L1) P: τ̃
p CP: 2τ̃ c − S SQ: S
D,D −2α− S ≤ τ̃ p ≤ S −2α ≤ τ̃ p < −2α− S S < τ̃ p ≤ 0
D,R S ≤ τ̃ p ≤ 0 - −2α ≤ τ̃ p < S
R,D - - 0 ≤ τ̃ p < 2α
R,R 0 ≤ τ̃ p < 2α - -
(b) Moderate-left S: −2α ≤ S < −α
Policy
Government (E1, L1) P: τ̃
p CP: 2τ̃ c − S SQ: S
D,D S ≤ τ̃ p ≤ −2α− S −2α− S < τ̃ p ≤ 0 −2α ≤ τ̃ p ≤ S
D,R S ≤ τ̃ p ≤ 0 - −2α ≤ τ̃ p < S
R,D - 0 ≤ τ̃ p < 2α -
R,R 0 ≤ τ̃ p < 2α - -
(c) Extreme left S: S < −2α
Government Policy
(E1, L1) P: τ̃
p CP: 2τ̃ c − S SQ: S
D,D −2α ≤ τ̃p ≤ 0 - -
D,R −2α ≤ τ̃p ≤ 0 - -
R,D
0 ≤ τ̃p ≤ −2α− S if −4α ≤ S < −2α
0 ≤ τ̃p ≤ 2α if S < −4α
−2α− S ≤ τ̃p ≤ 2α if −4α ≤ S < −2α -
R,R 0 ≤ τ̃p < 2α - -
Notes: P=Proposer's Bliss Point, CP=Compromise Policy, SQ=Status Quo
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Table 3.3: Equilibrium Policies under Complete Information
(a) S ∈ [−α,−α3 )
Equilibrium Policy
τ̃ cD (D,D) (D,R) (R,D) (R,R)
[−2α, S−α
2
) −α S S α
[S−α
2
, S] 2τ̃ cD − S S S α
(S, −α−S
2
] S S 2τ̃ cD − S α
(−α−S
2
, 0] S S 2τ̃ cD − S −2τ̃ cD − S
(b) S ∈ [−α3 , 0]
Equilibrium Policy
τ̃ cD (D,D) (D,R) (R,D) (R,R)
[−2α, S−α
2





] 2τ̃ cD − S S S α
(−α−S
2
, S] 2τ̃ cD − S S S −2τ̃ cD − S
(S, 0] S S 2τ̃ cD − S −2τ̃ cD − S
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Table 3.4: Ideology of indierent voters τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l when S ∈ [−α, 0]
``````````````̀Gov (e, l)
Gov (e′, l′)












R,D * * - 10α
3−3α2s−12αs2−3s3
3(7α2−10αs−5s2)
R,R * * * -
Notes: Table is symmetric.
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Table 3.5: Ideology of indierent voters τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l when S ∈ [−α, 0]
``````````````̀Gov (e, l)
Gov (e′, l′)












R,D * * - 4α
2−3s2
6(α−s)
R,R * * * -
Notes: Table is symmetric.
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Table 3.6: Ideology of indierent voters τ̄ e
′,l′
e,l when S ∈ [−2α,−α]
``````````````̀Gov (e, l)
Gov (e′, l′)












R,D * * - −8α
2−12αs−3s2
6(3α+s)
R,R * * * -
Notes: Table is symmetric.
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